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1 INTRODUCTION 
Due to the recent financial crisis and the widely publicized accounting scandals at 
the beginning of the century (e.g., Enron, Parmalat, WorldCom), there has been a 
growing demand to enhance the transparency of companies’ operations and the 
integrity of financial reporting. Shareholders, creditors, and other company stake-
holders base their decisions on publicly disclosed financial information, and 
hence, the truthfulness and reliability of that information is essential for economic 
functionality. This doctoral dissertation focuses on two corporate governance 
mechanisms for financial reporting quality: internal control over financial report-
ing and external auditing. In response to the aforementioned scandals, a high-
profile change to the legislation was made in 2002 in the USA with the passing 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX), which aims at improving companies’ governance, 
internal controls, and external audit quality.3 Consequently, corporate governance 
codes and audit regulation have been developed worldwide by further defining 
and including new requirements especially for publicly listed companies, audit 
firms, and auditors.4 Thus, internal controls and external auditing have been at the 
center of the discussion among academics, practitioners, and regulators. As a 
whole, the purpose of the four essays that comprise this dissertation is to provide 
new evidence on the role of internal controls and external auditing in the context 
of financial reporting quality. 
The first essay uses data on internal control reports mandated by Section 404 of 
the SOX, which requires the management of listed companies to annually assess 
and report on the effectiveness of internal control over financial reporting, and to 
disclose any material weaknesses. The study examines whether Section 404 mate-
rial weakness (MW404) disclosures are predictive of future financial reporting 
quality, and concentrates on the fiscal years following the last MW404 disclosure, 
i.e., the post-MW404 period. The findings suggest that in the first two years after 
the last MW404 disclosure, internal controls are still not as effective at preventing 
or detecting misstatements in a timely manner as they are in companies without a 
history of MW404s. The findings further imply that the reason for the misstate-
                                                 
 
3 Along with the SOX, Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) was established. 
PCAOB is responsible for regulating the auditing profession and monitoring public account-
ing firms and the compliance with SOX. 
4 For example, the new Statutory Audit Directive of the EU was enacted in 2006, and amended 
again in 2014. The main new issues in the 2006 directive were related to strengthening the 
oversight of auditors and auditor independence. The new requirements in the 2014 directive 
further aim at improving auditor independence, audit oversight and audit report informative-
ness, for example. 
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ment incidences in the post-MW404 period is the unacknowledged pervasiveness 
of control problems. 
The second essay examines the association between MW404s and manipulation 
of real operational activities to manage earnings (e.g., inventory overproduction). 
The empirical findings indicate that real earnings management is greater in com-
panies with existing material weaknesses, and in companies disclosing previous 
year’s material weaknesses. It appears that the poor commitment by management 
to provide effective internal control systems and high quality financial infor-
mation relates to a tendency to use real earnings management methods and also 
impairs management’s real operational decisions. Moreover, the public disclosure 
of material weaknesses might induce management to strive to mitigate the ex-
pected negative reactions of stakeholders to the disclosure by engaging in real 
earnings management. Overall, this study provides further insights into pervasive 
control problems that may exist in companies with material weaknesses by docu-
menting how operational activities fall under the sphere of influence of internal 
control effectiveness. 
The third essay investigates audit quality in the context of tax services provided 
by incumbent audit firms. Although having the same audit firm to provide both 
auditing and non-auditing services could improve audit quality due to possible 
knowledge spillover, the greater economic dependence may jeopardize auditor 
independence leading to lower audit quality. The SOX legislation prohibits most 
non-audit services being provided by incumbent audit firms, but allows tax ser-
vices. The empirical findings of the third essay suggest that there is a greater like-
lihood of low financial reporting quality remaining unacknowledged when tax-
related fees are higher, which supports the economic dependence view. However, 
the findings also imply that the mere act of providing both audit and tax services 
does not in itself have an impact on audit quality, but rather it is the magnitude of 
the tax-related fees that counts. 
The fourth essay focuses on individual auditor specialization in auditing public 
clients. Especially nowadays with increasingly complex client companies and 
greater demand for high quality auditing by regulators and stakeholders, auditors 
need to possess specialized in-depth knowledge of their clients to build expertise 
in a domain and perform high quality audits. Using Finnish data on listed compa-
nies, the fourth essay examines the association between an audit partner’s public-
client specialization and the client company’s abnormal accruals, which is used as 
a proxy for audit/financial reporting quality. The identity of the individual auditor 
in charge is publicly available in Finland because, unlike in the USA or the UK 
for example, the responsible auditors are required to personally sign the audit re-
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port. The findings suggest that greater public-client specialization is associated 
with higher audit/financial reporting quality. Moreover, it appears that this associ-
ation is attributable to partners with a moderate level of public-client specializa-
tion, while the higher number of public-clients may reflect busyness, mitigating 
the benefits related to the public-client specialization. 
Collectively, the findings of this dissertation contribute to the literature on inter-
nal control and external auditing in the context of financial reporting quality. The 
inferences from the first two essays underline the pervasive nature of internal con-
trol weaknesses and the role of management in developing effective internal con-
trol systems. The last two essays focus on audit quality, and discuss how auditor 
judgments can be disrupted by the economic dependence of the audit firm, but 
benefit from individual auditor specialization. 
The remainder of the introductory chapter is structured as follows. Section 2 
briefly describes the theoretical background of financial reporting quality in order 
to illustrate the role of internal controls and external auditing. Section 3 presents 
the concept and relevant prior research on internal control over financial report-
ing, and introduces the research questions in the first two essays. Section 4 de-
scribes the perspective on audit quality used in this dissertation, and discusses the 
relevant background of the provision of non-audit services by incumbent audit 
firms, and of auditor specialization. Section 5 summarizes the four essays. 
4      Acta Wasaensia 
 
2  FINANCIAL REPORTING 
2.1 Demand for financial reporting 
The role of financial reporting is most commonly explained by agency theory. In 
an agency relationship, a principal engages an agent to work on the principal’s 
behalf through a contract. The fundamental problem in the principal-agent rela-
tionship stems from self-interest, where both parties attempt to maximize their 
own utility, but their interests are not necessarily aligned. Information asymmetry 
between the two parties creates an opportunity for the agent to gain private bene-
fits. Therefore, the principal faces the risk that the agent will try to maximize 
his/her private benefits at the expense of the principal. The agent’s behavior is 
unobservable to the principal, who faces the risk that the agent is not doing what 
he/she is supposed to do (moral hazard), and/or cannot verify the skills and abili-
ties of the agent (adverse selection). (E.g., Jensen and Meckling 1976; Eisenhardt 
1989.) 
The agency relationship between shareholders (principals) and management 
(agents) is considered to predominantly create the demand for financial reporting 
especially in large companies (such as public (listed) companies) where, in prin-
ciple, ownership and control are separated. Financial reporting alleviates agency 
problems by aligning the interests of management with those of the shareholders 
(bonding), and by monitoring. The bonding role can be observed from incentive 
contracts, which are usually based on the financial statement numbers. The moni-
toring role suggests that financial statements are used to monitor managerial ac-
tions (performance and contract terms). In addition to the shareholder-manager 
relationship, financial reporting also reduces information asymmetry between 
blockholders and minority shareholders, or creditors and shareholders, for in-
stance.5 Moreover, publicly disclosed financial statements provide information 
for the decision-making by a number of different stakeholders, including share-
holders and creditors, but also potential shareholders, suppliers, and employees, 
                                                 
 
5 Small and medium-sized companies, which are usually private (i.e., unlisted) companies, are 
mostly run by owner-managers. Thus, the problem of information asymmetry in private com-
panies centers on the relationship of manager-owners and creditors, for instance. Ball and 
Shivakumar (2005), however, argue that private companies are likely to distribute information 
via unofficial channels, and thus, information asymmetry is not as profound as in listed com-
panies. They suggest that the demand and supply of financial reporting in private companies 
can rather be explained by tax, dividend, and compensation payment policies than information 
asymmetry issues. 
 Acta Wasaensia     5 
  
etc. (Fama 1980; Fama and Jensen 1983; Watts and Zimmermann 1983; Bushman 
and Smith 2001.) 
2.2 Financial reporting quality 
In order for financial reporting to serve its bonding and/or monitoring purpose of 
reducing agency problems, the disclosed information needs to be truthful and reli-
able. The conceptual frameworks for financial reporting produced by both the 
Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) and International Accounting 
Standards Board (IASB) state that relevance and faithful representation (com-
plete, neutral and free from error) are the important qualitative characteristics of 
financial information (FASB 2010; IASB 2010). Quality levels however vary 
across companies. Previous literature has extensively investigated the determi-
nants and consequences of financial reporting quality (or earnings quality), using 
various proxies to capture different dimensions of quality (see Dechow et al. 2010 
for a review).6 
Although financial reporting quality can have many slightly different dimensions, 
this dissertation focuses more on the aspect of faithful representation, and not, for 
example, on perceived quality by investors. Bias and erroneous information can 
occur both intentionally and unintentionally. The financial reporting process in-
volves decision-making, and discretion is used in accounting choices (e.g., Watts 
and Zimmerman 1983). Due to its decision-making authority, management has 
both opportunities and incentives (bonuses and reputation building, for example) 
to manipulate accounting numbers to reach earnings targets (e.g., Watts and 
Zimmerman 1983). However, not all the deterioration in financial reporting quali-
ty stems from intentional malpractice, unintentional errors may also contribute. 
Nonetheless, in these cases too, the accountability of management is important 
since it is responsible for establishing a properly functioning accounting system. 
The measures of financial reporting quality used in the essays of this dissertation 
are introduced briefly here. 
                                                 
 
6 Dechow et al. (2010) discuss the different proxies for earnings quality examined in previous 
studies by categorizing them to earnings properties (earnings persistence, abnormal accruals, 
earnings smoothness, asymmetric timeliness and timely loss recognition, and target beating), 
investor responsiveness to earnings (the research on earnings response coefficient as a proxy 
for perceived earnings quality), and external indicators of earnings misstatements (for exam-
ple, restatements and internal control weaknesses). 
6      Acta Wasaensia 
 
o In the USA the generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) requires 
companies to restate previous financial statement(s), if it includes (either in-
tentional or unintentional) material misstatement (e.g., DeFond and Jiambalvo 
1991). Restatements explicitly indicate problems in the accounting system 
(violations of accounting principles), and hence, are used as a proxy for finan-
cial reporting quality (e.g., DeFond and Francis 2005). 
o A vast number of previous studies have focused on the magnitude of abnor-
mal accruals as a proxy for earnings quality. The basic idea is to distinguish 
abnormal accruals from the normal by modeling the expected accruals. The 
magnitude of abnormal accruals is considered to capture the problems in the 
accounting measurement system, and distortions that stem from discretion 
used in accrual choices or earnings management. Previous literature uses sev-
eral different models to estimate abnormal accruals (e.g., Jones 1991; Dechow 
et al. 1995; DeFond and Park 2001; Dechow and Dichev 2002; McNichols 
2002; Kothari et al. 2005; Ball and Shivakumar 2006). 
o Real earnings management is not related to accounting issues per se, but refers 
to the manipulation of real operational activities such as inventory overpro-
duction or reduction of discretionary expenses. These actions are departures 
from normal operating practices conducted to achieve financial targets, but 
which might have a negative effect on long-term company value (Roychow-
dhury 2006). Prior research has stated that real earnings management is exten-
sively employed, because it is not easily detected or constrained by outsiders 
(e.g., Graham et al. 2005; Cohen et al. 2008). The most commonly examined 
real earnings management methods are inventory overproduction (proxied by 
abnormal levels of production costs), reduction of discretionary expenses 
(proxied by abnormal levels of discretionary expenses), and sales manipula-
tion (proxied by abnormal levels of cash flows from operations). 
Because of the risk of misstatements, users of financial statement information 
need assurance of the integrity of the accounting system and financial reporting. 
Internal control over financial reporting aims to prevent and/or detect errors or 
malpractice that could result in a misstatement in a financial statement (PCAOB 
2007). However, if not properly established, maintained and developed, internal 
control may not serve its purpose. Consequently, the existence of internal control 
weaknesses can also be considered an indicator of low financial reporting quality, 
while effective internal control should manifest in high quality financial infor-
mation. Internal control over financial reporting is further elaborated upon in sec-
tion 3. 
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The task of external auditing is to provide reasonable assurance to the users of 
financial information that a client company’s financial statements are fairly stated 
and free of material misstatement (e.g., Watts and Zimmerman 1986; Eilifsen and 
Messier 2000). However, the quality of an audit is not just about meeting legal 
and professional requirements, but it is rather a continuum that ranges between 
low and high quality (e.g., Francis 2004; Francis 2011). Audit quality as it relates 
to the provision of non-audit services by incumbent audit firm and auditor spe-
cialization is discussed in more detail in section 4. 
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3 INTERNAL CONTROL OVER FINANCIAL 
REPORTING 
According to the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Com-
mission’s (COSO) framework from 1992, the three objectives of internal control 
are 1) the effectiveness and efficiency of operations, 2) reliability of financial 
reporting, and 3) compliance with applicable laws and regulations. Naturally, an 
internal control process involves the risk that the objectives are not achieved 
(Kinney 2000). This dissertation concentrates on the risk of not achieving the 
second objective, and examines the effectiveness of internal control over financial 
reporting. 
“Internal control over financial reporting is a process designed… to 
provide reasonable assurance regarding the reliability of financial 
reporting and the preparation of financial statements for external 
purposes” (PCAOB 2007). 
Management is responsible for establishing and maintaining adequate internal 
controls, and ought to adopt an internal control framework to assist with both es-
tablishing internal controls and with evaluating the effectiveness of the control 
system (SOX 2002; SEC 2003a).7 Because the management is accountable for the 
quality of financial information, internal controls can be considered a tool for 
management to alleviate the risk of not achieving the objective of reliable finan-
cial reporting due to errors or malpractice by the personnel, for instance. Howev-
er, management itself has the incentives and opportunities to neglect its responsi-
bility to establish a properly functioning internal control system. In accordance 
with the definition of internal control over financial reporting, ineffective internal 
controls may not be able to prevent or detect misstatements in financial infor-
mation (e.g., DeFond and Jiambalvo 1991; Eilifsen and Messier 2000; PCAOB 
2007; Doyle et al. 2007a; Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2008). 
                                                 
 
7 The most widely known internal control framework is the COSO (1992) framework, which 
comprises five components of internal controls: control environment sets the foundation for 
the entire internal control system, ‘the tone at the top’,  and involves management’s philoso-
phy, human resources, policies and practices, among others; risk assessment involves the 
identification and assessment of the relevant risks in achieving objectives; control activities 
involves policies and practices to ensure that the risks are mitigated or eliminated and objec-
tives are achieved; information and communication relates to the identification and communi-
cation of relevant information throughout the organization; monitoring involves the follow-up 
of the internal controls. COSO-ERM is a refined integrated framework that focuses on enter-
prise risk management. In addition to the components of the traditional COSO framework, the 
COSO-ERM framework includes also three other components to help with risk management: 
objective setting, event identification, risk response. 
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3.1 Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
Section 404 of the SOX focuses on improving companies’ internal controls, and 
requires the management of companies under the authority of the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) to provide annual reports containing an internal 
control report. The internal control report must include a statement about man-
agement’s responsibility for establishing and maintaining adequate internal con-
trol over financial reporting, and the management’s assessment of the effective-
ness of the internal controls. Any material weaknesses must be disclosed. A mate-
rial weakness is defined as a significant deficiency, or combination of significant 
deficiencies, that results in more than a remote likelihood that a material mis-
statement of the interim or annual financial statements will not be prevented or 
detected (PCAOB 2007). Section 404 also requires that the company’s external 
auditor attests to and reports on the assessment made by the management. In order 
to be able to render an opinion on the effectiveness of the client’s internal con-
trols, the auditor must plan and perform a comprehensive evaluation of them 
(PCAOB 2007).8  
Section 404 became effective for the fiscal years ending after November 15, 2004 
for accelerated filers (market capitalization of at least 75 million dollars). The 
SOX also includes Section 302, which became effective for fiscal years ending 
after August 29, 2002, and requires management to assess the effectiveness of 
disclosure controls and procedures on a quarterly basis. The quarterly certification 
should indicate that the management has evaluated the effectiveness of internal 
controls, as well as any significant changes in internal controls. The provisions of 
Section 302 are, however, somewhat less stringent than those of Section 404, as 
Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2007) note “…under the provisions of Section 302, the 
review of internal control is subject to less scrutiny by both management and the 
auditor and the disclosure rules are less specific than subsequently exist under 
Section 404.” 
Although there are some prior studies suggesting that Section 404 has achieved its 
objective of improving the quality of companies’ financial reporting (e.g., Nagy 
2010), it has also attracted considerable criticism, especially due to the high costs 
it has brought to companies and their auditors. Audit fees have risen substantially 
with the adoption of Section 404, since the scope of financial statement audits has 
widened, and auditor responsibility, and litigation risk due to investor expecta-
                                                 
 
8 External auditors follow the standards by the PCAOB in their internal control assessment, while 
management follows the guidance issued by the SEC (Schneider et al. 2009). 
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tions have increased (e.g., Raghunandan and Rama 2006; Krishnan et al. 2008; 
Hoag and Hollingsworth 2011). In 2007, Auditing Standard No. 2 was replaced 
by Auditing Standard No. 5 (AS5), which attempts to increase the efficiency of 
internal control evaluation. In particular, AS5 includes guidance on the “top-down 
risk-based” approach to internal control testing, which means that audit firms 
should focus on areas that include the most risk and they should scale audits 
based on the client company size and complexity (PCAOB 2007). Moreover, 
since 2007 smaller public companies have also started to report on their internal 
control effectiveness, but because of the concerns of high costs compared to bene-
fits, external auditors’ internal control reporting is not required (SEC 2010).9  
3.2 Determinants and consequences of internal control 
weaknesses 
The public internal control disclosures have enabled researchers to use large da-
tasets to examine different aspects of internal control effectiveness. Companies 
disclosing internal control weaknesses are found to be smaller, riskier, more com-
plex, and poorly performing in comparison to companies that have reported effec-
tive internal controls (e.g., Ge and McVay 2005; Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2007; 
Doyle et al. 2007b). That is, weaknesses appear to occur in companies that may 
have difficulties in investing in internal controls due to limited resources, for ex-
ample. Moreover, companies with weak boards, audit committees, and financial 
management are more likely to have internal control weaknesses (Krishnan and 
Visvanathan 2007; Zhang et al. 2007; Hoitash et al. 2009; Li et al. 2010). Strong 
governance has the expertise and the will to invest in internal controls. The previ-
ous research also suggests that companies are more likely to remediate their inter-
nal control deficiencies if they have stronger governance and better financial per-
formance (e.g., Goh 2009; Li et al. 2010; Johnstone et al. 2011). Bedard et al. 
(2012), however, point out that the likelihood of such remediation depends on the 
type of weakness, that is, some weaknesses are remediated more quickly. 
Several studies have examined the consequences of having/disclosing weakness-
es. As the aim of internal controls over financial reporting is to secure the reliabil-
ity of financial information, prior literature has examined the association between 
the effectiveness of internal controls and financial reporting quality (Doyle et al. 
                                                 
 
9 The first essay of this dissertation uses data on companies with auditor internal control reports, 
and the second and the third essay uses data that comprises both auditors’ internal control re-
ports and management-only internal control reports. 
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2007a; Chan et al. 2008; Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2008; Bedard et al. 2012). In 
general, the findings of these studies suggest that internal control weaknesses 
cause deterioration in financial reporting quality. Doyle et al. (2007a) find that the 
association is primarily driven by weaknesses in less auditable entity-level con-
trols, while the association is not especially evident with account-specific internal 
control weaknesses. Chan et al. (2008) provide marginally significant evidence 
that companies with material weaknesses have greater discretionary accruals. 
Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2008) report that accruals quality is better in companies 
remediating weaknesses compared to companies continuing to disclose internal 
control weaknesses, and Bedard et al. (2012) suggest that the significant impact of 
the material weakness remediation on abnormal accruals depends on the type of 
the weakness. 
According to the agency theory view on internal controls, a company’s public 
disclosures should matter to users of financial statement information. Prior re-
search has examined the impact of internal control disclosures on equity markets, 
and found that these disclosures do affect investors’ risk assessment, stock re-
turns, and companies’ cost of equity (Beneish et al. 2009; Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 
2009; Lopez et al. 2009; Rezee et al. 2012). Previous studies investigating debt 
holders’ reactions to internal control reports have documented that internal con-
trol weaknesses affect loan officers’ risk assessment (Schneider and Church 2008) 
and cost of debt (Kim et al. 2011). In addition to the research investigating equity 
and debt market reactions, Su et al. (2014) found that customer demand decreases 
after internal control weaknesses are disclosed. 
Considering the negative consequences of internal control weaknesses on finan-
cial reporting quality, and equity and debt markets, the impact of internal control 
effectiveness on auditors’ risk assessment and audit fees has been discussed in 
prior studies. When designing the audit process, auditors need to carefully evalu-
ate risks involved to that specific audit engagement in order to plan the required 
audit effort, and to reduce overall risk to an acceptable level (e.g., O’Keefe et al. 
1994; Johnstone and Bedard 2001).10 Thus, high levels of perceived risk increase 
                                                 
 
10 The risks that auditors need to consider can be categorized into a client’s business risk, an audi-
tor’s business risk, and an audit risk (e.g., Johnstone 2000). The client company business risk 
is the risk that the client’s economic condition will deteriorate in the short or long term; the 
auditor business risk is the risk that the audit firm will suffer a loss resulting from the en-
gagement (either through a lack of engagement profitability, loss of reputation, or via future 
litigation); the audit risk is the likelihood of undetected material misstatements in a client’s fi-
nancial statements. Furthermore, audit risk comprises inherent risk (the risk of material mis-
statements), control risk (the risk that material misstatements will not be prevented or detected 
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audit effort (and possibly induce a fee premium due to heightened litigation risk), 
and results in higher audit fees (Simunic 1980; Simunic and Stein 1996). 
Raghunandan and Rama (2006), Hoitash et al. (2008) and Hogan and Wilkins 
(2008), for example, found strong evidence on the positive association between 
internal control weaknesses and audit fees. 
3.3 Pervasiveness of internal control weaknesses 
Since management is responsible for establishing and maintaining adequate inter-
nal controls, it could be argued that the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of an in-
ternal control system stems from (and reflects) the competence and overall atti-
tude of management toward internal controls and financial reporting quality (i.e., 
‘the tone at the top’). Consequently, problems in the control environment could be 
expected to be pervasively reflected, for example, in internal control assessments 
and in the credibility of those assessments, and in the operational decisions by the 
management. 
Rice and Weber (2012) show that some existing material weaknesses remain 
unacknowledged (undiscovered and undisclosed). They suggest that whether ma-
terial weaknesses are actually acknowledged depends on the incentives for detec-
tion and disclosure. Moreover, Bedard and Graham (2011) point out that judging 
whether the internal control weakness should be designated material is difficult, 
because of the ambiguity in the definition of materiality. Thus, there are challeng-
es for reliable assessment of internal control effectiveness. The pervasiveness of 
internal control weaknesses and the challenges in evaluating internal controls are 
discussed in the first essay, which examines whether the low financial reporting 
quality of companies disclosing Section 404 material weaknesses persists into the 
period after the last material weakness disclosure. In particular, the essay investi-
gates whether companies will continue to have a higher likelihood of misstate-
ment in financial information in the post-MW404 period compared to companies 
without a history of disclosed material weaknesses. 
Recent research on internal controls suggests that, in addition to the direct link to 
accounting quality, material weaknesses may have spillover effects to operations 
too (Cheng et al. 2013; Bauer et al. 2014; Feng et al. 2015). Considering the gov-
ernance problems in companies with internal control weaknesses (e.g., Zhang et 
                                                                                                                                     
 
by internal controls), and detection risk (the risk that auditor fails to detect material misstate-
ments) (e.g., Eilifsen and Messier 2000). 
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al. 2007; Hoitash et al. 2009; Skaife et al. 2013) and the importance of the ‘tone at 
the top’ in developing internal control process, material weaknesses could be ex-
pected to reflect such a business environment, which is permissive to manipula-
tion of real activities to manage earnings. Therefore, not only do internal control 
weaknesses increase the probability of accounting misstatements, but they also 
might be associated with real earnings management. The second essay investi-
gates whether the existence of material weaknesses in internal controls manifests 
in real earnings management behavior and whether the subsequent year’s disclo-
sure of the weaknesses induces company management to employ real earnings 
management methods. 
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4 AUDIT QUALITY 
The stakeholders of the financial reporting process have different expectations of 
external auditing, and thus, there is no unanimous agreement on the definition of 
audit quality (Watkins et al. 2004; Francis 2011; Knechel et al. 2013). Similar to 
many prior studies, this dissertation adopts the perspective of the users of finan-
cial statements, and explores audit quality in the context of client companies’ fi-
nancial reporting quality. Audit outcome, and hence, audit quality itself is unob-
servable (Knechel et al. 2013). Consequently, the observable audit outputs, audit-
ed financial statements and audit reports, have been utilized in prior archival re-
search to examine quality and to test hypotheses (e.g., Francis 2011). The under-
lying assumption in the fourth essay is that better quality audits should be mani-
fested in better quality financial reporting (for example, smaller abnormal accru-
als). The third essay takes another approach to audit quality in the context of fi-
nancial reporting quality. That is, when solely examining client companies with 
low financial reporting quality, high quality auditing should lead to a greater like-
lihood of acknowledging existing problems/bias/errors, for example, discovering 
misstatements or material weaknesses. 
Before the audit report and financial statement are issued, the preceding audit 
process involves a number of phases, which all require judgment and decision-
making: risk assessment, internal control evaluation, analytical procedures, ob-
taining and assessing audit evidence, testing, and reviewing (Knechel et al. 2013). 
The quality of the audit process is dependent on the quality of judgments during 
each phase. Risk assessment, for example, is vital to the entire audit process, af-
fecting internal control evaluation, the nature and extent of the audit procedures, 
and testing. However, the judgments are affected by the various circumstances 
that auditors face (e.g., an audit firm’s economic dependence on a client) and by 
the auditors’ individual characteristics (e.g., auditor domain-specific knowledge) 
(Knechel et al. 2013). The circumstances and personal characteristics influence 
the probability that an auditor will both discover a breach in a client’s accounting 
system (implying expertise and audit effort) and disclose that breach (implying 
objectivity and independence), which is the most commonly used definition of 
audit quality (DeAngelo 1981). The following sections discuss audit quality in the 
context of non-audit services provided by an incumbent audit firm, and auditor 
specialization in building expertise. 
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4.1 Non-audit services and audit quality 
Over the last few decades, audit firms have expanded their businesses to include 
consultancy services, such as those addressing taxation, mergers and acquisitions, 
and risk management. Audit quality research has investigated two conflicting hy-
potheses on the association between non-audit services provided by incumbent 
audit firms and audit quality. 
1. The knowledge spillover view holds that information acquired in consulting 
flows to the audit partner, improving audit quality. 
2. The economic dependence view holds that non-audit fees increase an audi-
tor’s economic dependence on the clients, thereby impairing audit quality. 
Overall, the previous studies investigating the association between non-audit fees 
and audit quality have provided mixed results (Schneider et al. 2006). The find-
ings of Frankel et al. (2002), Kanagaretnam et al. (2011), and Rice and Weber 
(2012) suggest that non-audit fees jeopardize auditor independence and result in a 
lower audit quality. However, DeFond et al. (2002), Ashbaugh et al. (2003), 
Chung and Kallapur (2003), and Reynolds et al. (2004) do not find a statistically 
significant association between non-audit fees and audit quality. Prior research 
has also investigated whether investors perceive the quality-enhancing or quality-
deteriorating effects of incumbent audit firm-provided non-audit services. Studies 
examining earnings response coefficients (e.g., Krishnan et al. 2005), market val-
uation of earnings surprise (Francis and Ke 2006), and cost of equity capital 
(Khurana and Raman 2006) suggest that investors do perceive non-audit fees to 
be a threat to auditor independence. However, Gosh et al. (2009) do not find a 
significant association between non-audit fees and perceived auditor independ-
ence. 
Particularly after the accounting scandal of Enron and its audit firm Arthur An-
dersen, investors and regulators became concerned over the magnitude of the fees 
paid to incumbent audit firms for their non-audit services. Consequently, the SOX 
(2002) prohibits audit firms from offering audit and certain non-audit services to 
the same client on a concurrent basis. Because of the potential benefits from 
knowledge spillover, the SOX permits the provision of tax services. There are, 
however, certain specific requirements for incumbent audit firms providing tax 
services, such as an audit committee’s pre-approval of the tax services, a separate 
disclosure of the amount of non-audit fees paid by type of the service (audit-
related fees, tax fees, other fees) and limitations to the scope of the consulting 
(SEC 2003b; PCAOB 2005). 
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Since the restrictions on the non-audit services provided by incumbent audit firms 
were established, the research has focused on examining tax services. The find-
ings of these prior studies indicate that tax services are associated with a reduced 
likelihood of restatements (Kinney et al. 2004), and of tax-related restatements 
(Seetharaman et al. 2011), with a greater likelihood of a going concern opinion 
prior to bankruptcy filing (Robinson 2008), with reduced discretionary accruals 
(Choi and Lee 2009), a reduced likelihood of loss avoidance (Krishnan and 
Visvanathan 2011), improved estimates for tax reserves (Gleason and Mills 
2011), the value-relevance of earnings (Krishnan et al. 2013), and a reduced like-
lihood of non-tax internal control weaknesses (Harris and Zhou 2013). In sum-
mary, these studies support the knowledge spillover hypothesis. Moreover, Huang 
et al. (2007) found mostly insignificant associations between tax fees and proxies 
for financial reporting quality (some weak evidence of lower abnormal accruals 
and insignificant association with meeting or beating earnings benchmarks). 
However, a few prior studies have found indications suggesting that tax fees may 
negatively affect audit quality. Using an experiment, Favere-Marchesi (2006) 
found that the joint provision of audit and tax services led to significantly lower 
fraud-risk assessments. Paterson and Valencia (2011) found that the recurring tax 
services provided by audit firm create knowledge spillover, but nonrecurring tax 
services seem to have a detrimental impact on auditor independence. 
The issue of tax-related fees and financial reporting quality is examined in the 
third essay. The study specifically focuses on a sample of companies that all have 
poor financial reporting quality (misstatements in financial information), and in-
vestigates whether tax services being provided by incumbent audit firms enhance 
or impair the likelihood that the client company acknowledges the low financial 
reporting quality. 
4.2 Individual auditor specialization and audit quality 
Knechel et al. (2013) refer to an audit as a knowledge-based professional service. 
Thus, audit performance is affected by the quality of judgments, and hence, the 
expertise of individual auditors. Expertise is determined by a person’s innate abil-
ities (problem-solving abilities) and knowledge (e.g., Bonner and Lewis 1990; 
Libby 1995). Although education and training develop knowledge, experience 
and extensive practice are required to acquire expertise in auditing (e.g., Bonner 
and Lewis 1990; Bédard and Chi 1993; Libby 1995). 
An expert can be characterized as an individual with specialized knowledge of the 
domain (Bédard and Chi 1993). That is, in order to gain expertise, a person must 
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acquire specialized knowledge in addition to more general knowledge (e.g., Bon-
ner and Lewis 1990; Bedard and Biggs 1991; Bedard and Chi 1993). Specializa-
tion acquired by auditing similar types of client companies can foster domain-
specific knowledge and in-depth expertise, and result in high quality auditing 
(e.g., Bonner and Lewis 1990; Libby 1995; Bedard and Chi 1993; Bedard and 
Biggs 1991; Zerni 2012). Prior studies examining auditors’ domain-specific 
knowledge have primarily examined the specialization in auditing specific indus-
tries. The findings of these studies generally indicate higher audit fees charged 
(Craswell et al. 1995; Zerni 2012) and higher quality auditing (Owhoso et al. 
2002; Hammersley 2006; Chin and Chi 2009; Reichelt and Wang 2010; Chi and 
Chin 2011; Gul et al. 2009; Lim and Tan 2008; Lim and Tan 2010) by industry-
specialist auditors. 
The majority of the previous archival auditing research has investigated audit 
quality at the firm-level (e.g., Simunic 1980; Becker et al. 1998; Francis and 
Krishnan 1999; Balsam et al. 2003). The underlying assumption in these studies is 
that quality relates to the audit firm’s brand name and that knowledge can be dis-
tributed across audit offices (e.g., Becker et al. 1998; Francis and Krishnan 1999; 
Balsam et al. 2003). However, as audit performance depends on the expertise of 
individual auditors (e.g., Bonner and Lewis 1990), more recent archival research 
has studied audit quality at the office-level (e.g., Ferguson et al. 2003; Francis et 
al. 2005; Reichelt and Wang 2010) and at the individual partner-level (e.g., Chin 
and Chi 2009; Chi and Chin 2011; Zerni 2012). Accordingly, recent research sug-
gests that audit partners’ characteristics affects audit quality (Carey and Simnett 
2006; Gul et al. 2009; Chin and Chi 2009; Chi and Chin 2011; Zerni 2012; 
Knechel et al. 2015). In terms of industry specialization, the findings of Chin and 
Chi (2009), for example, indicate that an individual audit partner’s industry spe-
cialization is associated with higher quality financial reporting of client compa-
nies, but the audit-firm level industry specialization does not of itself lead to bet-
ter quality auditing. 
Zerni (2012) points out that audit firms organize their business lines, not only 
based on industry sectors, but also according to criteria like client size and owner-
ship structure. However, there is a lack of research on other dimensions of spe-
cialization in determining domain-specific knowledge. An exception is the study 
by Zerni (2012) that finds that both auditor industry specialization and specializa-
tion in auditing public companies are associated with higher audit fees. Extending 
the research on auditor specialization, the fourth essay examines the association 
between an individual audit partner’s public-client specialization and au-
dit/financial reporting quality. 
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5 SUMMARY OF THE ESSAYS  
5.1 The persistence in the association between Section 
404 material weaknesses and financial reporting quality 
The first essay investigates whether MW404 disclosures are predictive of future 
financial reporting quality. In particular, the paper examines whether the low fi-
nancial reporting quality of MW404 companies persists into the post-MW404 
period. Given that changing organizational policies takes time (Kotter 1995) it is 
intuitively appealing to assume that this kind of persistence occurs. Because mate-
rial weaknesses in internal controls carry a threat that material misstatements are 
not detected in a timely manner, the current study relies on the view that an inci-
dence of a misstatement indicates a failure in a company’s internal controls (e.g., 
Eilifsen and Messier 2000; Leone 2007; Rice and Weber 2012). If companies in 
the post-MW404 period have not yet reached as high level of internal control ef-
fectiveness as companies without a history of MW404s, the likelihood of inci-
dences of misstatement would be higher in the post-MW404 period too. 
The empirical findings indicate that there is a greater likelihood of undiscovered 
material misstatements in financial information among MW404 companies and 
companies in the post-MW404 period compared to companies without a history 
of MW404s (referred to as EIC companies, i.e., companies with effective internal 
controls). On average, the greater likelihood of misstatements is estimated to per-
sist for two years. That is, in the two years immediately following the last 
MW404 disclosure, internal control over financial reporting is still not as effec-
tive at preventing or detecting misstatements in a timely manner as it is in EIC 
companies. The magnitude of the effect, however, decreases non-linearly (i.e., 
first rapidly then slowly). 
When exploring the possible explanations for the empirical findings, the addition-
al descriptive analysis provides some evidence that companies with undiscovered 
misstatements in the post-MW404 period have previously disclosed more entity-
level internal control problems (multiple account-specific MW404s, and entity-
level MW404s related to accounting personnel training and competence, year-end 
adjustment, and untimely or inadequate account reconciliations) compared to 
those companies without undiscovered misstatements. More interestingly, the 
exploration reveals that the majority of the misstatements in the post-MW404 
period are unrelated to the previously disclosed account-specific MWs. It appears 
that many companies with misstatements in the post-MW404 period have even 
 Acta Wasaensia     19 
  
more pervasive internal control problems than reported in the last MW404 disclo-
sure. 
Overall, the findings of this study indicate that in the post-MW404 period, there is 
a greater likelihood of existing control problems remaining unacknowledged. It 
might be that management’s assertion of the effectiveness of internal controls is 
too easily accepted by some auditors. Moreover, due to insufficient expertise 
and/or lack of resources, some auditors might concentrate their effort on the pre-
viously discovered MW problem and not adequately examine other aspects of 
financial reporting. These inferences bring additional insights to the problem of 
undiscovered and undisclosed control weaknesses, suggesting the need to develop 
auditors’ competence in evaluating the effectiveness of internal control over fi-
nancial reporting. 
5.2 Real earnings management before and after 
reporting SOX 404 material weaknesses 
The second essay investigates whether the existence of Section 404 material 
weaknesses manifests in real earnings management behavior and/or whether the 
disclosure of material weaknesses induces company management to employ real 
earnings management. Firstly, it is examined whether real earnings management 
is employed in company years with ineffective internal controls based on a subse-
quent SOX 404 internal control report – that is, material weaknesses exist, but 
have not yet been disclosed. Because of management responsibility for establish-
ing and maintaining adequate internal controls (SOX 2002), weaknesses in inter-
nal controls implicitly create doubts about management’s competence and its atti-
tude toward financial reporting and/or in extreme cases, even its integrity. Materi-
al weaknesses particularly reflect pervasive problems in the control environment 
(e.g., Zhang et al. 2007; Hoitash et al. 2009), and thus these weaknesses might 
stem from the ‘tone at the top’. More recent studies on internal control effective-
ness suggest that weaknesses in internal control over financial reporting have 
spillover effects to operations (Cheng et al. 2013; Bauer et al. 2014). The exist-
ence of material weaknesses could hence be expected to reflect such a business 
environment, which is permissive to real earnings management. Moreover, given 
that material weaknesses per se frequently reduce the quality of internal infor-
mation (Feng et al. 2015), it is possible that management is making (unintention-
ally) poor operational decisions based on this information, which manifest in 
greater real earnings management. 
20      Acta Wasaensia 
 
The essay goes on to examine whether companies disclosing material weaknesses 
relating to the prior period have higher levels of real earnings management. High-
er levels of real earnings management could be expected in companies that have 
recently attracted bad publicity due to material weakness disclosures. Prior re-
search has shown that the disclosures of internal control deficiencies are per-
ceived negatively in debt and equity markets (e.g., Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2009; 
Kim et al. 2011), and lead to a decline in customer demand (Su et al. 2014). The 
negative consequences anticipated from material weakness disclosure (e.g., nega-
tive investor reactions, increased cost of debt, or impact on personal reputation) 
mean management could be expected to strive to mitigate these concerns and 
therefore have an incentive for earnings management by manipulating real opera-
tional activities, which is not something easily detected or constrained by outsid-
ers. 
The sample used in this study comprises fiscal year observations of US listed 
companies from 2004 to 2012. The real earnings management methods investi-
gated are inventory overproduction (proxied by abnormal levels of production 
costs), reduction of discretionary expenses (proxied by abnormal levels of discre-
tionary expenses), and sales manipulation (proxied by abnormal levels of cash 
flow from operations) (Roychowdhury 2006). The main analyses are additionally 
conducted using a propensity-score matched sample. 
The empirical findings indicate that companies with material weaknesses in their 
internal controls have higher levels of real activities manipulation (particularly 
inventory overproduction but also the reduction of discretionary expenses) com-
pared to companies with effective internal controls. This implies that the weak 
commitment by management to provide effective internal control systems and 
high quality financial information relates to a tendency to use real earnings man-
agement methods and also impairs management’s real operational decisions. Fur-
thermore, the empirical results indicate that companies employ real earnings 
management (overproduction and reduction of discretionary expenses) after dis-
closing a previous year’s material weaknesses. It appears that the public disclo-
sure of material weaknesses induces management to strive to manage the ex-
pected negative reactions of stakeholders to the disclosure by engaging in real 
earnings management, which is not easily detected or constrained by outsiders. 
Overall, this study suggests that material weaknesses in internal controls signal an 
environment where management is more inclined to employ real earnings man-
agement. 
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5.3 Incumbent audit firm-provided tax services and 
clients with low financial reporting quality 
The third essay investigates whether tax services provided by incumbent audit 
firms enhance or impair the likelihood of acknowledging client companies’ low 
financial reporting quality. As discussed in Section 4.1, SOX (2002) prohibits 
audit firms from providing most non-audit services to their audit clients, but per-
mits tax services due to the potential benefits from knowledge spillover. This 
study approaches the issue of incumbent audit firm-provided tax services by using 
a sample of companies with poor financial reporting quality, that is, companies 
with misstatements. The misstatements are determined from the restated periods 
indicated by restatement data. First, the essay investigates whether tax fees are 
associated with restatement lags, in other words, those misstatements in financial 
information that remain undiscovered in a particular fiscal year. That is, the com-
panies with a restatement lag are compared to those companies with misstate-
ments more quickly restated. Second, the essay investigates whether tax fees are 
associated with the likelihood of Section 404 internal control weakness disclo-
sures among companies with misstatements. Based on the view that an incidence 
of a misstatement indicates underlying internal control weaknesses (e.g., Eilifsen 
and Messier 2000; Rice and Weber 2012), material weakness disclosures would 
suggest greater scrutiny by auditors. The research setting featured a sample of 
similar companies in terms of poor accounting quality, allows examining the au-
ditors’ professional skepticism in particular. Enhanced knowledge of the client 
acquired via the provision of tax services could make restatements more timely 
and material weakness disclosures more likely for companies with poor account-
ing quality. However, economic dependence may disrupt an auditor’s profession-
al skepticism, resulting in restatement lags and unacknowledged control prob-
lems. 
The inferences of the findings in prior studies investigating the association be-
tween tax services being provided by an incumbent audit firm and financial re-
porting quality largely support the knowledge spillover view. For example, Kin-
ney et al. (2004) suggest that tax fees reduce the likelihood of restatements, im-
plying there are benefits from knowledge spillover. Seetharaman et al. (2011), 
however, report an insignificant association between tax fees and restated periods, 
but a significant negative association with tax-related restatements. These studies 
examine whether or not restatements/misstatements occur. Harris and Zhou 
(2013) suggest that tax consulting leads to a reduced likelihood of non-tax-related 
internal control weaknesses but does not have an effect on tax-related weakness-
es. Lower likelihood of internal control weakness disclosures could, however, 
also indicate a reluctance to disclose weaknesses. Rice and Weber (2012) exam-
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ine a sample of companies with existing internal control weaknesses and conclude 
that larger non-audit fees makes it less likely that material weaknesses are dis-
closed, supporting the economic dependence view. The current study extends the 
findings of these prior studies and investigates the role of tax services being pro-
vided by audit firm among companies with poor financial quality, using a sample 
of fiscal-year observations of US companies from 2005–2012. 
The empirical findings indicate that higher tax-related fees are associated with a 
reduced likelihood of SOX 404 internal control weakness disclosures for compa-
nies with misstatements, implying that underlying control problems are 
unacknowledged. However, the findings suggest that just providing both audit 
and tax services does not itself have an impact on audit quality, but rather it is the 
magnitude of the tax-related fees in particular that counts. The results also pro-
vide modest evidence suggesting that lower levels of tax-related fees are associat-
ed with a lower likelihood of restatement lags, that is, misstatements are restated 
in a more timely manner. Overall, the findings of this study provide some evi-
dence suggesting that, among companies with poor accounting quality, greater 
economic bond with the clients might impair auditors’ professional skepticism. In 
other words, auditors’ scrutiny of their client is weaker when the magnitude of 
fees generated from tax services provided to that client is higher. 
5.4 Audit partner public-client specialization and client 
abnormal accruals 
The fourth essay examines whether the extent an audit partner specializes in pub-
lic-clients is associated with abnormal accruals, a proxy for client companies’ 
audit quality/financial reporting quality. Prior research has provided extensive 
evidence of the effects of audit firm or local audit office-level characteristics on 
both audit quality (e.g., Reynolds and Francis 2001; Balsam et al. 2003; Krishnan 
2005; Reichelt and Wang 2010) and audit fees (e.g., Craswell et al. 1995; Fergu-
son et al. 2003). However, the empirical evidence on how individual audit partner 
specialization affects client financial reporting outcomes is limited due to the 
wide-spread absence of audit partner signature on audit reports, which would en-
able the identification of individual partners with specific client engagements. 
Prior research has mainly investigated auditors’ specialization in different indus-
tries, and audit partner industry specialization has been found to be positively 
associated with audit quality (Chin and Chi 2009; Chi and Chin 2011). Speciali-
zation in public companies is another means to gain domain-specific knowledge 
(Zerni 2012). Auditing public-clients requires specialist knowledge of the relevant 
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financial reporting and auditing requirements. Zerni (2012) finds that both indus-
try specialization and specialization in public companies are associated with high-
er audit fees. However, prior research has not investigated whether public-client 
specialization is associated with actual audit outcomes that are indicative of high-
er quality. In addition to the enhanced expertise achieved through public-client 
specialization, the willingness to resist client pressure is likely to increase with 
the number of public clients in the partner’s portfolio as the partner’s dependence 
on any one client diminishes, which should help to ensure audit quality (John-
stone et al. 2001). 
This study uses a sample of 420 company-year observations from the NASDAQ 
OMX Exchange in Finland. The identities of audit partners assigned to public-
client engagements are linked with client financial statement data. The findings 
reveal a negative association between greater public-client specialization and ab-
solute abnormal working capital accruals. Moreover, the findings indicate that the 
negative association between public-client specialization and abnormal accruals 
only occurs for partners with three to six public clients; a moderate level of pub-
lic-client specialization appears optimal, and the busyness that goes with having a 
high level of such specialization appears to mitigate the knowledge and independ-
ence benefits associated with this type of specialization. Finally, the results reveal 
that companies audited by partners with a higher level of public-client specializa-
tion have significantly smaller income-decreasing abnormal accruals. In the set-
ting with high-tax and high-alignment between financial reporting and tax ac-
counting, auditors with a greater public-client specialization might be more likely 
to recognize the negative reputational implications of their clients’ aggressive tax 
minimization strategies and discourage income-decreasing earnings management. 
Overall, this study suggests that audit partner public-client specialization is asso-
ciated with improved audit quality, reveals the extent of public-client specializa-
tion that appears to be optimal, and the nature of earnings management that is 
mitigated by partner public-client specialization. 
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REAL EARNINGS MANAGEMENT BEFORE AND 
AFTER REPORTING SOX 404 MATERIAL 
WEAKNESSES♦ 
The co-author of this essay is Tuukka Järvinen 
ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this study is to investigate whether the existence of SOX section 
404 material weaknesses manifests in real earnings management behavior and/or 
whether the disclosure of material weaknesses induces company management to 
employ real earnings management. First, the empirical findings indicate that 
companies with material weaknesses in their internal controls engage in more 
manipulation of real activities (particularly inventory overproduction, but also 
reduction of discretionary expenses) compared to companies with effective inter-
nal controls. This implies that the weak commitment by management to provide 
effective internal control system and high quality financial information relates to 
a tendency to use real earnings management methods and also impairs manage-
ment’s real operational decisions. Second, the empirical results indicate that com-
panies employ real earnings management (overproduction and reduction of dis-
cretionary expenses) after disclosing previous year’s material weaknesses. It ap-
pears that the public disclosure of material weaknesses induces management to 
strive to mitigate the expected negative reactions of stakeholders to the disclosure 
by engaging in real earnings management, which is not easily detected or con-
strained by outsiders. Overall, this study suggests that material weaknesses in 
internal controls signal an environment where management is more inclined to 
employ real earnings management. 
Keywords: internal control, material weakness; real earnings management 
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1 Introduction 
The past two decades have seen a series of well-publicized failures of corporate 
governance, some being related to accounting scandals, some to the financial cri-
sis. Such failures make it essential for both the financial markets and accounting 
research to improve the understanding of internal control effectiveness; of the 
pervasiveness of control issues; and of how they relate to earnings management 
behavior.1 Utilizing internal control reports mandated by Section 404 of the Sar-
banes-Oxley Act (SOX) of 2002, this study investigates whether the existence of 
material weaknesses in internal controls manifests in real earnings management 
behavior, and whether the subsequent disclosure of weaknesses induces manage-
ment to employ real earnings management methods.2 Real earnings management 
refers to the manipulation of real operational activities to achieve certain financial 
goals, which do not necessarily enhance long-term company value but are instead 
likely to decrease future cash flows (e.g., Roychowdhury 2006). Real earnings 
management, as opposed to accrual-based earnings management, is not related to 
accounting issues per se. Consequently, real earnings management can be fully 
executed within the generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP), and (after 
the proper disclosure of these transactions in the financial statements) does not 
necessarily fall within the purview of auditors or regulators (Cohen et al. 2008; 
Kim et al. 2010). Considering the wide-ranging use of real activities manipulation 
to manage earnings instead of or in addition to accounting manipulation (e.g., 
Graham et al. 2005; Cohen et al. 2008) and the pervasive problems in the control 
environment and governance in companies with internal control weaknesses (e.g., 
Zhang et al. 2007; Hoitash et al. 2009; Skaife et al. 2013), it is interesting to ex-
amine whether real earnings management is greater in companies with material 
internal control weaknesses.3 
                                                 
 
1 Related to internal controls in general, it is stated in a report of global survey on risk manage-
ment and internal control that “Strong risk management and internal control systems are cru-
cial to strengthening the governance of organizations, and therefore the global financial in-
frastructure, and helping to prevent future crises.” (PAIB 2011) 
2 Section 404 requires Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) registrants’ managers to assess 
and report on the effectiveness of internal control over financial reporting, and to disclose the 
existence of any material weaknesses. Moreover, companies’ auditors must also evaluate and 
report on the effectiveness of internal controls. Section 404 became effective for fiscal years 
ending after November 15, 2004 for the largest companies (market capitalization of at least 75 
million dollars). Since 2007, SEC has required also smaller public companies to report on in-
ternal control effectiveness, but do not require external auditors internal control reporting. 
Thus, the data used in this study comprises both auditors’ internal control reports and man-
agement-only internal control reports. 
3 Although Chan et al. (2008), for example, have found some evidence of accrual-based earnings 
management in companies with material weaknesses, the current study takes a broader per-
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First, we examine whether real earnings management is employed in company 
years with ineffective internal controls based on subsequent SOX 404 internal 
control report. That is, material weaknesses exists, but have not yet been dis-
closed. We particularly scrutinize situations where material weaknesses were dis-
closed for the first time, so as to explore the impact of the existence of weakness-
es without the possibly confounding effect arising from previous material weak-
ness disclosures. Internal control systems are designed and implemented by the 
management (COSO 1992; SOX 2002), and consequently, weaknesses in internal 
controls implicitly create doubts about management’s competence and its attitude 
toward financial reporting and/or in extreme cases, even its integrity. Material 
weaknesses particularly reflect pervasive problems in the control environment, 
and thus these weaknesses might stem from the ‘tone at the top’. As prior re-
search suggests, low quality governance characteristics are associated with the 
presence of material weaknesses (e.g., Zhang et al. 2007; Hoitash et al. 2009). 
Recent studies also suggest that weaknesses in internal control over financial re-
porting have spillover effects to operations (Cheng et al. 2013; Bauer et al. 2014). 
The existence of material weaknesses could hence be expected to reflect such a 
business environment, which is permissive to real earnings management. Moreo-
ver, given that material weaknesses per se frequently give rise to lower quality 
internal information (Feng et al. 2015), it is possible that management is (uninten-
tionally) making poor operational decisions based on this information, which 
manifest in greater real earnings management. 
Second, we examine whether companies disclosing previous year’s material 
weaknesses have higher levels of real earnings management. Higher levels of real 
earnings management could be expected in companies that have recently attracted 
bad publicity due to material weakness disclosures. Prior research has shown that 
disclosures of internal control deficiencies are perceived negatively in debt and 
equity markets (e.g., Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2009; Kim et al. 2011). Moreover, Su 
et al. (2014) report a decline in customer demand following the disclosure of in-
ternal control weaknesses. Because of the negative consequences anticipated from 
the disclosure of material weakness (e.g., negative investor reactions, increased 
cost of debt, or impact on personal reputation), management could be expected to 
strive to mitigate these effects and therefore have an incentive for earnings man-
agement executed by the manipulation of real operational activities, which is not 
easily detected or constrained by outsiders. Therefore, inducing a short-term in-
                                                                                                                                     
 
spective on the influence of material weaknesses by examining whether also operational activ-
ities fall under the sphere of influence of internal control effectiveness, not only accounting is-
sues. 
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crease in earnings by real earnings management in an attempt to mitigate the neg-
ative reactions to material weakness disclosures might be perceived to outweigh 
the risk posed by real earnings management being detected. 
Using a sample of fiscal year observations of US listed companies from 2004 to 
2012, we examine whether real earnings management is greater in companies 1) 
having material weaknesses for the first time (existence), 2) disclosing material 
weaknesses for the first time and subsequently disclosing a clean 404 report (dis-
closure), and 3) disclosing material weaknesses for the first time and continuing 
to have material weaknesses based on a subsequent internal control report4. Our 
control group consists of companies without a history of material weakness dis-
closures (i.e., companies that have always had effective internal controls based on 
404 reports). The main analyses are also conducted using a propensity-score 
matched sample. The real earnings management methods investigated are inven-
tory overproduction (proxied by abnormal levels of production costs), reduction 
of discretionary expenses (proxied by abnormal levels of discretionary expenses), 
and sales manipulation (proxied by abnormal levels of cash flows from opera-
tions) (Roychowdhury 2006). For each method, we use three measures: the basic 
real earnings management measures introduced by Roychowdhury (2006) and 
two other measures where the basic measures have been adjusted by perfor-
mance.5  
The empirical findings of this study suggest that the existence of material weak-
nesses and the disclosure of those weaknesses are related to more extensive real 
earnings management than in companies that have always had effective internal 
controls. First, companies with existing material weaknesses appear to be using 
overproduction as a real earnings management method. This implies that, alt-
hough the association may stem from the behavior of an opportunistic manage-
ment, the poor ‘tone at the top’ may also flow through to inventory-related opera-
tional decisions via low quality internal information that results from material 
weaknesses (see Feng et al. 2015). The existence of material weaknesses is also 
related to the reduction of discretionary expenses, but the significance of that rela-
tionship appears to be somewhat smaller. Moreover, we find only modest evi-
                                                 
 
4 The third group captures both effects: the existence of material weaknesses and the disclosure of 
material weaknesses. Therefore, the indicator variable for this group is merely used to provide 
supplemental information. 
5 The first performance-adjusted measures are calculated by adding lagged return on assets to the 
estimation models of real earnings management measures. The second performance-adjusted 
measures are calculated by subtracting the mean values of real earnings management 
measures of matched control companies based on year, industry, and return on assets (e.g., 
Kim and Park 2014). 
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dence on the association between the existence of material weaknesses and sales 
manipulation. 
Second, companies disclosing material weaknesses and subsequently disclosing a 
clean internal control report also use inventory overproduction and reduction of 
discretionary expenses as real earnings management methods. In particular, cut-
ting discretionary expenses seems likely to be the most feasible real earnings 
management method after disclosure. The results do not, however, indicate that 
material weakness disclosure is associated with sales manipulation. This insignif-
icance might be related to the reduction in customer demand following the disclo-
sure of an internal control weakness (Su et al. 2014). Thus, sales manipulation is 
not a workable real earnings management method for companies with material 
weaknesses. Finally, companies disclosing material weaknesses and subsequently 
continuing to disclose material weaknesses employ inventory overproduction to 
manage earnings, but there is also some evidence on reduction of discretionary 
expenses among these companies. 
To provide additional evidence on the incentives for real earnings management 
among material weakness companies, we examine whether the associations be-
tween material weakness/material weakness disclosure companies and real earn-
ings management differ based on previous-year performance. These findings pri-
marily indicate that when the sample consists of previously poorly performing 
companies, the existence (but not the disclosure) of material weaknesses is asso-
ciated with inventory overproduction and reduction of discretionary expenses. 
That is, although the motivation is similar (previous poor performance), the man-
agement of a material weakness company employs real earnings management 
methods. When the sample consists of previously better performing companies 
(i.e., the sample companies do not have a clear performance-related incentive to 
manage earnings), the companies disclosing material weaknesses are utilizing 
overproduction and reduction of discretionary expenses, suggesting that the nega-
tive publicity of material weakness disclosures induces management to manipu-
late real operational activities to manage earnings. There is also, however, some 
modest evidence of sales manipulation among poor performing companies that 
disclose material weaknesses, and among better performing companies with exist-
ing material weaknesses. 
This study contributes to the research on internal control over financial reporting 
and the research on earnings management. First, while previous studies have 
found evidence for a relationship between internal control deficiencies and earn-
ings management through accrual-manipulation/accrual quality (e.g., Chan et al. 
2008; Doyle et al. 2007a; Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2008), the current study investi-
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gates another possible method, namely real earnings management. In particular, 
the findings on the impact of material weaknesses on real earnings management 
behavior imply the pervasiveness of control issues in companies with material 
weaknesses. That might reflect a direct tendency to use real earnings management 
methods or decisions made based on biased internal accounting information (nev-
ertheless caused by management’s failure to establish an adequate control sys-
tem). These findings therefore offer insights into the issue of the pervasive nature 
of control problems and spillover effects to operations that have been discussed in 
prior studies (e.g., Skaife et al. 2013; Cheng et al. 2013; Feng et al. 2015; Bauer et 
al. 2014; Myllymäki 2014). 
Second, this study extends the literature on the effects of internal control disclo-
sures (e.g., Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2009; Beneish et al. 2009; Kim et al. 2011; 
Rezee et al. 2012; Clinton et al. 2014; Su et al. 2014) and provides new infor-
mation about greater real earnings management in companies after a material 
weakness disclosure, suggesting that incentives for real earnings management 
exist due to the expected negative effects of such disclosures. Third, this study 
contributes to the real earnings management literature (e.g., Roychowdhury 2006; 
Cohen et al. 2008; Cohen and Zarowin 2010; Gunny 2010; Badertscher 2011; Chi 
et al. 2011; Zang 2012; Kim and Park 2014) by indicating that material weak-
nesses in internal controls signal an environment where management is more sus-
ceptible to real earnings management behavior, which may subsequently incur 
costs for stockholders by decreasing company value in the longer term. Overall, 
our study provides further insights on pervasive governance problems that may 
exist in companies with material weaknesses by documenting how operational 
activities fall under the sphere of influence of internal control effectiveness. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section two discusses the 
relevant prior studies, and reasoning behind the hypotheses. Section three de-
scribes the data and methodology. The empirical findings are reported in section 
four. Section five concludes the paper. 
2 Background and development of the hypotheses 
Healy and Wahlen (1999) define earnings management in the following way: 
“Earnings management occurs when managers use judgment in fi-
nancial reporting and in structuring transactions to alter financial 
reports to either mislead some stakeholders about the underlying eco-
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nomic performance of the company or to influence contractual out-
comes that depend on reported accounting numbers.” 
According to the survey results of Graham et al. (2005), managers consider meet-
ing or exceeding financial objectives to be very important, although the ways in 
which they do so might have a negative effect on the company’s future value. The 
primary incentives for managers to meet short-term objectives are stock prices 
and career and reputation concerns (Graham et al. 2005). Prior research on earn-
ings management has primarily concentrated on investigating accrual-based earn-
ings management, which relates to the discretion that management employs in 
applying an accounting method (Zang 2012). In addition to accrual-based earn-
ings management, more recent research has considered whether management 
might apply earnings management through operational decisions, that is, real ac-
tivities manipulation (e.g., Graham 2005; Roychowdhury 2006; Badertscher 
2011; Zang 2012). 
Real activities manipulation relates to departures from normal operating practices 
(Roychowdhury 2006). According to Roychowdhury (2006), these departures do 
not necessarily enhance the long-term company value, although they enable the 
company to meet certain financial reporting targets. That is, the stakeholders are 
misled into believing that normal business operations led to the achievement of 
the goals. However, the manipulation of current earnings might have a negative 
effect on cash flows in the future periods (Roychowdhury 2006). Real earnings 
management methods available to managers are, for example, acceleration of 
sales through aggressive price discounts or more lenient credit terms, overproduc-
tion, and cutting discretionary expenditure (Roychowdhury 2006). These actions 
increase earnings in the current period, but most likely result reducing cash flows 
in the longer term. The recent research on real activities manipulation is primarily 
motivated by the survey results in Graham et al. (2005), which suggest that the 
bulk of earnings management results from manipulating real operating activities. 
Supporting the survey results in Graham et al. (2005), the findings of Roychow-
dhury (2006), Cohen et al. (2008), and Zang (2012) suggest that managers do 
engage in real activities manipulation. For example, investigating earnings man-
agement in the pre- and post-SOX environment, Cohen et al. (2008) find that the 
level of real earnings management activities increased significantly after the pas-
sage of SOX in 2002, whereas accrual-based earnings management declined. The 
use of real earnings management is related to the assumption that manipulating 
real operating activities is harder for company outsiders to detect or constrain (see 
the discussion in, for example, Graham et al. 2005; Roychowdhury 2006; Cohen 
et al. 2008). 
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2.1 The effect of existence: real earnings management before disclosure of 
material weakness 
SOX section 404 requires management to report annually on its assessment of the 
effectiveness of internal controls over financial reporting, and to disclose any ma-
terial weaknesses.6,7 The internal controls over financial reporting aim to provide 
a reasonable assurance that financial information is reliable (PCAOB 2007). Ac-
cordingly, prior research has indicated that an effective internal control system is 
associated with higher quality earnings (Doyle et al. 2007a; Chan et al. 2008; 
Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2008).8 Chan et al. (2008) concentrate on the association 
between internal control weaknesses and accrual-based earnings management 
(proxied by discretionary accruals), and document some evidence of accrual-
based earnings management among companies reporting material weaknesses. 
Although internal controls over financial reporting are not specifically designed to 
constrain real activities manipulation, in as far as internal control effectiveness 
reflects management’s attitude toward financial reporting quality, by implication, 
it could be linked with real earnings management behavior. The effectiveness of 
internal controls is an outcome of management decision making, since manage-
ment is responsible for designing, implementing, monitoring, and improving in-
ternal control systems (SOX 2002). Thus, weaknesses in internal controls result 
from a lack of commitment to establish or maintain appropriate internal controls. 
Such weaknesses then implicitly cast doubt on the management’s competence, 
and/or attitude toward financial reporting and internal control systems. In the ex-
treme cases, material weaknesses may reflect an absence of integrity among the 
management. Prior research has demonstrated that effective internal control sys-
tems are associated with different governance characteristics: audit committee 
characteristics (e.g., Zhang et al. 2007; Hoitash et al. 2009), CFO characteristics 
(Li et al. 2010), and board strength (e.g., Hoitash et al. 2009). Thus, companies 
with internal control weaknesses are exposed to greater governance risk. 
                                                 
 
6 Material weakness is defined as “a significant deficiency, or combination of significant deficien-
cies, that results in more than a remote likelihood that a material misstatement of the annual 
or interim financial statements will not be prevented or detected” (PCAOB 2007). 
7 SOX contains also Section 302, which relates to quarterly reporting and requires management to 
assess the effectiveness of disclosure controls and procedures. The quarterly certification 
should indicate that the management has evaluated the effectiveness of internal controls as 
well as any significant changes in internal controls. 
8 Ineffective internal controls have the potential to allow both unintentional errors in accounting 
information and intentional earnings management (Doyle et al. 2007a; Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 
2008). 
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If material weaknesses signal an environment that promotes actions and policies 
supporting management’s self-interest (see the discussion in Skaife et al. 2013), 
management of material weakness companies might intentionally apply real earn-
ings management to boost earnings and to gain private benefits. Recent literature 
suggests that, in addition to the direct link to accounting quality, material weak-
nesses have spillover effects on operations as well (Cheng et al. 2013; Bauer et al. 
2014). Moreover, if internal control weaknesses per se reduce the quality of in-
ternal information (Feng et al. 2015), it is possible that management is uninten-
tionally making poor operational decisions based on inaccurate information, 
which manifest in real earnings management. Feng et al. (2015), for example, find 
that inventory-related weaknesses are associated with poor inventory manage-
ment. 
Based on the discussion above, we propose the following hypothesis: 
H1: Companies with first-time internal control material weaknesses have higher 
levels of real earnings management than companies that have always had effec-
tive internal controls. 
In line with the hypothesis above, we concentrate on first-time material weak-
nesses, because we wish to capture the effect of the existence of internal control 
material weaknesses in particular. That is, we use the company years before the 
actual disclosure of 404 material weaknesses, in order to investigate whether real 
earnings management decisions are related to the existence of material weakness-
es rather than the disclosure of those weaknesses. 
2.2 The effect of disclosure: real earnings management after disclosure of 
material weakness 
Company stakeholders may perceive material weaknesses in internal control over 
financial reporting to be an indicator of unreliable financial reporting, and there-
fore as increasing information risk. Previous studies generally suggest that equity 
markets react negatively to disclosures of internal control deficiencies (Schneider 
et al. 2009). For example, Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2009) document adverse reac-
tions to the disclosures of internal control deficiencies, and although Beneish et 
al. (2009) suggested that investors react negatively only to section 302 disclosure 
reports (see footnote 7), Rezee et al. (2012) found negative stock market reactions 
to section 404 disclosures. Moreover, previous research has found evidence of the 
high cost of debt for companies with internal control deficiencies (e.g., Kim et al. 
2011), and less financial analysts’ coverage after internal control weaknesses had 
been disclosed (Clinton et al. 2014). Experimental studies have also found, for 
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example, that adverse internal control opinions have an impact on loan officers’ 
assessments of risk (Schneider and Church 2008), analysts’ risk assessments 
(Shelton and Whittington 2008), and investors’ decision making (Lopez et al. 
2009). Finally, Su et al. (2014) illustrate a decline in customer demand after the 
disclosure of internal control weakness. In summary, managers probably expect 
negative reactions from various stakeholders and negative economic consequenc-
es to arise from material weakness disclosures. Considering that corporate execu-
tives pay a great deal of attention to stock prices, and their personal and company 
reputation (Graham et al. 2005), managers of companies disclosing material 
weaknesses could be expected to have an incentive for upward earnings manage-
ment to mitigate the negative consequences involved (e.g., lowered stock-based 
compensation, career concerns, increased risk of being the target of a hostile 
takeover). 
The management of companies with recent disclosures of material weaknesses 
might expect to attract the rigorous attention of auditors and regulators, making 
accruals-based earnings management seem risky. Real earnings management does 
not violate GAAP and therefore is not something that external auditors, for exam-
ple, would necessarily constrain or could even detect.9 Moreover, the opaque na-
ture of real earnings management is likely to mislead investors (Kothari et al. 
2012). Therefore, managers might consider enhancing financial performance by 
real earnings management in cases when the companies have received bad public-
ity from material weakness disclosure outweighs the risk of that real earnings 
management being detected. Based on the above indications of management in-
centives to manipulate earnings, this study examines whether companies disclos-
ing material weaknesses have higher levels of real earnings management com-
pared to companies without a history of material weaknesses. Accordingly, we 
propose the following hypothesis: 
H2: Companies disclosing previous year internal control material weaknesses for 
the first time have higher levels of real earnings management than companies that 
have always had effective internal controls. 
                                                 
 
9 Kim and Park (2014) do suggest that auditors drop clients with aggressive real activities manipu-
lation. Thus, in order to avoid excessive risk, auditors appear to be concerned about real earn-
ings management. Whether auditors would actually constrain real earnings management is, 
however, another issue. Chi et al. (2011) find that companies that have higher quality external 
auditors employ real earnings management, since these auditors are constraining accrual earn-
ings management. 
68      Acta Wasaensia 
 
3 Data and methodology 
3.1 Sample description 
The data used in this study consist of company-year observations of listed com-
panies located in the U.S., covering the years 2004–2012. The data on internal 
control over financial reporting and external auditors are obtained from the Audit 
Analytics database, whereas the financial statement data are obtained from the 
Thomson Financial database. 
The initial sample of internal control opinions from Audit Analytics consists of 
54,798 company-year observations (11,491 companies). Then, in order to exam-
ine the hypotheses, we identify the following groups:  
o MWEXIST to test Hypothesis 1: company-year observations of existing mate-
rial weaknesses for the first time based on subsequent Section 404 internal 
control reports. 
o MWDISCLCLEAN to test Hypothesis 2: company-year observations of first-
time material weakness disclosures, where companies subsequently disclosed 
a clean report. Because our second hypothesis relates to the impact of the dis-
closure in particular, we exclude those MWDISCLCLEAN observations where 
the previous year’s material weaknesses were disclosed only in the restated 
internal control report. 
o MWDISCLREPEATED to provide supplemental information: company-year ob-
servations of first-time material weakness disclosures, where companies con-
tinue to have material weaknesses. 
o EIC: effective internal controls—observations of companies that have always 
disclosed a clean internal control report. Because the dataset consists of both 
auditors’ internal control reports (starting from 2004) and management-only 
internal control reports (mostly starting from 2007), we use two criteria to 
construct the EIC group: 1) observations of companies that have disclosed a 
clean internal control report each year 2004–2012, and 2) observations of 
companies that have disclosed a clean internal control report each year 2007–
2012 and no internal control reports before 2007. The second criterion is ap-
plied to capture smaller companies that began to disclose internal control re-
ports only after 2007 in the control sample. Moreover, we exclude company-
year observations with disclosed weaknesses based on section 302 require-
ments (see footnote 7). 
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After identifying these groups, the sample consists of 23,409 company-year ob-
servations: 4,267 observations in the MWEXIST group; 1,081 observations in the 
MWDISCLCLEAN group; 1,858 observations in the MWDISCLREPEATED group; 
and 16,203 observations in the EIC group. 
The initial sample from Thomson Financial consists of financial data for 9,669 
companies, and after excluding banks, insurance companies, and other financial 
companies (SIC codes 6XXX), and the observations with missing values on vari-
ables required to estimate real earnings management, the sample consists of 
20,498 company-year observations (3,340 companies).10 
After combining the Thomson Financial data with the Audit Analytics’ data, and 
after excluding the observations with missing values on control variables, the fi-
nal sample consists of 5,439 company-year observations: 532 observations in the 
MWEXIST group; 259 observations in the MWDISCLCLEAN group; 194 observa-
tions in the MWDISCLREPEATED group; and 4,454 observations in the EIC group. 
The number of sample observations by year, and by group, is presented in Table 
1. 
Table 1. Sample by year and by group  
Year MWEXIST 
MWDISCL 
CLEAN 
MWDISCL 
REPEATED 
EIC Total 
      
2004 93 0 0 379 472 
2005 85 47 37 378 547 
2006 57 60 29 365 511 
2007 95 35 9 517 656 
2008 73 51 44 553 721 
2009 36 28 36 556 656 
2010 29 19 12 567 627 
2011 31 6 17 579 633 
2012 33 13 10 560 616 
Total 532 259 194 4,454 5,439 
Notes: See Appendix 1 for variable definitions. 
 
 
                                                 
 
10 This sample is used to estimate the models of production costs, discretionary expenditure, and 
operating cash flows, and further, to determine measures for real earnings management (see 
the model specification section for details). 
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3.2 Propensity-score-matched sample 
Companies with material weaknesses usually possess certain company character-
istics (e.g., poor financial performance, complexity, and small size) (e.g., Ge and 
McVay 2005; Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2007; Doyle et al. 2007b) that could them-
selves incentivize earnings management. Therefore, we conduct analyses using a 
propensity-score-matched sample as well. This approach aims to match each ma-
terial weakness company to a control company that is similar along observable 
dimensions other than the treatment effect. It is suggested that the advantage of 
this approach is its ability to better control for determinants of material weakness 
companies because it disregards functional form for confounding effects that in-
herently exist in cross-sectional regression analyses (Skaife et al. 2013). We 
match companies belonging to the MWEXIST, MWDISCLCLEAN, and MWDIS-
CLREPEATED groups with EIC companies based on the predicted probabilities de-
rived from the following probit regression: 
MW = α + β1LOGMC + β2LOGAGE + β3FOREIGN + β4SQRTSEGMENTS + 
β5RESTRUCTURE + β6ACQUISITION + β7INV + β8LOSS + β9ROA + 
β10LEVt-1 + β11GC + β12ZSCORE + β13HIGHGROWTH + β14BIG4 + 
β15AUDITORCHANGE + β16LITIGATION + β17ICREPORTM + annual 
fixed effects + industry fixed effects + ε, 
(1) 
where MW is assigned a value of one if it is either MWEXIST, MWDISCLCLEAN, 
or MWDISCLREPEATED, and zero if it is an EIC observation. Model (1) includes 
independent variables of measures for company size (LOGMC), age (LOGAGE), 
complexity (FOREIGN, SQRTSEGMENTS, RESTRUCTURE, ACQUISITION, 
INV), financial performance (LOSS, ROA), debt (LEVt-1), bankruptcy risk (GC, 
ZSCORE), extreme growth (HIGHGROWTH), auditor (BIG4, AUDI-
TORCHANGE), litigation risk (LITIGATION), management-only internal control 
reports (ICREPORTM). Moreover, Model (1) includes year and industry (two-
digit SIC codes) dummy variables. See Appendix 1 for the variable definitions. 
Before the propensity-score matching, the sample consisted of 4,971 observations 
(after excluding observations with missing data on the independent variables). 
The estimation results of the probit regression are presented in column (1) of Ap-
pendix 2. The propensity-score-matched sample used in the analyses comprises 
1,432 company-year observations.11 The same propensity-score-matching proce-
                                                 
 
11 After the propensity score matching procedure, the sample size at the first stage is 1,710 obser-
vations. However, to tighten matching criteria even further, we include to the matched sample 
only those observations with maximum of ten percent difference in propensity scores between 
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dure was applied for the reduced sample where observations with missing values 
for the performance-matched real earnings management variables (see the model 
specification section for details) are dropped. After the matching, the propensity-
score-matched sample for the analyses with performance-matched real earnings 
management variables comprises 748 observations. 
3.3 Model specifications 
Following Roychowdhury (2006), we investigate the following real earnings 
management methods: increasing earnings by reducing the cost of goods sold by 
overproducing inventory (proxied by the abnormal level of production costs); 
reducing discretionary expenditure (proxied by the abnormal level of discretion-
ary expenditures); and sales manipulation (proxied by the abnormal level of cash 
flow from operations). Overproduction of inventories is considered real earnings 
management when producing an excessive volume of units is intended to reduce 
fixed costs per unit by spreading fixed overhead costs over a larger number of 
units (Cohen et al. 2008). Thus, overproduction can reduce sales costs in a current 
period and therefore increase earnings, if greater inventory holding costs or mar-
ginal cost per unit are not offsetting realized cost savings (Gunny 2010). Howev-
er, in subsequent periods high inventory holding costs caused by excess of inven-
tories are negatively affecting cash flows. The normal level of production costs is 
measured using the following model: 
 
(2) 
where PROD12  is the sum of the cost of goods sold in year t and the change in 
inventory from t-1 to t, S is net sales, and TA is total assets. 
                                                                                                                                     
 
treatment observation and control observation (84 percent of the 1,432 observations have a 
maximum of one percent difference in propensity scores). In the propensity score matched 
sample, the mean (median) difference in propensity scores is 0.0030 (0.0001). Moreover, a re-
run of Model (1) using the propensity score matched sample shows that the global hypothesis 
that all of the explanatory variables are zero cannot be rejected, suggesting that the matching 
was successful (chi-square 18.29, Prob > Chi-Square 1.000). These results are presented in 
column (2) of Appendix 2. 
12 Following Roychowdhury (2006), we use production costs instead of cost of goods sold because 
of two reasons: Using cost of goods sold may also measure simultaneously accrual manipula-
tion via inventory account, and it could be distorted by company's FIFO/LIFO choice. 
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Reducing discretionary expenditure refers to managers trying to decrease expens-
es such as advertising expense, research and development, and selling, general, 
and administrative (SG&A) expenses to achieve various income objectives for the 
current period (Cohen et al. 2008). While the reduction of those costs can boost 
current period earnings, the action is likely to have a negative effect on cash flow 
in the future and is therefore not an optimal long-term operational decision. For 
instance, delaying the start of a new project or shutting down a research site can 
weaken a company's competitive advantage in the markets (Graham et al. 2005). 
The normal level of discretionary expenditure is measured using the following 
model: 
 
(3) 
where DISX is the discretionary expenditure (i.e., the sum of R&D expenditure, 
advertising, and SG&A expenditure13) in year t. 
Sales manipulation may be carried out using various techniques enabling manag-
ers to increase sales during the current year in an effort to increase reported earn-
ings. Offering customers abnormal discounts or lenient credit terms can increase 
sales volume temporarily and pull sales from the next fiscal year into the current 
year, but is also likely to result in reduced cash flows overall and sacrifice future 
earnings (Cohen et al. 2008; Gunny 2010). Furthermore, re-establishing former 
prices and payment terms can adversely affect demand if customers defer pur-
chases in anticipation of more favorable terms reappearing (Roychowdhury 2006; 
Gunny 2010). The normal level of cash flow from operations is measured using 
the following model: 
 
 
(4) 
where OCF is cash flow from operations in year t. 
                                                 
 
13 If advertising or R&D are missing, they are set to zero (see Roychowdhury 2006). 
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Models (2), (3), and (4) are estimated for industry-years with at least 15 observa-
tions, and the industry categorization is based on two-digit SIC industry groups. 
The estimated residuals from Model (2) represent the abnormal level of produc-
tion costs (AB_PROD). Higher residuals indicate greater inventory overproduc-
tion, which reduces the cost of goods sold and increases earnings. The estimated 
residuals from Model (3) represent the abnormal level of discretionary expendi-
ture (AB_DISX), with lower values indicating greater real earnings management 
to increase earnings. The estimated residuals from Model (4) represent the ab-
normal level of operating cash flows (AB_OCF), with lower values indicating 
greater real earnings management to increase earnings. Observations with ex-
treme values are winsorized at the top and bottom one percent. 
Following Kothari et al. (2005), who demonstrate an improvement in abnormal 
accruals estimations after taking performance into account, recent studies (e.g., 
Cohen et al. 2014; Kim and Park 2014) suggest that real earnings management 
estimations also include potential performance-related misspecification. There-
fore, we construct two additional real earnings management variables adjusted by 
performance (return on assets). First, we estimate the above Models (2)-(4) after 
including the previous year’s return on assets (ROAt-1) in the models. The real 
earnings management variables from these estimations are labeled 
AB_PROD_LAGROAadded, AB_DISX_LAGROAadded, and 
AB_OCF_LAGROAadded. Second, we follow Kim and Park (2014) in employing 
the performance-matching procedure. We subtract the mean values of real earn-
ings management measures of matched control companies based on the following 
criteria: fiscal year, two-digit SIC code and ROA between +/- 50 percent. The 
sample observation is dropped if there is no match between the ROA ranges. 
These real earnings management variables are labeled AB_PROD_ROAmatched, 
AB_DISX_ROAmatched, and AB_OCF_ROAmatched. 
To test Hypotheses 1 and 2, we estimate the following OLS regression model: 
RM = α + β1MWEXIST + β2MWDISCLCLEAN + β3MWDISCLREPEATED + β4LOGMC 
+ β5LEVt-1 + β6PBt-1 + β7ΔINCOMEt-1 + β8ROAt-1 + β9BIG4 + β10DACC + 
annual fixed effects + industry fixed effects + ε, 
 (5) 
where RM is either AB_PROD, AB_DISX, or AB_OCF (or their corresponding 
performance-adjusted measures). Congruent with groups described in the sample 
description section, the variables of interest are the following: MWEXIST is a 
dummy variable set to one, if the company year includes first-time material 
weaknesses in internal controls over financial reporting according to the 404 re-
port, and zero otherwise; MWDISCLCLEAN is a dummy variable assigned a value 
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of one if the previous company year included first-time material weaknesses in 
internal controls, and the subsequent report was a clean report, and zero other-
wise; MWDISCLREPEATED is a dummy variable equal to one, if the previous com-
pany year included first-time material weaknesses in internal controls according 
to the 404 report, and the subsequent report still indicated material weaknesses, 
and zero otherwise; EIC group of companies without a history of 404 material 
weaknesses serves as the control group. 
Model (5) includes control variables for various company characteristics expected 
to influence real earnings management. The following six control variables were 
adapted from Chi et al. (2011). We control for company size by including the 
natural logarithm of market capitalization (LOGMC) in the model. To control for 
the effect of indebtedness on real earnings management, we include the prior fis-
cal year’s leverage (LEV) in the model. We add the previous year’s price-to-book 
ratio (PB) into the model in order to control for growth opportunities. We control 
for firm performance by adding the previous year’s change in net income before 
extraordinary items (∆INCOME) and return on assets (ROA) to the model. To 
control for the effect of the size of the audit firm on its client companies’ real 
earnings management, we include an indicator variable for the four largest audit 
firms (BIG4). 
Moreover, as Zang (2012) suggest that accrual-based earnings management is 
associated with real activities manipulation, we add discretionary accruals 
(DACC) to the model as a control variable.14 Year and industry (according to the 
two-digit SIC industry groups) fixed effects control for temporal variation and 
industry differences in the real earnings management. The variables are defined in 
Appendix 1.15 
3.4 Descriptive statistics 
Panel A of Table 2 displays the descriptive statistics of the variables used in the 
empirical analyses. The means of the real earnings management variables 
(LAGROAadded, and ROAmatched in parentheses, respectively) are: AB_PROD -
                                                 
 
14 There may not be direct causal relationship between these variables, as Zang (2012) suggests 
that these two earnings management methods are sequential decisions, i.e. real earnings man-
agement (executed during the fiscal year) preceding accrual-based earnings management (ex-
ecuted after the fiscal-year end to "fine-tune the manipulation"). However, we include discre-
tionary accruals to the model to control for accounting earnings management behavior. 
15 The continuous control variables are winsorized at the top and bottom one percent to mitigate 
outliers. 
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0.013 (-0.007, -0.026), AB_DISX -0.007 (0.032, 0.005), and AB_OCF 0.033 
(0.007, 0.013). The median values of the real earnings management variables 
(LAGROAadded, and ROAmatched in parentheses, respectively) are: AB_PROD -
0.009 (-0.001, -0.023), AB_DISX -0.067 (-0.032, -0.015), and AB_OCF 0.048 
(0.021, 0.018). According to Cohen et al. (2014): “… in random samples where 
firms are selected without regard to any hypothesis or prediction about manage-
rial incentives to manage real activities, the expected value of each REM measure 
is zero.” Against this backdrop, our inferences from the analyses are based on 
those models where the real earnings management measure contains less bias 
(i.e., the mean and median are closer to zero). Our distributional statistics regard-
ing the means (and medians) of real earnings management measures indicate that 
LAGROAadded variables are the most well-specified measures for abnormal pro-
duction costs and abnormal operating cash flows16, while ROAmatched is the 
most well-specified measure for abnormal discretionary expenses. 
Market capitalization ranges from 2.486 million to 113 billion dollars, with an 
average (median) value of 6,136 (819) million dollars. The mean (median) LEVt-1 
is 0.196 (0.180), PBt-1 is 3.479 (2.265), ∆INCOMEt-1 is 0.017 (0.010), and ROAt-1 
is 0.010 (0.050). In addition, 76 percent of the company years are audited by one 
of the four largest audit firms. The mean (median) DACC is -0.069 (0.002). 
Panel B of Table 2 displays the Pearson correlation coefficients across the inde-
pendent variables. Overall, correlations between the variables are modest and the 
highest correlation (0.629) occurs between the indicator variable for a Big 4 audit 
firm (BIG4) and market capitalization (LOGMC). Untabulated variance inflation 
factors do not indicate problems with multicollinearity. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
16 The median of the performance-matched measure of abnormal operating cash flows is slightly 
closer to zero com-pared to LAGROAadded measure. However, since the difference in mean 
values between these two measures is somewhat larger, with the mean of LAGROAadded be-
ing closer to zero, the inferences from the analyses are primarily based on results where 
AB_OCF_LAGROAadded is the dependent variable. 
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics  
Panel A: Distributional statistics 
Variable Mean Std. Min 25%tile Median 75%tile Max N 
AB_PROD -0.013 0.228 -0.936 -0.120 -0.009 0.094 0.910 5,439 
AB_PROD 
LAGROAadded 
-0.007 0.224 -0.919 -0.107 -0.001 0.095 0.845 5,439 
AB_PROD 
ROAmatched 
-0.026 0.229 -1.151 -0.134 -0.023 0.079 1.330 3,839 
AB_DISX -0.007 0.646 -1.771 -0.196 -0.067 0.045 5.378 5,439 
AB_DISX 
LAGROAadded 
0.032 0.561 -1.473 -0.136 -0.032 0.078 4.893 5,439 
AB_DISX 
ROAmatched 
0.005 0.404 -6.352 -0.100 -0.015 0.084 5.708 3,839 
AB_OCF 0.033 0.246 -1.830 -0.027 0.048 0.139 1.006 5,439 
AB_OCF 
LAGROAadded 
0.007 0.206 -1.523 -0.037 0.021 0.087 0.954 5,439 
AB_OCF 
ROAmatched 
0.013 0.173 -1.396 -0.037 0.018 0.073 2.661 3,839 
MWEXIST 0.098 0.297 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 5,439 
MWDISCLCLEAN 0.048 0.213 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 5,439 
MWDISCLREPEATED 0.036 0.185 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 5,439 
EIC 0.819 0.385 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 5,439 
Market cap  
(millions) 
6136.140 16616.390 2.486 161.788 819.321 3456.080 113240.000 5,439 
LEVt-1 0.196 0.169 0.000 0.028 0.180 0.307 0.649 5,439 
PBt-1 3.479 4.458 0.350 1.415 2.265 3.759 34.282 5,439 
∆INCOMEt-1 0.017 0.155 -0.554 -0.020 0.010 0.042 0.745 5,439 
ROAt-1 0.010 0.181 -0.902 -0.004 0.050 0.093 0.335 5,439 
BIG4 0.758 0.428 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 5,439 
DACC -0.069 3.244 -17.264 -0.210 0.002 0.290 13.966 5,439 
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Panel B: Pearson’s correlation coefficients among independent variables 
(N=5,439) 
  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
MWEXIST (1) -0.074 -0.063 -0.206 -0.022 0.033 0.038 -0.123 -0.139 -0.001 
MWDISCL 
CLEAN(2)  
-0.043 -0.122 -0.016 0.016 -0.054 -0.094 -0.083 0.018 
MWDISCL 
REPEATED(3)  
  -0.179 -0.007 0.053 -0.022 -0.124 -0.155 0.030 
LOGMC (4) 
   
0.174 0.033 0.000 0.388 0.629 -0.007 
LEVt-1 (5)     
0.108 -0.042 -0.022 0.168 0.032 
PBt-1 (6)      
0.021 -0.221 -0.074 0.032 
∆INCOMEt-1 (7)       
0.354 0.010 0.004 
ROAt-1 (8)        
0.261 -0.009 
BIG4 (9) 
        
-0.012 
DACC (10)          
Notes: See Appendix 1 for variable definitions. Bold text in the Pearson correlation matrix indicates significance at 
the 0.05 level. 
 
In Table 3, we present the mean differences of the real earnings management 
measures between MW companies and EIC companies. The statistical signifi-
cances are based on t-tests. In general, these univariate tests imply that MWEX-
IST companies, MWDISCLCLEAN companies, and MWDISCLREPEATED compa-
nies, have higher levels of real earnings management than EIC companies. Spe-
cifically, across different real earnings management measures, abnormal produc-
tion costs appear to be consistently higher in MW companies than in EIC compa-
nies. Abnormal operating cash flows are significantly smaller in MW companies, 
except when using the performance-matched measure. Performance-matched ab-
normal discretionary expenses are significantly smaller for companies with exist-
ing material weaknesses. Companies disclosing material weaknesses and subse-
quently disclosing a clean report have also significantly smaller discretionary ex-
penses, but only when using the measure estimated from the models with lagged 
ROA added. However, we make our inferences based on the multivariate analyses 
reported in the following section. 
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Table 3. Univariate results  
 MWEXIST MWDISCLCLEAN MWDISCLREPEATED 
Control group: 
EIC 
 Mean n Mean n Mean n Mean n 
AB_PROD 0.031 *** 532 
0.038 
*** 259 
0.067 
*** 194 -0.025 4,454 
AB_PROD LAGROAadded 0.032 *** 532 
0.043 
*** 259 
0.072 
*** 194 -0.018 4,454 
AB_PROD ROAmatched 
0.004 
** 271 
0.026 
** 136 -0.004 81 -0.031 3,351 
         
AB_DISX -0.027 532 -0.013 259 0.044 194 -0.007 4,454 
AB_DISX LAGROAadded 0.013 532 
-0.021 
** 259 0.021 194 0.038 4,454 
AB_DISX ROAmatched 
-0.038 
* 271 
-0.044 
 
136 
-0.037 
 
81 0.011 3,351 
         
AB_OCF 
-0.031 
*** 532 
-0.025 
*** 259 
-0.027 
*** 194 0.047 4,454 
AB_OCF LAGROAadded -0.052 *** 532 
-0.032 
*** 259 
-0.013 
* 194 0.018 4,454 
AB_OCF ROAmatched -0.002 271 0.000 136 0.022 81 0.015 3,351 
Notes: See Appendix 1 for variable definitions. Statistical significance are based on t-tests. 
4 Results 
We estimate Model (5) to test whether MWEXIST, MWDISCLCLEAN, and/or 
MWDISCLREPEATED are associated with real activities manipulation. The OLS re-
gression results (the statistical significances calculated by clustering the standard 
errors within companies) are reported in Table 4: regressions of abnormal produc-
tion costs, abnormal discretionary expenditure, and abnormal operating cash 
flows in Panel A, Panel B, and Panel C of Table 4, respectively. In each panel, 
columns (1)-(3) report the results when using the total sample, while columns (4)-
(6) report the results when using the propensity-score-matched sample. 
4.1 Abnormal production costs 
The results in Panel A of Table 4 indicate that the coefficient on MWEXIST is 
positive and significant at the 0.05 level when the dependent variable is either 
AB_PROD or AB_PROD_LAGROAadded. The findings are similar for the pro-
pensity-score-matched sample. When using the performance-matched measure of 
abnormal production costs (AB_PROD_ROAmatched), MWEXIST is insignificant. 
However, as explained in the descriptive statistics section, our distributional sta-
tistics suggest that the most well-specified measure for abnormal production costs 
is that calculated by adding the lagged ROA (AB_PROD_LAGROAadded) to the 
estimation models [Model (2)]. It should also be noted that using the propensity-
score-matched sample should control for differences in performance, among oth-
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ers. We therefore infer that the existence of material weaknesses is associated 
with inventory overproduction. 
In the analyses on the total sample, the coefficients on MWDISCLCLEAN indicate a 
significant and positive association with AB_PROD (at the 0.10 level) and 
AB_PROD_LAGROAadded (at the 0.05 level). These associations are similar 
when using the propensity-score-matched sample (a positive association with 
AB_PROD significant at the 0.05 level and with AB_PROD_LAGROAadded sig-
nificant at the 0.01 level). Following the rationale outlined above, we infer that 
companies disclosing material weaknesses have greater inventory overproduction, 
although the performance-matched measure is not significantly associated with 
MWDISCLCLEAN. 
When using the total sample (propensity-score-matched sample) MWDISCLRE-
PEATED is positive and significant at the 0.01 level (at the 0.05 level) when the de-
pendent variable is AB_PROD, and positive and significant at the 0.01 level when 
the dependent variable is AB_PROD_LAGROAadded. Thus, we infer that compa-
nies disclosing material weaknesses and maintaining material weaknesses (as 
confirmed by a subsequent internal control report) have significantly more inven-
tory overproduction compared to companies with effective internal controls.17 
Again, the association is insignificant when using the performance-matched 
measure as a dependent variable [columns (3) and (6)]. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
17 In column (2) where the dependent variable is AB_PROD_LAGROAadded, the coefficients on 
MWEXIST, MWDISCLCLEAN, and MWDISCLREPEATED indicate 3, 3.7, and 7.1 percentage points 
higher abnormal production costs compared to the control group, respectively. 
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4.2 Abnormal discretionary expenses 
The results in Panel B of Table 4 indicate that MWEXIST is negative and signifi-
cant at the 0.01 level when the dependent variable is AB_DISX, and negative and 
marginally significant (at the 0.10 level) when the dependent variable is 
AB_DISX_ROAmatched. We draw our inferences from the model with a perfor-
mance-matched measure as a dependent variable, since the distributional statistics 
in Panel A Table 2 suggest that ROAmatched variable is the most well-specified 
measure for abnormal discretionary expenses. Moreover, in the propensity score 
matched sample, MWEXIST is marginally significantly associated with AB_DISX 
(at the 0.10 level). We therefore conclude that the existence of material weak-
nesses has a modest association with the reduction of discretionary expenses. 
In the total sample, MWDISCLCLEAN is marginally significantly (at the 0.10 level) 
associated with the performance-matched measure of abnormal discretionary ex-
penses (AB_DISX_ROAmatched). When using the propensity-score-matched 
sample, MWDISCLCLEAN is significant at the 0.01 level when the dependent varia-
ble is AB_DISX or AB_DISX_LAGROAadded, and significant at the 0.05 level 
when the dependent variable is AB_DISX_ROAmatched. In sum, we find evidence 
that companies disclosing material weaknesses are cutting discretionary expenses 
to manage earnings. 
MWDISCLREPEATED is marginally significant in the total sample when the perfor-
mance-matched measure of abnormal discretionary expenses 
(AB_DISX_ROAmatched) is the dependent variable. Moreover, when using the 
propensity-score-matched sample, MWDISCLREPEATED is significant at the 0.05 
level, but only if the dependent variable is AB_DISX_ROAmatched. Accordingly, 
these results offer evidence that companies disclosing material weaknesses and 
continuing to have material weaknesses are managing earnings by reducing dis-
cretionary expenses, albeit that evidence is somewhat modest.18 
 
 
                                                 
 
18 In column (3) where the dependent variable is AB_DISX_ROAmatched, the coefficients on 
MWEXIST, MWDISCLCLEAN, and MWDISCLREPEATED indicate 5.5, 7.1, and 7.9 percentage 
points lower abnormal discretionary expenses compared to the control group, respectively. 
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4.3 Abnormal operating cash flows 
The results in Panel C of Table 4 do not show any consistent evidence of an asso-
ciation between abnormal operating cash flows and material weaknesses. That is, 
MWEXIST is negative and significant at the 0.05 level (at the 0.10 level) when 
using the total sample (the propensity-score-matched sample) and the dependent 
variable is AB_OCF_LAGROAadded (which is the most well-specified measure 
of abnormal operating cash flows based on distributional statistics). Thus, we 
conclude that there is some evidence of sales manipulation when companies have 
material weaknesses. However, it appears that companies disclosing material 
weaknesses are not employing sales manipulation to manage earnings. When the 
dependent variable is AB_OCF_ROAmatched, MWDISCLREPEATED is positive and 
marginally significant in columns (3 and (6), but the statistical power of these 
models is almost non-existent.19 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
19 In column (2) where the dependent variable is AB_OCF_LAGROAadded, the coefficient on 
MWEXIST indicate 2.8 percentage points lower abnormal operating cash flows compared to 
the control group. 
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4.4 Additional tests 
In the main analyses, we attempted to alleviate the concern that the performance 
of material weakness companies is systematically lower than that in the EIC con-
trol companies by 1) using a propensity-score-matched sample, and 2) employing 
performance-adjusted measures of real earnings management. Moreover, in order 
to scrutinize the incentives for real earnings management, we investigate whether 
the association between MW and real earnings management differs based on pre-
vious performance. 
We construct two sub-samples based on performance in the previous fiscal year: 
1) poor performing companies with a negative change in net income (DINCOMEt-
1<0), or a negative return on assets (ROAt-1< 0), and 2) better performing compa-
nies with both a positive change in net income (DINCOMEt-1>0), and a positive 
return on assets (ROAt-1>0). Moreover, we include in those sub-samples only 
those observations that show an increase in net income in the current fiscal year 
(DINCOMEt>0). We rerun the analyses using those sub-samples. The results re-
ported in Table 5 indicate that when the sample consists of previously poorly per-
forming companies, the existence of material weaknesses (MWEXIST) is associat-
ed with higher levels of abnormal production costs (Panel A columns 1–3) and 
lower levels of abnormal discretionary expenses (Panel B columns 1–2).20 This 
suggests that, although the incentive is similar (being previous poor performance), 
the management of a material weakness company is the one employing these real 
earnings management methods. 
When the sample consists of previously better performing companies, companies 
disclosing material weaknesses (MWDISCLCLEAN) have higher levels of abnormal 
production costs (Panel A columns 4–6) and lower levels of discretionary expens-
es (Panel B columns 4–6) than companies that have never reported 404 material 
weaknesses. That is, when investigating a sample of companies that have all pre-
viously showed good financial performance (i.e., the sample companies do not 
have a clear performance-related incentive to manage earnings), the disclosure of 
material weaknesses (MWDISCLCLEAN) is significantly associated with real earn-
ings management, suggesting that the negative publicity associated with the dis-
closure of material weakness induces management to employ these real earnings 
management methods. 
                                                 
 
20 The association with the performance-matched measure is insignificant (column 3), but it 
should be noted that the model fit is weak. 
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The results of the abnormal operating cash flows are somewhat inconsistent (Pan-
el C of Table 5). In the sample of previously poor performing companies, 
MWDISCLCLEAN is marginally negatively associated with abnormal operating cash 
flows, but not when the dependent variable is the performance-adjusted measure. 
Moreover, in the sample of better performing companies, the coefficient on 
MWEXIST is marginally significant when the dependent variable is 
AB_OCF_LAGROAadded. 
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4.5 Robustness checks 
As of 2007, Auditing Standard No. 2 was replaced by Auditing Standard No. 5 
(AS5), which recognizes scalability in evaluating controls, and requires a top-
down risk-based approach to controls testing. Although including indicator varia-
bles for fiscal years should capture the yearly effects on the material weakness 
disclosures, we perform the propensity-score matching by replacing the year 
dummy variables in Model (1) with an indicator variable for the company years 
after 2006. The regression results of estimating Model (5) using the alternative 
propensity-score-matched sample are presented in Table 6. The inferences from 
these results are essentially similar to those from the main analyses, although 
some significance levels vary. For example, MWDISCLCLEAN is significantly asso-
ciated with each measure of abnormal production costs (Panel A of Table 6). 
Moreover, MWEXIST and abnormal discretionary expenses is insignificant when 
the dependent variable is the basic measure, but significant at the 0.05 level when 
the dependent variable is the performance-matched measure (Panel B of Table 6).  
Real earnings management through overproduction is applicable to manufacturing 
companies, which is why we also estimate the model of abnormal production 
costs for manufacturing companies (two-digit SIC codes between 20 and 39) 
(Cohen et al. 2008). The inferences from the results presented in Table 7 are simi-
lar to those from the main analysis (Panel A of Table 4). 
Because our first hypothesis relates to the existence but not the disclosure of ma-
terial weaknesses and our second hypothesis relates specifically to the disclosure, 
we exclude those MWEXIST observations that disclosed 302 weaknesses21 in the 
first and/or the second quarter from the sample. The inferences from these 
(untabulated) results are essentially similar to those from the main analyses. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
21 No distinction is made between material weaknesses and significant deficiencies. 
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Table 6. Propensity-score-matched sample with AS5 controlled 
Panel A: Abnormal production costs 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent variable   AB_PROD 
AB_PROD 
LAGROAadded 
AB_PROD 
ROAmatched 
 
Exp. 
sign 
Est. t  Est. t  Est. t  
MWEXIST + 0.030 1.69 * 0.034 1.97 ** 0.031 1.41  
MWDISCLCLEAN + 0.051 2.30 ** 0.056 2.66 *** 0.070 2.37 ** 
MWDISCLREPEATED + 0.041 1.69 * 0.056 2.19 ** 0.033 0.93  
LOGMC - -0.012 -2.27 ** -0.009 -1.66 * -0.001 -0.10  
LEVt-1 + 0.186 3.78 *** 0.176 3.68 *** 0.079 1.11  
PBt-1 - -0.004 -1.79 * -0.006 -2.27 ** -0.013 -1.87 * 
∆INCOMEt-1 - -0.002 -0.05  0.036 0.81  0.006 0.07  
ROAt-1 - -0.049 -0.91  -0.056 -1.02  -0.184 -1.08  
BIG4 - 0.014 0.63  0.011 0.51  0.002 0.08  
DACC ? 0.000 0.15  0.002 0.58  -0.001 -0.29  
Intercept  0.000 -0.01  0.021 0.28  0.128 0.75  
Annual fixed effects?  Yes   Yes   Yes   
Industry fixed effects?  Yes   Yes   Yes   
Adj. R2  0.04   0.03   0.05   
N  1,468   1,468   792   
 
Panel B: Abnormal discretionary expenses 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent variable   AB_DISX 
AB_DISX 
LAGROAadded 
AB_DISX 
ROAmatched 
 
Exp. 
sign 
Est. t  Est. t  Est. t  
MWEXIST - -0.024 -0.68  -0.009 -0.26  -0.054 -1.99 ** 
MWDISCLCLEAN - -0.052 -1.73 * -0.054 -1.89 * -0.113 -2.30 ** 
MWDISCLREPEATED - 0.005 0.09  -0.020 -0.37  -0.126 -2.55 ** 
LOGMC + -0.004 -0.34  -0.006 -0.60  0.017 1.36  
LEVt-1 - -0.241 -2.40 ** -0.304 -3.53 *** -0.281 -3.16 *** 
PBt-1 + 0.012 2.64 *** 0.012 2.81 *** 0.015 2.07 ** 
∆INCOMEt-1 + 0.182 1.27  0.266 1.98 ** -0.049 -0.34  
ROAt-1 + -0.551 -3.95 *** -0.080 -0.58  -0.003 -0.01  
BIG4 + -0.040 -0.86  -0.023 -0.54  -0.020 -0.55  
DACC ? -0.020 -2.29 ** -0.022 -2.64 *** 0.003 0.48  
Intercept  -0.278 -1.84 * -0.034 -0.23  -0.112 -0.67  
Annual fixed effects?  Yes   Yes   Yes   
Industry fixed effects?  Yes   Yes   Yes   
Adj. R2  0.11   0.10   0.07   
N  1,468   1,468   792   
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Panel C: Abnormal operating cash flows 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent variable   AB_OCF 
AB_OCF 
LAGROAadded 
AB_OCF 
ROAmatched 
 
Exp. 
sign 
Est. t  Est. t  Est. t  
MWEXIST - -0.025 -1.62  -0.028 -2.11 ** -0.009 -0.60  
MWDISCLCLEAN - -0.020 -1.28  -0.014 -1.01  -0.002 -0.08  
MWDISCLREPEATED - -0.004 -0.20  0.008 0.38  0.025 1.20  
LOGMC + 0.008 1.75 * 0.009 2.03 ** -0.006 -0.90  
LEVt-1 - 0.116 3.09 *** 0.112 3.22 *** 0.114 2.42 ** 
PBt-1 + -0.002 -0.76  0.000 -0.04  -0.002 -0.58  
∆INCOMEt-1 + -0.090 -1.70 * -0.145 -2.62 *** 0.068 0.74  
ROAt-1 + 0.502 7.99 *** 0.218 3.60 *** 0.094 0.57  
BIG4 + 0.010 0.54  0.010 0.61  0.019 0.93  
DACC ? 0.007 2.12 ** 0.007 2.37 ** 0.005 1.40  
Intercept  0.074 1.04  -0.017 -0.34  -0.151 -1.20  
Annual fixed effects?  Yes   Yes   Yes   
Industry fixed effects?  Yes   Yes   Yes   
Adj. R2  0.22   0.11   0.01   
N  1,468   1,468   792   
Notes: See Appendix 1 for the variable definitions. Statistical significances based on two-tailed tests at the 1 
percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels are denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively. Statistical significances 
are calculated by clustering the standard errors within companies (Petersen 2009). For brevity, results for the 
year and industry fixed effects are not reported. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Acta Wasaensia     93 
 
Table 7. Abnormal production costs – manufacturing companies SIC 20XX-
39XX 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
     
Dependent variable   AB_PROD 
AB_PROD 
LAGROAadded 
AB_PROD 
ROAmatched 
 
Exp. 
sign 
Est. t  Est. t  Est. t  
MWEXIST + 0.049 3.41 *** 0.048 3.33 *** 0.022 1.19  
MWDISCLCLEAN + 0.051 2.74 *** 0.052 2.83 *** 0.024 1.10  
MWDISCLREPEATED + 0.070 3.44 *** 0.081 3.94 *** 0.007 0.25  
LOGMC - -0.008 -2.07 ** -0.007 -1.67 * -0.008 -1.70 * 
LEVt-1 + 0.243 6.37 *** 0.244 6.47 *** 0.209 4.58 *** 
PBt-1 - -0.012 -6.51 *** -0.012 -6.58 *** -0.014 -5.59 *** 
∆INCOMEt-1 - 0.000 -2.13 ** 0.000 -1.83 * 0.000 -0.64  
ROAt-1 - -0.130 -3.60 *** -0.125 -3.44 *** -0.075 -1.01  
BIG4 - -0.003 -0.12  -0.004 -0.22  -0.024 -0.97  
DACC ? 0.001 1.09  0.002 1.41  0.002 1.45  
Intercept  0.019 0.45  0.018 0.41  0.055 1.09  
Annual fixed effects?  Yes   Yes   Yes   
Industry fixed effects?  Yes   Yes   Yes   
Adj. R2  0.12   0.12   0.11   
N  3,742   3,742   2,631   
Notes: See Appendix 1 for the variable definitions. Statistical significances based on two-tailed tests at the 1 
percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels are denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively. Statistical significances 
are calculated by clustering the standard errors within companies (Petersen 2009). For brevity, results for the 
year and industry fixed effects are not reported. 
5 Conclusions 
This study examines the association between SOX 404 material weaknesses and 
earnings management by manipulating real operational activities. Our empirical 
findings suggest that both the existence and the disclosure of SOX 404 material 
weaknesses are related to real earnings management. For companies with existing 
material weaknesses, the results consistently indicate overproduction being used 
as a method of real earnings management. Although the association may stem 
from the behavior of an opportunistic management, the poor ‘tone at the top’ may 
also flow through to inventory-related operational decisions via low quality inter-
nal information caused by material weaknesses (see Feng et al. 2015). Further-
more, the findings show some evidence that the existence of material weaknesses 
is associated with the reduction of discretionary expenses. 
Companies disclosing material weaknesses are using inventory overproduction 
and reduction of discretionary expenses as real earnings management methods. 
Cutting discretionary expenses in particular is probably the most feasible real 
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earnings management method after disclosure. We do not find evidence of sales 
manipulation among companies disclosing material weaknesses, which might be 
due to reduced customer demand after the disclosure of internal control weak-
nesses (Su et al. 2014), making sales manipulation as a dysfunctional real earn-
ings management method for material weakness companies. 
The additional analyses reveal that among previously poor performing companies, 
the existence of material weaknesses in particular is associated with real earnings 
management, implying that the management of a company with material weak-
nesses employs real earnings management methods. However, when the sample 
consists of previously better performing companies, it is mainly the companies 
disclosing material weaknesses that appear to be employing real earnings man-
agement methods, suggesting that the incentive stems from the negative publicity 
flowing from material weakness disclosures. 
Our results offer several avenues for future research. First, while we interpret our 
results as indicating that material weakness companies do engage in real earnings 
management, whether intentionally or unintentionally, future research could strive 
to investigate the question of intentionality further. Second, as our data set is in-
adequate to address the underlying reason for the variance in these real earnings 
management methods, we surmise that one possible reason is the desirability of a 
specific method in a certain situation and a fear of real earnings management be-
ing detected by outsiders determining the preferred order of the application of real 
earnings management methods. 
In summary, the findings of this study suggest that, after controlling for various 
company characteristics, material weaknesses reflect pervasive control problems 
and the ‘tone at the top’, enabling real earnings management behavior. Material 
weaknesses hence identify a setting where there is a greater risk of the value of 
stockholders’ investments in the company being reduced in the long run via real 
activities manipulation. The findings of this study extend the research on internal 
control over financial reporting and the research on real earnings management by 
providing new information on situations that can provide fertile ground for real 
earnings management, and on what might prompt it. 
We acknowledge as a limitation of the study that some material weaknesses might 
not be detected and disclosed (see e.g., Rice and Weber 2012). However, this 
concern is not likely to distort the statistical significance of our findings if the 
underlying reasons for undetected weaknesses are random. In addition, there is a 
risk that the models used in this study to capture real earnings management might 
measure it erroneously, and thus bias our results. This is, however, the same risk 
faced by prior real earnings management studies (e.g., Roychowdhury 2006; Co-
 Acta Wasaensia     95 
 
hen et al. 2008; Zang 2012). Finally, we acknowledge that the common problem 
of endogeneity cannot be completely ruled out, although we do address this issue 
by employing a propensity-score-matching technique and using the matched sam-
ple in our main analyses. 
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Appendices  
Appendix 1. Variable definitions 
 Variable Definition 
AB_PROD 
The estimated residuals from the following industry-year regression 
 
AB_DISX 
The estimated residuals from the following industry-year regression 
 
 
AB_OCF 
The estimated residuals from the following industry-year regression 
 
 
PROD 
The sum of the cost of goods sold in year t and the change in inventory 
from t-1 to t. 
DISX 
The discretionary expenditure that are the sum of R&D expenditure, adver-
tising, and selling, general, and administrative (SG&A) expenditure. 
OCF Cash flow from operations. 
TA Total assets. 
S Net sales. 
AB_PROD 
LAGROAadded 
The estimated residuals from the following industry-year regression 
 
AB_DISX 
LAGROAadded 
The estimated residuals from the following industry-year regression 
 
AB_OCF 
LAGROAadded 
The estimated residuals from the following industry-year regression 
 
AB_PROD 
ROAmatched 
AB_PROD minus average AB_PROD of matched control companies based 
on fiscal-year, two-digit SIC code and return on assets between +/- 50 
percent. 
AB_DISX 
ROAmatched 
AB_DISX minus average AB_DISX of matched control companies based 
on fiscal-year, two-digit SIC code and return on assets between +/- 50 
percent. 
AB_OCF 
ROAmatched 
AB_OCF minus average AB_OCF of matched control companies based on 
fiscal-year, two-digit SIC code and return on assets between +/- 50 percent. 
MWEXIST 
A dummy variable with a value of one if the company-year includes first 
time material weaknesses in internal controls according to the subsequent 
404 report, and zero otherwise. 
MWDISCLCLEAN 
A dummy variable with a value of one if the previous company-year in-
cluded first time material weaknesses, but the current company-year does 
not include weaknesses based on subsequent 404 report, and zero other-
wise.  
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MWDISCLREPEATED 
A dummy variable with a value of one if the previous company-year in-
cluded first time material weaknesses and the current company-year again 
includes weaknesses based on subsequent 404 report, and zero otherwise. 
LOGMC The natural logarithm of market capitalization. 
LEVt-1 Beginning of the year total debt divided by total assets. 
PBt-1 Lagged price-to-book ratio. 
∆INCOMEt-1 
Lagged change in a company’s annual net income before extraordinary 
items, scaled by the beginning of the year total assets. 
ROAt-1 
Lagged ROA calculated as net income before extraordinary items, scaled 
by the beginning of the year total assets. 
BIG4 
A dummy variable with a value of one if the auditor is one of the four larg-
est audit firms, and zero otherwise. 
DACC 
Discretionary accruals estimated using the modified Jones (1991) model 
with ROAt-1 included to the model. 
YEAR Dummy variables for the fiscal years 2004–2012. 
INDUSTRY Dummy variables for two-digit SIC industry groups. 
Variables used in the propensity score matching [Model (1)] if not defined above: 
MW 
A dummy variable with a value of one if MWEXIST=1, MWDISCLCLEAN=1, 
or MWDISCLREPEATED=1, and zero otherwise. 
LOGAGE 
A natural logarithm of the number of years since the company was found-
ed. 
FOREIGN 
A dummy variable with a value of one if a company reported geographic 
segment(s) other than the US, and zero otherwise. 
SQRTSEGMENTS 
The square root of the number of business segments reported by the com-
pany. 
RESTRUCTURE 
A dummy variable with a value of one if a company reported restructuring 
expenses / charges, and zero otherwise. 
ACQUISITION 
A dummy variable with a value of one if an exemption to the assessment of 
internal controls indicates acquisition(s) during the past year, and zero 
otherwise. 
INV Total inventory divided by total assets. 
LOSS 
A dummy variable with a value of one if the net income before extraordi-
nary items is negative in year t or t-1, and zero otherwise. 
GC 
A dummy variable with a value of one if a company received a going con-
cern opinion, and zero otherwise. 
ZSCORE 
Altman’s Z-score: 1.2*(working capital / total assets) + 1.4*(retained earn-
ings / total assets) + 3.3*(earnings before interests and taxes / total assets) 
+ 0.6*(market capitalization/total liabilities) + 1*(sales/total assets). 
HIGHGROWTH 
A dummy variable with a value of one if a company’s sales growth from 
previous fiscal year falls into the top quartile in the sample, and zero oth-
erwise. 
AUDI-
TORCHANGE 
A dummy variable with a value of one if the signing audit firm changed 
from previous year, and zero otherwise. 
LITIGATION 
A dummy variable with a value of one if the company operates in a liti-
gious industry (SIC codes 2833–2836, 3570–3577, 3600–3674, 5200–
5961, 7370-7374), and zero otherwise.  
ICREPORTM 
A dummy variable with a value of one if the internal control report is man-
agement-only report (no auditor’s internal control report), and zero other-
wise. 
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Appendix 2. Probit regression results on estimating Model (1) 
 (1) (2) 
Dependent variable  MW MW 
 
Estimate Z  Estimate Z  
LOGMC -0.218 -10.68 *** 0.015 0.48  
LOGAGE -0.147 -4.78 *** 0.013 0.31  
FOREIGN -0.120 -1.97 ** 0.039 0.47  
SQRTSEGMENTS 0.276 5.03 *** 0.031 0.39  
RESTRUCTURE 0.057 0.92  -0.033 -0.37  
ACQUISITION -0.057 -0.68  -0.003 -0.02  
INV 0.197 0.83  -0.289 -0.91  
LOSS 0.175 2.82 *** 0.021 0.24  
ROA -0.185 -1.62  -0.016 -0.10  
LEVt-1 0.428 2.85 *** -0.076 -0.37  
GC 0.526 3.94 *** -0.055 -0.28  
ZSCORE -0.000 -0.87  0.003 0.87  
HIGHGROWTH 0.130 2.08 ** -0.115 -1.37  
BIG4 -0.154 -2.09 ** 0.013 0.13  
AUDITORCHANGE 0.431 5.02 *** 0.081 0.70  
LITIGATION 0.225 2.83 *** 0.011 0.10  
ICREPORTM -0.096 -1.03  0.071 0.54  
Intercept 0.318 1.22  0.001 0.00  
Annual fixed effects? Yes   Yes   
Industry fixed effects? Yes   Yes   
N 4,971   1,432   
Likelihood ratio 
Chi-Square 1,073.98 
Prob > ChiSq  0.0000 
Chi-Square, 18.29 
Prob > ChiSq  1.0000 
Log likelihood -1744.89 -983.44 
Notes: See Appendix 1 for the variable definitions. Statistical significance based on two-tailed tests at the 1 
percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels are denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively. For brevity, results for 
the year and industry fixed effects are not reported. 
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INCUMBENT AUDIT FIRM-PROVIDED TAX 
SERVICES AND CLIENTS WITH LOW FINANCIAL 
REPORTING QUALITY♦ 
The co-authors of this essay are H. Gin Chong and Erkki K. Laitinen 
ABSTRACT 
This study investigates whether tax services being provided by incumbent audit 
firms enhances or impairs the likelihood of acknowledging client companies’ low 
financial reporting quality. In particular, we examine the association between tax-
related fees and the likelihood of timely restatements, and internal control weak-
ness disclosures among a sample of US companies that all have misstatements in 
their financial information. The empirical findings indicate that companies paying 
higher tax-related fees are less likely to disclose SOX 404 internal control weak-
nesses, implying that underlying control problems are unacknowledged when 
incumbent audit firm-provided tax-related fees are higher. However, the findings 
suggest that merely providing both audit and tax-related services does not have an 
impact on audit quality per se, but rather it is the magnitude of the tax-related fees 
in particular that counts. We also find some evidence suggesting that companies 
paying higher tax-related fees have a greater likelihood of restatement lags, 
whereas companies paying smaller tax-related fees to their audit firm restate fi-
nancial statements in a more timely manner. Overall, the findings suggest that 
audit scrutiny of client companies with low quality financial reporting is weaker 
when the magnitude of tax-related fees is higher. 
 
Keywords: tax fees, financial reporting quality, internal control weakness 
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1 Introduction 
This study investigates whether tax services provided by incumbent audit firms 
enhance or impair the likelihood of acknowledging client companies’ low finan-
cial reporting quality. Since the audit scandal involving Arthur Andersen, inves-
tors and regulators have expressed their concerns over the magnitude of non-audit 
services provided by incumbent audit firms, because they are perceived as a threat 
to auditors’ independence, in that non-audit services might increase auditors’ 
economic dependence on their clients, leading to lower audit quality. In the USA, 
the Sarbanes Oxley Act (SOX) (2002) prohibits audit firms from providing most 
non-audit services to their audit clients, but permits tax services due to the poten-
tial benefits from knowledge spillover to audit quality. After all, audit quality 
consists of both the likelihood that the auditor discovers a breach (implying ex-
pertise and audit effort) and the likelihood that the auditor discloses the breach 
(implying objectivity and independence) (DeAngelo 1981).  
The bulk of prior studies have investigated the association between non-audit fees 
and audit/financial reporting quality, and reported somewhat mixed results (see 
Schneider et al. 2006 for a review). After the restrictions on the provision of most 
non-audit services by incumbent audit firms (SOX 2002), prior research has par-
ticularly focused on the influence of tax services in order to examine whether the 
expected benefits from knowledge spillover outweigh the problems of economic 
dependence (e.g., Seetharaman et al. 2011; Krishnan and Visvanathan 2011; Pat-
erson and Valencia 2011). In this study, we approach the issue of incumbent audit 
firm-provided tax services using a sample of companies that all have poor finan-
cial reporting quality, that is, they are companies with misstatements that were 
eventually restated. The misstatements are determined from the restated periods 
indicated by restatement data. First, we investigate whether tax fees are associated 
with those misstatements in financial information that remain undiscovered in a 
fiscal year in question, to which we refer to as restatement lag. We therefore 
compare companies with restatement lag to those companies with misstatements 
restated more quickly. Secondly, we investigate whether tax fees are associated 
with the likelihood of Section 404 internal control weakness disclosures. Based 
on the view that an occurrence of a misstatement indicates existing internal con-
trol weaknesses (e.g., Eilifsen and Messier 2000; Rice and Weber 2012), disclos-
ing material weakness would suggest that the company acknowledges the control 
weaknesses. The research setting featuring a sample of similar companies in 
terms of poor accounting quality allows examining the auditors’ professional 
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skepticism in particular.1 Thus, the underlying assumption is that high quality 
auditing should lead to the discovery of any material misstatements and internal 
control weaknesses, and auditors should require management to acknowledge 
them. Enhanced knowledge about the client via tax-services could make restate-
ments more timely and material weakness disclosures more likely for companies 
with poor accounting quality. However, economic dependence may reduce an 
auditor’s professional skepticism, resulting in restatement lags and unacknowl-
edged control problems. 
The inferences of the findings in prior studies that investigate the association be-
tween incumbent audit firm-provided tax services and financial reporting quality 
mostly support the knowledge spillover view. For example, Kinney et al. (2004) 
suggest that tax-related fees reduce the likelihood of restatements, implying there 
are benefits from knowledge spillover. Seetharaman et al. (2011), however, report 
insignificant association between tax-related fees and restated periods, but signifi-
cant negative association with tax-related restatements. These studies examine 
whether or not restatements/misstatements occur. Harris and Zhou (2013) suggest 
that tax services lead to reduced likelihood of non-tax internal control weaknesses 
but do not have an effect on tax-related weaknesses. A lower likelihood of re-
statements and/or internal control weaknesses could, however, also signify a re-
luctance to acknowledge and disclose them. Rice and Weber (2012) examine a 
sample of companies with existing internal control weaknesses and find that non-
audit fees makes it less likely that material weaknesses are disclosed, supporting 
the economic dependence view. We extend the findings of the prior studies on tax 
services and investigate the role of audit firm-provided tax services among com-
panies with poor financial reporting quality.  
This study uses a sample of fiscal-year observations of US companies from 2005–
2012. Only the company-years involving misstatements are included in the sam-
ple used in the analyses. That analysis investigates the probability of a restate-
ment lag (an indicator variable for company-years where restatement is disclosed 
after the filing date of internal control opinion) and the probability of internal 
control material weakness disclosure (an indicator variable for internal control 
reports disclosing material weaknesses). Our independent variables of interest are 
                                                 
 
1 Nelson (2009) defines professional skepticism as “indicated by auditor judgments and decisions 
that reflect a heightened assessment of the risk that an assertion is incorrect, conditional on 
the information available to the auditor.” He elaborates that “In many circumstances the as-
sertion in question will be a client’s assertion that the financial statements are free of material 
misstatement, but the definition could apply to other assertions as well (e.g., attesting to the 
effectiveness of a client’s internal controls).” 
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(1) an indicator variable with a value of one if the tax fees paid to the incumbent 
auditor are greater than zero, and zero otherwise (DTAXFEES), (2) the tax fees 
paid to the incumbent auditor divided by the square root of total assets 
(TAXFEES), (3) the ratio of tax fees divided by total fees paid to the incumbent 
auditor (TAXFEES_TF), and (4) the ratio of tax fees divided by audit fees paid to 
the incumbent auditor (TAXFEES_AF).       
The empirical findings of this study suggest that in all different model specifica-
tions, the indicator variable for tax services is insignificant. This implies that tax 
services provided by incumbent audit firms do not have either a quality-
enhancing or quality-impairing impact. However, the results indicate that the con-
tinuous variables measuring the magnitude of tax-related fees (TAXFEES, 
TAXFEES_TF, and TAXFEES_AF) have negative effects on the likelihood of a 
material weakness disclosure, although the significance levels vary across differ-
ent model specifications. That is, we find evidence implying that the higher (pro-
portional) magnitude of tax fees results in unacknowledged control problems. In 
most model specifications, tax-related fees are not associated with the likelihood 
of restatement lags. However, when we further examine the impact of tax-related 
fees using a sample of only those companies that have paid tax-related fees to 
their auditors (i.e., observations of zero tax fees are excluded), the results indicate 
that tax fees divided by total fees and tax fees divided by audit fees are (mostly 
marginally) significantly associated with higher likelihood of restatement lags and 
lower likelihood of material weakness disclosures. These findings support the 
inference that it is the magnitude of the fees in particular that reduce the likeli-
hood of acknowledging client companies’ financial reporting problems. In sum-
mary, this study contributes to the literature investigating non-audit fees charged 
by incumbent audit firms by suggesting that, among companies with poor ac-
counting quality, a stronger economic bond with the client resulting from higher 
levels of tax-related fees may jeopardize the auditor’s independence and impair 
auditor’s professional skepticism. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section summarizes 
the literature on the relation between non-audit services and financial reporting 
quality, and develops the hypotheses. Section three describes the data and the 
methodology. Results are reported in Section four, and are followed by conclu-
sions. 
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2 Background and hypotheses development 
Over the past 30 years, audit firms have expanded their business areas to consul-
tancy services, such as taxation, mergers and acquisitions, and risk management. 
Research on audit quality has investigated the possible benefits and disadvantages 
of an audit firm providing both audit and non-audit services to the same client 
concurrently. There are two conflicting hypotheses on the association between 
non-audit services being provided by an incumbent auditor and audit quality. The 
knowledge spillover view suggests that information acquired in the course of con-
sulting flows to the audit partner, improving the quality of the audit (and vice ver-
sa) (e.g., Simunic 1984). However, these services are economically important to 
the audit firms. High non-audit fees increase an auditor’s economic dependence 
on the client, thereby possibly impairing audit quality (e.g., Simunic 1984).2 
Prior studies have reported mixed results on the association between non-audit 
fees and audit/financial reporting quality (see Schneider et al. 2006 for a review). 
While the findings of Frankel et al. (2002), Ferguson et al. (2004), and Kana-
garetnam et al. (2011) imply that non-audit fees impair auditor independence, 
DeFond et al. (2002), Ashbaugh et al. (2003), Chung and Kallapur (2003), 
Raghunandan et al. (2003), and Reynolds et al. (2004) do not find a statistically 
significant association between non-audit fees and audit/financial reporting quali-
ty.  
The findings of an experiment by Joe and Vandervelde (2007) indicate that alt-
hough knowledge spillover improves audit risk assessment, auditors seem to be 
less skeptical in identifying specific factors indicative of fraud when they provide 
both audit and non-audit services. Rice and Weber (2012) examine a sample of 
companies with existing internal control weaknesses and find that non-audit fees 
make it less likely that material weaknesses are disclosed. Their findings therefore 
support the economic dependence view. Prior research has also investigated mar-
ket perceptions of non-audit services being provided by incumbent audit firms 
(e.g., Krishnan et al. 2005; Francis and Ke 2006; Khurana and Raman 2006), and 
the findings generally suggest that investors perceive the provision of non-audit 
services impairs auditor independence. 
In 2002, the US Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX), which brought 
greater regulation to audit firms, among other things. In order to enhance audit 
                                                 
 
2 As defined by DeAngelo (1981), audit quality consists of both the likelihood that the auditor 
discovers a breach and the likelihood that the auditor discloses the breach. 
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quality by securing auditor independence, SOX provisions and Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) rules prohibit audit firms from offering audit and 
certain non-audit services to the same client concurrently. Because of the poten-
tial benefits from knowledge spillover, providing tax services is permitted, but is 
hedged with specific requirements. For example, an audit committee must ap-
prove in advance all audit firm-provided tax services, tax-related fees paid to the 
audit firm must be reported separately, and there are limitations to the scope of 
the tax consulting (SEC 2003; PCAOB 2005).  
There are some prior studies examining the effects of tax services on the clients’ 
financial reporting quality. The underlying assumption in most of these studies is 
that better quality auditing ought to manifest in better quality financial reporting 
by the client company. Kinney et al. (2004) find a negative association between 
restatements of financial statements and tax fees. They interpret this result as sug-
gesting that there are benefits from tax consulting that flow to the audit quality. 
Seetharaman et al. (2011) examine the association between restated periods and 
tax-related fees, but do not find statistically significant results. However, they 
report a significant negative relation when the restatements relate to tax issues. 
Choi and Lee (2009) find that tax services being provided by an incumbent audit 
firm results in lower client discretionary accruals. Huang et al. (2007) find mostly 
insignificant associations between tax fees and proxies for financial reporting 
quality (some weak evidence of lower abnormal accruals, but insignificant asso-
ciation with meeting or beating earnings benchmarks). Krishnan and Visvanathan 
(2011) suggest that tax services have a negative impact on loss avoidance. 
Gleason and Mills (2011) find improvement in estimates for tax reserves when 
the audit firm also provides tax services. Harris and Zhou (2013) suggest that tax 
services lead to lower likelihood of non-tax internal control weak-nesses but do 
not have an effect on tax-related weaknesses. In addition to the studies examining 
the client company’s financial reporting quality, Robinson (2008) finds a positive 
association between tax fees and the likelihood that the auditor issues a going 
concern opinion prior to bankruptcy filing. In summary, these studies support the 
view of knowledge spillover or find insignificant associations. However, a few 
prior studies have found indications suggesting that tax fees may have a negative 
effect on audit quality. Using an experiment, Favere-Marchesi (2006) find that the 
joint provision of audit and tax services lead to significantly lower fraud-risk as-
sessments. Paterson and Valencia (2011) find that recurring audit firm-provided 
tax services create knowledge spillover, but nonrecurring tax services seem to 
have a detrimental impact on auditor independence.  
In this study, we approach the issue of tax services being provided by an incum-
bent audit firm via a sample of companies with poor financial reporting quality, 
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that is, companies with misstatements. The misstatements are determined from 
restatement data, and the focus is on the restated periods. Rather than examining 
the years of restatement announcements, it is more appropriate to concentrate on 
the restated periods including misstatement in order to determine the company-
years with poor accounting quality. First, we investigate whether tax-related fees 
are associated with those misstatements in financial information that remain un-
discovered in a fiscal year in question, to which we refer as restatement lag. Sec-
ond, we investigate whether tax-related fees are associated with the likelihood of 
internal control weakness disclosures among companies with misstatements. SOX 
Section 404 requires the management of listed companies to disclose their as-
sessment on the effectiveness of internal control over financial reporting.3 The 
underlying assumption is that an occurrence of a misstatement indicates internal 
control weaknesses (e.g., Eilifsen and Messier 2000; Leone 2007; Rice and We-
ber 2012). Therefore, utilizing a sample of companies with misstatements (even-
tually restated), we examine whether tax fees has an impact on whether or not a 
company disclosed the existing material weaknesses. 
A research setting utilizing a sample of companies that all have low financial re-
porting quality allows the examination of auditors’ professional skepticism in the 
context of the joint provision of tax services and audit services. Given the cost (a 
threat to auditor independence) and benefit (knowledge spillover) associated with 
tax services, it is not obvious how tax services affect audit quality. The enhanced 
knowledge of clients acquired via the provision of tax services could make re-
statements more timely and material weakness disclosures more likely in compa-
nies with poor accounting quality. However, economic dependence might disrupt 
an auditor’s professional skepticism, resulting in restatement lags and unacknowl-
edged control problems. Thus, we state the following two hypotheses without 
directional expectations:  
H1: There is a significant association between restatement lag and incumbent au-
dit firm-provided tax services among companies with poor financial reporting 
quality.    
                                                 
 
3 This section became effective for accelerated filers in 2004. In addition to the management as-
sessment, Section 404 requires the company’s external auditor to attest the assessment. Since 
2007 smaller listed companies have also been reporting their assessment of internal control ef-
fectiveness annually, but auditor’s internal control disclosure is not required. Thus, our sample 
includes company-year observations with both auditor internal control reports and manage-
ment-only internal control reports. 
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H2: There is a significant association between disclosure of internal control 
weaknesses and incumbent audit firm-provided tax services among companies 
with poor financial reporting quality. 
3 Data and methodology 
3.1  Sample and model specification 
The data used in this study consist of company-year observations of US listed 
companies from 2005–2012. We start the sample selection by gathering from Au-
dit Analytics all the companies located in the US that have issued the SOX Sec-
tion 404 mandated internal control reports. Then we obtain restatement data and 
audit fee data (also from Audit Analytics), and combine those with the internal 
control data. Finally, we extract the financial data from the Thomson Financial 
database. 
The samples used in the analyses consist of companies with poor financial report-
ing quality based on occurrences of misstatements (eventually restated). Specifi-
cally, we examine the restatement disclosure data, focusing on the restated peri-
ods, that is, the periods including misstatements. The restatement data include the 
period beginning and ending dates for which the company is restating. The re-
statement can affect an entire fiscal year, multiple fiscal years, or only a part of 
the fiscal year. 
In order to investigate the first hypothesis, we estimate the following logit mod-
el4: 
REST_LAG = α + β1taxservices + β2AUDITFEES + β3AUDITRELATED + 
β4OTHERFEES + β5BIG4 + β6GC + β7ACHANGE + β8LOGTA + 
β9LOGNBS + β10FOREIGN + β11RESTRUCT + β12ACQ + 
β13LOSS + β14LEV + β15PRIORICW + annual fixed effects + in-
dustry fixed effects + ε 
(1) 
 
 
                                                 
 
4 Because we are estimating conditional probability, we use logistic analysis, where normal distri-
butions of variables are not required. 
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The dependent variable in Model (1) is REST_LAG, which is a dummy variable 
equal to one if the restatement announcement took place after the filing date of 
internal control report, and zero otherwise. If more than one restatement an-
nouncement affects the same fiscal-year, REST_LAG is coded as one only if each 
announcement date takes place after the filing date of the internal control report. 
The rationale in the analyses using Model (1) is to compare company-years where 
misstatements were restated in a more timely manner to those company-years 
where misstatements were restated only at the later periods (restatement lag). We 
assume that better audit quality would manifest in a reduced likelihood of re-
statement lags. 
In order to investigate the second hypothesis, we estimate the following logit 
model: 
MW404 = α + β1taxservices + β2AUDITFEES + β3AUDITRELATED + 
β4OTHERFEES + β5BIG4 + β6GC + β7ACHANGE + β8LOGTA + 
β9LOGNBS + β10FOREIGN + β11RESTRUCT + β12ACQ + β13LOSS + 
β14LEV + β15PRIORICW + annual fixed effects + industry fixed ef-
fects + ε 
(2) 
The dependent variable in Model (2) is MW404, which is a dummy variable equal 
to one if a company disclosed an internal control report indicating material weak-
nesses, and zero otherwise. Since the sample used in the analyses consists of 
company-years with misstatements, material weakness disclosures could be ex-
pected to indicate that control problems have been acknowledged. The data on 
section 404 material weaknesses consists of both auditor internal control reports 
and management-only reports (see also footnote 3). The assumption is that, in 
case of high quality auditing, auditors would require management to acknowledge 
existing material weaknesses also when they do not issue their own internal con-
trol report. Additionally, we use the variable MW404FIRST, which is set to one if 
a company discloses internal control material weaknesses for the first time, and 
zero otherwise. 
Both Model (1) and Model (2) include the same explanatory variables. Tax-
services represents the four alternative variables for tax-related fees, which are 
examined separately in the analyses: DTAXFEES is set as one, if tax-related fees 
are greater than zero, and zero otherwise; TAXFEES measures the magnitude of 
tax fees, and is calculated by dividing tax-related fees paid to the incumbent audi-
tor by the square root of total assets (see Kinney et al. 2004); TAXFEES_TF is the 
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ratio of tax-related fees paid to the incumbent auditor divided by total fees5; 
TAXFEES_AF is the ratio of tax-related fees paid to the incumbent auditor divid-
ed by audit fees. 
The control variables are adapted from prior studies investigating the likelihood 
of restated financial statements (Seetharaman et al. 2011) and the non-disclosure 
of existing material weaknesses (Rice and Weber 2012). AUDITFEES controls 
for the effect of audit effort, and is calculated as audit fees scaled by the square 
root of total assets (see e.g., Kinney et al. 2004; Rice and Weber et al. 2012). Sim-
ilarly, audit related fees (AUDITRELATED) and all other auditor fees (OTHER-
FEES) are scaled by the square root of total assets. To control for the effect of 
audit firm size, an indicator variable for the Big 4 audit firms (BIG4) is included 
in the model (see e.g., Seetharaman et al. 2011). Indicator variables for going 
concern opinion (GC) and for change of the signatory audit firm from previous 
year (ACHANGE) are also included in the model. Company size is controlled by 
including the natural logarithm of total assets (LOGTA) in the model (e.g., 
Seetharaman et al. 2011). Complex companies might have more difficulties to 
establish and maintain higher quality accounting system. To control for the effect 
of company complexity, we include the natural logarithm of the number of busi-
ness segments (LOGNBS) in the model (e.g., Seetharaman et al. 2011). Moreover, 
we include indicator variables for companies reporting geographic segment(s) 
other than the USA (FOREIGN), restructuring expenses/charges (RESTRUCT) 
and exemptions to the internal control assessment due to acquisition (ACQ).6 
Poorly performing companies may have more incentive to manage earnings, 
and/or have less resource to maintain high quality accounting systems. Thus, we 
add to the model an indicator variable for companies reporting negative income in 
either previous or current company year (LOSS) to control for financial perfor-
mance. Highly leveraged companies might try to avoid violating debt covenants 
by managing earnings (e.g., Seetharaman et al. 2011), but those companies might 
also be subject to closer monitoring leading to more conservative reporting (e.g., 
Seetharaman et al. 2011). Thus, we include leverage (LEV) calculated as total 
debt divided by total assets in the model.7 Finally, we control for the disclosure of 
the previous year’s internal control effectiveness (PRIORICW). PRIORICW is set 
to one if a company identified internal control weaknesses in the previous year 
based on either Section 404 disclosure or Section 302 quarterly disclosure. SOX 
                                                 
 
5 Total fees is the sum of audit fees, audit related fees, tax-related fees, and other fees. 
6 This information is based on Audit Analytics data where it is indicated if exemptions to the as-
sessment of internal controls over financial reporting were identified. 
7 Observations with LEV>1 are excluded to mitigate outliers. 
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Section 302 relates to quarterly reporting and requires management to assess the 
effectiveness of disclosure controls and procedures. Finally, year and industry 
(according to the 17 industry classifications by Fama and French) fixed effects 
control for temporal variation and industry differences. All the variables used in 
the analyses are defined in Table 1. 
Table 1. Variable definitions 
Variable Definition 
REST_LAG 
A dummy variable with a value of one if the restatement announcement took 
place after the filing date of internal control opinion, and zero otherwise. 
MW404 
A dummy variable with a value of one if a company disclosed weaknesses in 
internal controls over financial reporting based on Section 404, and zero 
otherwise. 
MW404FIRST 
A dummy variable with a value of one if a company disclosed weaknesses in 
internal controls over financial reporting based on Section 404 for the first 
time, and zero otherwise. 
DTAXFEES 
A dummy variable with a value of one if a company paid tax related fees to 
the auditor, zero otherwise. 
TAXFEES 
Tax related fees paid to the incumbent auditor scaled by the square root of 
total assets. 
TAXFEES_TF Tax related fees paid to the incumbent auditor scaled by total fees. 
TAXFEES_AF Tax related fees paid to the incumbent auditor scaled by audit fees. 
AFEES Audit fees scaled by the square root of total assets. 
AUDITRELATED Audit related fees scaled by the square root of total assets. 
OTHERFEES Other fees scaled by the square root of total assets. 
BIG4 
A dummy variable with a value of one if the auditor is one of the four larg-
est audit firms, and zero otherwise. 
GC 
A dummy variable with a value of one if a company received a going con-
cern opinion, and zero otherwise. 
ACHANGE 
A dummy variable with a value of one if the signing audit firm changed 
from the previous fiscal year, and zero otherwise. 
LOGTA The natural logarithm of total assets 
LOGNBS 
The natural logarithm of the number of business segments reported by the 
company. 
FOREIGN 
A dummy variable with a value of one if a company reported geographic 
segment(s) other than the US, and zero otherwise. 
RESTRUCT 
A dummy variable with a value of one if a company reported restructuring 
expenses / charges, and zero otherwise. 
ACQ 
A dummy variables with a value of one if an exemption to the assessment of 
internal controls indicates acquisition(s) during the past year, and zero oth-
erwise. 
LOSS 
A dummy variable with a value of one if the net income before extraordi-
nary items is negative in year t or t-1, and zero otherwise. 
LEV Total debt divided by total assets 
PRIORICW 
A dummy variable with a value of one if the company disclosed either Sec-
tion 404 material weaknesses or Section 302 weaknesses in the previous 
year, and zero otherwise. 
YEAR A dummy variable for the fiscal years 2005–2012 
INDUSTRY A dummy variable for Fama and French 17 industry classifications 
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The analyses are conducted using 1) total sample of restated company-years and 
2) sample of company-years where only the first restated years are included. The 
number of observations in the samples is as follows8: 
1) Total samples of restated company-years 
o Model (1) used to examine the probability of a restatement lag: 2,749 ob-
servations (1,343 unique companies) 
o Model (2) used to examine the probability of a material weakness disclo-
sure: 2,584 observations (1,312 unique companies). If a restated internal 
control report was issued and the material weaknesses were stated only in 
the restated report, the observation is excluded from the sample. 
 Additionally, we examine the probability of a first time material 
weakness disclosure: 2,262 observations (1,174 unique compa-
nies). If an internal control report indicating material weaknesses is 
issued repeatedly (i.e., other than a first time material weakness 
report), the observation is excluded from the sample. 
2) Sample of restated company-years: only first restated years are included. A 
restatement may affect multiple fiscal years. We also conduct the analyses us-
ing a sample where continuous misstatement years have been excluded and 
examine only the first restated fiscal years. 
o Model (1) used to examine the probability of a restatement lag: 1,374 ob-
servations (1,096 unique companies) 
o Model  (2) used to examine the probability of a material weakness disclo-
sure: 1,297 observations (1,051 unique companies) 
 Additional investigation of first time material weaknesses: 1,131 
observations (941 unique companies) 
                                                 
 
8 Exclusions from the sample are primarily related to missing values on variables needed in the 
analyses, but also to some extreme cases or possible data errors in financial dates (which are 
used to determine years including misstatements) and inconsistencies in auditor names be-
tween datasets. 
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3.2 Descriptive statistics 
The descriptive statistics of the variables used in the empirical analyses are pre-
sented in Panel A of Table 2. The mean of the dependent variable REST_LAG 
indicates that 63 percent of the sample observations are restatement lag observa-
tions. Moreover, 21 percent of the sample observations include 404 material 
weaknesses and 10 percent first time material weaknesses. The dummy variable 
for tax fees (DTAXFEES) indicates that 70 percent of the company-year observa-
tions include incumbent auditor-provided tax services. The means (medians) of 
tax fees scaled by the square root of total assets (TAXFEES) is 0.165 (0.045), the 
ratio of tax fees to total fees (TAXFEES_TF) is 0.074 (0.039), and the ratio of tax 
fees to audit fees (TAXFEES_AF) is 0.105 (0.044). The means (medians) of audit 
fees divided by the square root of total assets (AFEES) is 1.596 (1.263), audit re-
lated fees divided by the square root of total assets (AUDITRELATED) is 0.124 
(0.027), and other fees divided by the square root of total assets (OTHERFEES) is 
0.028 (0.000). Seventy-three percent of the company-years are audited by one of 
the Big 4 audit firms, seven percent of the sample observations have a going con-
cern opinion, and approximately eight percent have changed their signatory audi-
tor from the previous year. 
The average value of total assets is 9,730 million dollars with a median value of 
735 million dollars. The average number of business segments is 2.625. Approx-
imately 46 percent of the observations have foreign operations, 24 percent have 
reported restructuring expenses/charges, and 10 percent indicate an exception to 
the assessment of internal controls due to acquisition. In about 49 percent of the 
company-years, the companies report a loss in either the current or previous year. 
The mean (median) leverage is 0.247 (0.197). On average, 23 percent of the sam-
ple observations have disclosed internal control weaknesses based on section 404 
disclosure, or section 302 disclosure in the previous year. 
Panel B of Table 2 displays the Pearson correlation coefficients among the select-
ed variables. The two highest correlations among the independent variables occur 
between BIG4 and LOGTA (0.563), and TAXFEES and AUDITRELATED (0.462). 
The variance inflation factors (untabulated) do not indicate problems with multi-
collinearity. 
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics 
Panel A: Distributional statistics 
Variable Mean Std. Min 25%tile Median 75%tile Max N 
REST_LAG 0.628 0.483 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 2,749 
MW404 0.214 0.410 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 2,584 
MW404FIRST 0.103 0.303 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 2,262 
DTAXFEES 0.696 0.460 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 2,749 
TAXFEES 0.165 0.384 0.000 0.000 0.045 0.192 8.818 2,749 
TAXFEES_TF 0.074 0.094 0.000 0.000 0.039 0.115 0.553 2,749 
TAXFEES_AF 0.105 0.164 0.000 0.000 0.044 0.142 1.693 2,749 
AFEES 1.596 1.379 0.029 0.717 1.263 2.052 24.417 2,749 
AUDITRELATED 0.124 0.358 0.000 0.000 0.027 0.118 7.727 2,749 
OTHERFEES 0.028 0.239 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 7.115 2,749 
BIG4 0.730 0.444 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 2,749 
GC 0.069 0.253 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 2,749 
ACHANGE 0.084 0.277 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 2,749 
Total assets  
(millions) 
9729.710 96053.390 0.003 182.666 735.445 2728.510 3222422.000 2,749 
Segments 2.625 1.809 1.000 1.000 2.000 4.000 10.000 2,749 
FOREIGN 0.458 0.498 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 2,749 
RESTRUCT 0.242 0.428 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 2,749 
ACQ 0.101 0.302 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 2,749 
LOSS 0.492 0.500 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 2,749 
LEV 0.247 0.230 0.000 0.040 0.197 0.384 0.996 2,749 
PRIORICW 0.225 0.418 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 2,749 
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3.3 Univariate tests 
Panel A of Table 3 reports the univariate results when the sample is partitioned 
into two groups based on the restatement lag variable (REST_LAG). The mean 
differences examined are DTAXFEES, TAXFEES, TAXFEES_TF, and 
TAXFEES_AF. The statistical significances are based on t-tests for continuous 
variables and a chi-square test for dummy variables. The descriptive test results 
for the total sample indicate that companies with restatement lags are more likely 
to have tax fees (DTAXFEES has a marginally significant difference at the 0.10 
level), and have higher proportions of tax fees to total fees (TAXFEES_TF) and 
tax fees to audit fees (TAXFEES_AF) (significant at the 0.01 level) compared to 
companies with misstatements discovered before filing the internal control report. 
Moreover, the results of a sample that includes only the first restated years indi-
cate that companies with restatement lags have higher tax-related fees (TAXFEES, 
TAXFEES_TF, and TAXFEES_AF). 
Panel B of Table 3 reports the univariate results when the sample is partitioned 
into two groups based on the material weakness disclosure variable (MW404). 
These descriptive results indicate that companies disclosing material weaknesses 
have significantly lower tax-related fees compared to those that do not 
acknowledge their control problems. In the total sample, the differences are sig-
nificant with the variables DTAXFEES, TAXFEES_TF, and TAXFEES_AF. In the 
sample that includes only the first restated years, all the variables of tax-related 
fees are significantly different between companies that disclose weaknesses and 
those that do not disclose them. 
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Table 3. Univariate results 
Panel A: Restatement lags 
 
Total sample of restated 
company-years  
Sample of restated company-years: 
only first restated year included 
 
 
REST_LAG=1 
n=1,727 
REST_LAG=0 
n=1,022 
 
REST_LAG=1 
n=908 
REST_LAG=0 
n=466 
 
       
DTAXFEES 0.708 0.674 * 0.666 0.663  
TAXFEES 0.170 0.156  0.161 0.126 ** 
TAXFEES_TF 0.080 0.066 *** 0.074 0.062 ** 
TAXFEES_AF 0.114 0.090 *** 0.107 0.082 *** 
 
Panel B: Section 404 material weaknesses 
 
Total sample of restated 
company-years  
Sample of restated company-years: 
only first restated year included 
 
 
MW404=1 
n=554 
MW404=0 
n=2,030 
 
MW404=1 
n=281 
MW404=0 
n=1,016 
 
       
DTAXFEES 0.610 0.724 *** 0.577 0.696 *** 
TAXFEES 0.153 0.172  0.111 0.164 *** 
TAXFEES_TF 0.054 0.080 *** 0.047 0.078 *** 
TAXFEES_AF 0.075 0.114 *** 0.064 0.110 *** 
Notes: See Table 1 for the variable definitions. The statistical significances are based on t-tests for continuous 
variables and chi-square test for dummy variables. 
4 Results 
We estimate Model (1) to test whether tax services are associated with the likeli-
hood of a restatement lag, and Model (2) to test whether tax services are associat-
ed with the likelihood of a material weakness disclosure. The logistic regression 
results are reported in Table 4. Panel A of Table 4 reports the results for the 
dummy variable of tax services (DTAXFEES). These results indicate that in each 
model specification (REST_LAG, MW404, MW404FIRST), the indicator variable 
for tax-related fees is insignificant, suggesting that tax services being provided by 
incumbent audit firms is not associated with audit quality. 
Panel B of Table 4 reports the results for the continuous variable TAXFEES, 
which represents the magnitude of tax-related fees.  Columns (1) and (4) indicate 
that tax-related fees are not associated with restatement lags. However, TAXFEES 
is marginally significantly associated with lower likelihood of material weakness 
disclosures in the sample that includes only the first restated years [column (5)]. 
Moreover, higher tax-related fees are negatively associated with the likelihood of 
first time material weakness disclosures [columns (3) and (6)]. 
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Panel C of Table 4 reports the results for the variable tax-related fees to total fees 
(TAXFEES_TF). These results show that TAXFEES_TF is not significantly asso-
ciated with the likelihood of restatement lags [columns (1) and (4)]. However, the 
results indicate that the proportion of tax-related fees of total fees is significantly 
and negatively associated (at the 0.05 level) with the likelihood of material weak-
ness disclosures (columns (2), (3), (5), and (6)].  
Panel D of Table 4 shows the results for the ratio of tax-related fees to audit fees. 
TAXFEES_AF is significantly (at the 0.05 level) and positively associated with 
the likelihood of restatement lags, but only in the total sample of misstatements 
[column (1)]. The results in columns (3) and (6) suggest that the likelihood of first 
time material weakness disclosures is lower when tax-related fees are higher. 
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Additionally, we estimate Model (1) and Model (2) for only those companies that 
have paid tax-related fees to their audit firm. That is, we exclude from the sample 
those observations where tax-related fees are zero. The results are reported in Ta-
ble 5. These results indicate that the magnitude of tax-related fees is associated 
with a greater likelihood of restatement lags: TAXFEES is significant at the 0.05 
level [column (4) of Panel A]; TAXFEES_TF is significant at the 0.10 level [col-
umns (1) and (4) of Panel B]; TAXFEES_AF is significant at the 0.05 level [col-
umns (1) and (4) of Panel C]. Moreover, the magnitude of tax-related fees is asso-
ciated with a lower likelihood of material weakness disclosures: TAXFEES is sig-
nificant at the 0.10 level [columns (3), (5), (6) of Panel A]; TAXFEES_TF is sig-
nificant at the 0.10 level [columns (2), (3), (6) of Panel B] and significant at the 
0.05 level [column (5) of Panel B]; TAXFEES_AF is significant at the 0.10 level 
[column (3)]. 
In summary, the current research does uncover some evidence suggesting that 
companies paying higher tax-related fees to their audit firm are more likely to 
have a restatement lag on a misstated financial statement. The results show more 
consistently across different model specifications that tax-related fees are associ-
ated with a lower likelihood of material weakness disclosures. Especially the 
higher proportion of tax fees over total fees or audit fees appears to have a signif-
icant influence on the material weakness disclosures. However, providing tax-
related services does not in itself affect the likelihood of restatement lags or mate-
rial weakness disclosures. Rather it is the magnitude of the fees that counts.   
The results of the control variables indicate that AUDITFEES is significantly and 
negatively (positively) associated with the likelihood of restatement lag (material 
weakness disclosure) in nearly every model specification, which suggests that 
greater audit effort leads to a greater probability that misstatements are restated 
and control problems acknowledged (e.g., Blankley et al. 2012). Surprisingly, the 
dummy variable for Big 4 audit firms is positive (negative) in restatement lag 
(material weakness disclosure) estimations. Auditor change from the previous 
year is negatively (positively) associated with restatement lag (material weakness 
disclosure). The indicator variable LOSS is negatively (positively) associated with 
restatement lags (material weakness disclosures). Moreover, restatement lag (ma-
terial weakness disclosure) is less likely (more likely) if control problems have 
been acknowledged in the previous year (PRIORICW). Other control variables 
have greater variations in their significance levels in different model specifica-
tions. 
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5 Conclusions 
Although SOX (2002) prohibits the provision of most non-audit services by in-
cumbent audit firms, tax services remain allowed because of the potential benefits 
from knowledge spillover. We have empirically examined whether tax-related 
fees paid to the incumbent auditor are associated with the likelihood of 1) re-
statement lag of misstated financial statement and 2) material weakness disclosure 
of misstatement companies. Collectively, our findings suggest that providing tax-
related services does not in itself have a significantly positive or negative impact 
on audit quality. However, the empirical findings of this study provide some evi-
dence that higher levels of tax-related fees are associated with restatement lags, 
and stronger evidence on the association between higher tax-related fees and 
unacknowledged internal control problems. That is, the findings of the current 
study indicate that, among companies with misstatements in financial statements, 
the misstatements and control problems are more likely to remain undiscovered 
during the fiscal year in question when the tax-related fees paid to the audit firm 
are higher. These findings have implications for regulators and company stake-
holders as well as for the audit profession. 
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ABSTRACT We examine the association of Big 4 audit partners’ public-client specialisation with client
companies’ audit quality. Using a sample of NASDAQ OMX companies in Finland, we identify the
audit partner assigned to each public-client engagement. We expect that partners with greater public-
client specialisation provide higher quality auditing, since they have likely developed deep domain-
specific knowledge and a keen sense of the litigation and reputational risks posed by public clients. In
addition, the willingness to resist client pressure likely increases with the number of public clients in the
partner’s portfolio because dependence on any one client diminishes, which should help to ensure audit
quality. The results show that public-client specialisation is negatively associated with abnormal
accruals, and this result is attributable to audit partners with three to six public clients. The results of
supplemental tests imply that public-client specialisation is more important when general auditing
experience is lower. Further, the results reveal that in our setting of high-tax and high alignment
between financial reporting and tax reporting, greater public-client specialisation is particularly
associated with smaller income-decreasing abnormal accruals, suggesting that auditors with greater
public-client specialisation likely recognise the downside reputational implications and achieve audit
quality by discouraging tax avoidance.
1. Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to examine how the extent of audit partners’ specialisation in public
clients is associated with abnormal accruals, a proxy for client companies’ audit quality.1 Prior
research has provided extensive evidence of the effects of audit firm or local audit office-level
characteristics on both audit quality (Balsam, Krishnan, & Yang, 2003; Krishnan, 2005; Reichelt
& Wang, 2010; Reynolds & Francis, 2001) and audit fees (Craswell, Francis, & Taylor, 1995;
Ferguson, Francis, & Stokes, 2003). However, the empirical evidence on how individual audit
partner specialisation affects client financial reporting outcomes is limited due to the widespread
lack of audit partner signature on audit reports, which enables identification of individual partners
with specific client engagements. Chin and Chi (2009) and Chi and Chin (2011) examine the
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1Abnormal accruals reflect the quality, or lack thereof, of reported earnings. Reported earnings are the output of the finan-
cial reporting and the audit process, and thus represent a signal of actual audit quality since the audit process affects the
client’s audited financial statements (Becker et al., 1998; Francis, 2011).
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effects of audit partner industry expertise and audit quality, whereas Zerni (2012) focuses on audit
partner specialisation and audit fees. The current study extends this prior literature by examining
how the extent of audit partners’ public-client specialisation is associated with abnormal accruals.
Recent literature suggests that it may be more informative to focus on office (Ferguson et al.,
2003; Francis, Reichelt, & Wang, 2005; Francis, Stokes, & Anderson, 1999; Reichelt & Wang,
2010; Reynolds & Francis, 2001) and audit partner level characteristics (Chi & Chin, 2011; Chin
& Chi, 2009; Zerni, 2012) than on overall audit firm-level analyses. More specifically, auditor
expertise is tied to the deep knowledge of individual professionals and at least partly this knowledge
cannot be captured and distributed by the firm to other offices (Ferguson et al., 2003) or even to
other partners (Chi & Chin, 2011; Zerni, 2012). Because signing partners plan and implement
the audit and ultimately determine the type of audit report to be issued to the client (Ferguson
et al., 2003), it is logical to assume that the characteristics of these individuals have a substantial
effect on the quality of the audit engagement (Chin & Chi, 2009). In addition, signing the public
audit report increases the risk of personal reputation loss in case of an audit failure, and hence
might work as an incentive for performing high-quality auditing (Chi & Chin, 2011).
Prior research suggests that domain-specific knowledge is an important determinant of exper-
tise, and this kind of knowledge can be acquired through the repetition of similar tasks, i.e.
specialisation (Bonner & Walker, 1994; Solomon, Shields, & Whittington, 1999; Thibodeau,
2003; Zerni, 2012). Prior research has mainly investigated auditors’ specialisation in different
industries, and audit partner industry specialisation is positively associated with audit quality
(Chi & Chin, 2011; Chin & Chi, 2009). Specialisation in public companies is another means
to gain domain-specific knowledge (Zerni, 2012). Auditing public clients requires specialised
knowledge concerning financial reporting (international financial reporting standards (IFRS))
and auditing requirements. In addition to the enhanced expertise achieved through public-
client specialisation, the willingness to resist client pressure is likely to increase with the
number of public clients in the partner’s portfolio as the partner’s dependence on any one
client diminishes, which should help to ensure audit quality (Johnstone, Sutton, & Warfield,
2001). Zerni (2012) finds that both industry specialisation and specialisation in public companies
are associated with higher audit fees. His findings suggest that auditors with greater public-client
specialisation put more effort into performing the audit and/or that they are valued by financial
statement users and corporate insiders – implying higher perceived audit quality. However,
prior research has not investigated whether public-client specialisation is associated with
actual audit outcomes that are indicative of higher quality. Building on Chin and Chi (2009),
Zerni (2012) and Chi and Chin (2011), we examine the relationship between the extent of indi-
vidual Big 4 audit partner’s public-client specialisation and the absolute value of client abnormal
working capital accruals (WCA), a proxy for actual audit quality. Specifically, we predict lower
absolute abnormal accruals for clients having partners with greater public-client specialisation
compared to those with lesser public-client specialisation.
To conduct our analyses, we use a sample of 420 company-year observations from the
NASDAQ OMX Exchange in Finland. We track the identities of audit partners assigned to
public-client engagements,2 and link the partner’s identity with client financial statement data.
Thus, we are able to examine the association between the extent of audit partners’ public-client
specialisation and abnormal accruals. Our primary analyses show a significant negative association
between greater public-client specialisation and absolute abnormal WCA.
2Audit partner signatures have been available in EUmember states since the implementation of the Directive on Statutory
Audit (Council of the European Union, 2006 (2006/43/EC)). However, Finland has a long tradition of publishing audit
partner signatures in the annual reports.
2 K. Ittonen et al.
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We also explore the extent of public-client specialisation that may be optimal versus poten-
tially dysfunctional. On one hand, audit quality is likely to improve with the number of public-
clients in the partner’s portfolio as both the partner’s expertise and independence is likely to be
increased. In contrast, and analogous to studies on busy directors (Beasley, 1996; Core, Holthau-
sen, & Larcker, 1999; Fich & Shivdasani, 2006), it is possible that having too many public
clients at some point may lead to overcommitted audit partners, which could threaten audit
quality. To investigate these possibilities, we analyse the linearity of the association between
public-client specialisation and abnormal accruals. We find that the negative association
between public-client specialisation and abnormal accruals only occurs for partners with three
to six public clients; this association is not evident for partners with seven or more public
clients. Thus, a moderate level of public-client specialisation appears optimal, and the busyness
that goes with having a high level of public-client specialisation appears to mitigate the knowl-
edge and independence benefits associated with this type of specialisation.
In supplemental analyses, we examine whether public-client specialisation reduces the poten-
tially negative association between shorter audit experience and audit quality. We re-estimate
our primary hypothesis testing model and include an interaction term of public-client specialis-
ation and experience. The results show a significant and positive interaction of public-client
specialisation and experience, implying that public-client specialisation compensates for poten-
tial lower audit quality of less experienced auditors. We also split the sample into higher versus
lower experience groups, and find that public-specialisation is significantly and negatively
associated with abnormal accruals in the below-median experience sub-sample, but insignificant
in the above-median experience sub-sample. Therefore, public-client specialisation appears to
be most important for less experienced partners.
Finally, we investigate the association between public-client specialisation and abnormal
accruals separately for income-increasing and income-decreasing sub-samples. Income-
increasing accruals are usually considered as the primary signal of earnings management, but
some prior research (Collins & Hribar, 2000; Peasnell, Pope, & Young, 2005) show that incen-
tives and opportunities for income-decreasing accruals exist, for example when managers desire
to mitigate the magnitude of a positive earnings surprise. In addition, Shackelford and Shevlin
(2001) illustrate that managers also may seek to decrease earnings in order to minimise taxation,
especially in high-tax countries. Further, Van Tendeloo and Vanstraelen (2008) show that Big 4
auditors constrain earnings management in countries with a high alignment between financial
reporting and tax accounting because the probability that an audit failure is detected is larger
when tax authorities have higher interest. Tax-driven choices of accounting policies in unconso-
lidated financial statements might ‘flow through’ to consolidated financial statements because of
administrative convenience or because tax authorities expect such conformity (Gee, Haller, &
Nobes, 2010). With respect to the tax authorities’ expectations, it is important to note that in
Finland the taxes of listed companies and their subsidiaries are administered and audited by a
special unit for taxation of consolidated corporations. To conclude, in our setting with high-
tax and high alignment between financial reporting and tax accounting, the tax authorities are
likely to monitor aggressive tax minimisation strategies of consolidated corporations and thus
the group auditors with greater public-client specialisation likely recognise the downside repu-
tational implications of client misreporting and achieve audit quality by discouraging aggressive
tax avoidance. The results reveal that companies audited by partners with greater public-client
specialisation have significantly smaller income-decreasing abnormal accruals. Thus, in addition
to providing the insight that audit partner public-client specialisation is associated with
improved audit quality, this study further contributes to the literature by revealing the extent
of public-client specialisation that appears to be optimal, and the nature of earnings management
that is mitigated by partner public-client specialisation.
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The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. The next section develops our hypothesis.
The following sections present research methods and describe results. The final section first pre-
sents limitations of the analyses and then discusses conclusions.
2. Background and Hypothesis Development
2.1. Literature on Audit Quality
Until recently, research on audit quality has mainly focused on examining audit firm character-
istics and their impact on audit engagements (Balsam et al., 2003; Becker, DeFond, Jiambalvo,
& Subramanyam, 1998; Francis & Krishnan, 1999). Considering portfolios at the audit-firm
level, DeAngelo (1981) shows that the diversified client portfolios of large audit firms are
less dependent on the outcome of any individual client relationship, which should be associated
with higher audit quality. Studies on industry specialisation at the national level indicate that
clients audited by industry-specialist audit firms have higher earnings quality than clients
audited by non-specialists (Balsam et al., 2003; Krishnan, 2003).
More recent research demonstrates the importance of local office-level audit firm characteristics
in determining both audit quality (usually proxied by measures of conservative financial reporting
or abnormal accruals) and audit fees (Francis, Richard, & Vanstraelen, 2005; Francis & Yu, 2009;
Krishnan, 2005; Reichelt &Wang, 2010; Reynolds & Francis, 2001). This office-level perspective
suggests that expertise and knowledge within the audit office are difficult to capture and distribute
by the firm to other offices (Ferguson et al., 2003; Johnstone, Li, & Luo, in press).
We extend this prior research by examining individual audit partner characteristics at the audit
partner portfolio level, as suggested by DeFond and Francis (2005). Auditor expertise is tied to
the deep knowledge of individual professionals and it is difficult to distribute this knowledge to
other partners (Chi & Chin, 2011; Zerni, 2012). Because signing partners plan and implement
the audit and ultimately determine the type of audit report to be issued to the client (Ferguson
et al., 2003), it is logical to assume that these engagement partners have a substantial effect
on audit quality (Chin & Chi, 2009). In addition, signing the public audit report leads to an
increase in the risk of personal reputation loss in case of an audit failure (Chi & Chin, 2011)
or attention from taxing authorities (Van Tendeloo & Vanstraelen, 2008). Following the Euro-
pean Union’s (EU’s) 8th directive (2006/43/EC) requiring the disclosure of engagement partner
identity and a Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB, 2009) release on requir-
ing individual partner signatures, Zerni (2012) notes that these initiatives also demonstrate that
the quality of public-client audits rests to a large extent on the input of individual auditors exer-
cising their own professional judgement.
2.2. Public-Client Specialisation
Underlying audit task knowledge develops early, including both explicit and tacit knowledge,
and is an important determinant of audit task performance (Libby & Luft, 1993). As the
auditor specialises in certain domains, domain-specific expertise grows (Bonner & Walker,
1994; Solomon et al., 1999; Thibodeau, 2003; Zerni, 2012). More specialised individuals
have generally acquired their expertise through relevant experience, education and training,
and consequently they are expected to have the ability to outperform less specialised individuals
in their domain (Bedard, 1989; Bedard & Chi, 1993). Over time, the auditor establishes personal
and professional contacts in the business community, which enables networking across individ-
uals through repeated interactions (Borgatti & Cross, 2003). These interactions yield enhance-
ments in the acquisition of domain-specific knowledge.
4 K. Ittonen et al.
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As the auditor gains further experience, the likelihood increases that the auditor will work on
engagements within a given domain. Ultimately, over time and with experience, the auditor
develops an understanding of commonalities and shared risks/opportunities among clients in a
given domain, which constitutes individual auditor-level domain-specific knowledge. This
type of domain-specific auditing knowledge is associated with superior performance (Jamal &
Tan, 2001; Libby & Tan, 1994; Ramsay, 1994). In terms of resolving difficult financial reporting
issues, Johnstone, Bedard, and Biggs (2002) show that auditors with greater specialised knowl-
edge about how to resolve a complex financial reporting issue generate a greater number and
monetary range of alternatives for evaluation as they prepare to negotiate with an aggressive
client. Brown and Johnstone (2009) find that auditors with higher levels of negotiation experi-
ence are better able to negotiate a relatively more conservative financial reporting outcome, even
when the client initially prefers an aggressive financial reporting outcome. Specialised auditors
possess characteristics that enable them to achieve higher quality auditing and financial report-
ing outcomes. Taken together, this line of research suggests that specialisation is a critical deter-
minant of developing expertise in a particular subject matter.3
Prior research has mainly investigated auditors’ specialisation in different industries (Balsam
et al., 2003; Chi & Chin, 2011; Chin & Chi, 2009; Ferguson et al., 2003; Francis et al., 2005;
Krishnan, 2003, 2005; Reichelt and Wang, 2010). Examining industry specialisation at the
audit partner level, Chin and Chi (2009) find that differences in restatement likelihood due to
industry expertise are mainly attributable to the partner-level experts rather than firm-level
experts. In addition, Chi and Chin (2011) report that individual audit partner industry expertise,
together with audit firm industry specialisation, increase audit quality.
Another means to differentiate audit service is through specialisation in public versus private
companies. It is logical to assume that the auditor’s specialised knowledge of auditing public
clients increases with the number of public clients audited. Auditing large, complex, high-
profile clients is likely to require a great deal of auditor expertise (Zerni, 2012). Public clients
require specialised knowledge concerning financial reporting and the associated auditing
requirements mandated by government and trading exchanges. It is reasonable that public-
client specialists possess the required domain-specific knowledge, which results in a higher
level of expertise and higher audit quality. Moreover, auditing listed clients requires an in-
depth understanding of the litigation risks that such clients represent to individual audit partners
and their audit firms as a whole. Public-client specialists bear the litigation and reputational risks
related to auditing listed companies, which receive a great deal of media and regulatory attention
(Zerni, 2012). Thus, partners with high levels of public-client specialisation are likely high-
profile leaders of their respective offices and audit firms, and, in addition, have valuable reputa-
tional capital at stake, which should encourage them to ensure that their clients present the
highest quality financial statements. Further, the willingness to resist client pressure is likely
3We recognise that experience, knowledge, and specialisation are distinct, but related concepts, both conceptually and
empirically. Experience involves ‘the learning of action-outcome connections . . . learning occurs through outcome feed-
back’ (Einhorn & Hogarth, 1981, p. 78). ‘Of great importance to the issue of learning from experience is the role of
awareness of the task factors that can influence outcomes’ (Einhorn & Hogarth, 1981, p. 79.) Knowledge ‘is generally
rich in content and complex in form. It includes appearance, function, relation to other objects, and any other property of
the object that can be deduced from our general knowledge of the world’ (Tversky, 1977, p. 329). Libby and Luft (1993)
help explain how repeated experiences affect knowledge development, noting that ‘ . . . the content and the organization
of knowledge can be changed by decision makers’ learning opportunities’ (p. 428). Expertise develops through repeated
experiences and the associated development of knowledge (Bedard & Chi, 1993; Nelson, Libby, & Bonner, 1995). And
according to Craswell et al. (1995), ‘specialized industry knowledge is thus a component of auditor expertise in addition
to the general knowledge base required for all audits’ (p. 301). Industry specialisation is associated with product differ-
entiation and fee premia (Craswell et al., 1995).
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to increase with the number of public clients in the partner’s portfolio as the partner’s depen-
dence on any one client diminishes, which should help to ensure audit quality (Johnstone
et al., 2001). Therefore, public-client specialisation may positively affect audit quality
because it assists in enhancing auditor independence.
Zerni (2012) finds that both industry specialisation and specialisation in public companies are
associated with higher audit fees, suggestive of higher perceived audit quality. Chin and Chi
(2009) and Chi and Chin (2011) document the association between industry specialisation
and actual audit quality. Prior research has not, however, examined whether the public-client
specialisation actually results in higher quality audit outcomes, i.e. higher quality financial
reporting of client companies. We extend Zerni (2012) by investigating whether public-client
specialisation is associated with a financial reporting measure that proxies for actual audit
quality, abnormal WCA.
Based on this discussion, our expectation is that auditors with a greater extent of specialisation
in auditing public clients will be associated with higher quality audits:
H1: Audit partner public-client specialisation is negatively associated with the absolute
value of client abnormal WCA.
A factor that may potentially mitigate the impact of specialisation on audit quality is audit
partner over-commitment. For example, while we hypothesise that public-client specialisation
will enhance audit quality, having too many public clients may at some point lead to overcom-
mitted audit partners who do not have time to focus on all clients. Of course, it is difficult to
predict how many is ‘too many’ public clients. Prior research on busy board members shows
that companies with busy directors have weaker performance and corporate governance
(Beasley, 1996; Core et al., 1999; Fich & Shivdasani, 2006). Based on this discussion, we
propose the following research question:
Research Question 1: Is there a point at which the audit quality benefits associated with
public-client specialisation are mitigated due to over-commitment?
3. Method
3.1. Data
Our sample includes publicly listed companies of the NASDAQ OMX Helsinki exchange in
Finland covering fiscal years 2006–2010.4 The NASDAQ OMX exchange provides an expedi-
ent environment for studying public-client specialisation because audit partners are required to
personally sign the audit reports on behalf of the audit firm, and thus, can be identified for each
client company. This is in contrast with, for example, the USA, where only the name of the audit
firm is public information.
Table 1 describes the sample selection. First, to construct our research variable we search all
NASDAQOMXHelsinki listed companies during years 2005–2010, yielding 793 engagements.
We remove observations for companies traded in First North Finland, companies for which
auditor information is unavailable, and companies with a foreign auditor. This yields 779
engagements for which we are able to identify the signing auditor (the engagement partner)
after locating and reviewing the audit opinions included in the annual reports. In constructing
the final sample, we exclude banks, insurance companies, and other financial companies (Stan-
dard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes 6000–6900) due to their unique regulations. To avoid
4As of 1 January 2005 all listed companies are required to follow the IFRS.
6 K. Ittonen et al.
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potential audit quality differences based on audit firm size, we exclude clients of non-Big 4 audit
firms. In addition, we exclude the few rare observations with joint audits, where engagement
partners from two audit firms have signed the audit report, again to avoid potential audit
quality differences across audit firms. After removing the observations with missing data on
our dependent and independent variables, the sample includes 478 observations. Since our
public-client specialisation variables are determined based on the number of public clients in
the previous fiscal year,5 the first year included in the sample is the year 2006. Our final
sample includes 420 company-year observations. The financial statement data are obtained
from the Thomson Financial Worldscope database.
3.2. Model Specifications
Our empirical tests focus on the association between public-client specialisation and abnormal
WCA, which is a proxy for actual audit quality. The abnormal part of WCA is defined as the
difference between actual WCA and expected WCA. WCA are calculated as the change in
current assets (less the change in cash and cash equivalents) minus the change in current liabil-
ities (less the change in short-term debt and current portion of long-term debt). In determining
the expected part of WCA, we use the DeFond and Park (2001) model:
ExpectedWCA = Sales x WCAt−1
Salest−1
( )
. (1)
Following prior audit studies using non-US data (Carey & Simnett, 2006; Francis et al., 2009;
Francis & Wang, 2008; Maijoor & Vanstraelen, 2006; Zerni, Haapama¨ki, Ja¨rvinen, & Niemi,
Table 1. Sample selection
Fiscal year ended 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Total
Companies (listed on NASDAQ OMX Helsinki) 136 136 135 131 129 126 793
Less companies traded in First North Finland 0 1 2 2 2 2 9
¼ 136 135 133 129 127 124 784
Less companies with auditor information not
available
2 0 0 0 1 0 3
¼ 134 135 133 129 126 124 781
Less companies with a foreign auditor 0 0 0 1 1 0 2
¼ Companies with identified audit partner 134 135 133 128 125 124 779
Less observations with fiscal year length six months 1 2 0 0 0 0 3
¼ 133 133 133 128 125 124 776
Less financial companies (SIC Codes 6XXX) 13 13 13 13 14 13 79
¼ 120 120 120 115 111 111 697
Less companies with non-Big4 audit firm 8 9 8 8 6 4 43
¼ 112 111 112 107 105 107 654
Less companies with two audit firms (joint audits) 2 2 2 0 0 0 6
¼ 110 109 110 107 105 107 648
Less observations with missing data 52 36 28 20 16 18 170
¼ 58 73 82 87 89 89 478
Less observations from fiscal year 2005 58 0 0 0 0 0 58
Final sample of companies used in the analyses 0 73 82 87 89 89 420
5We employ the previous year’s number of public clients in order to capture the public-client specialisation at the begin-
ning of a company-year.
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2012), we employ the DeFond and Park (2001) model because the Jones (1991) model and its
modifications may underperform when the industry samples are small (Francis et al., 2009;
Peek, Meuwissen, Moers, & Vanstraelen, 2013; Zerni et al., 2012).
To examine whether audit partner public-client specialisation is associated with audit quality,
we estimate the following fixed effects panel regression:
|ABWCA| = a+ public-client specialisation+ b1LOGEXP+ b2INDSPEC
+ b3LOGASSETS+ b4GROWTH+ b5PB+ b6LEVERAGE
+ b7INV+ b8LOSS+ b9OCF+ b10AC+ b11LAGWCA
+ b12STDSALES+ fixed effects+ 1,
(2)
where ABWCA is the abnormal working capital accruals (ABWCA) calculated as actual WCA
minus expected WCA, scaled by lagged total assets. The absolute values of ABWCA are used to
capture both income-increasing and income-decreasing ABWCA. Larger values of |ABWCA|
suggest lower actual audit quality. Observations with extreme values are dropped, that is, if
the absolute value of ABWCA scaled by lagged total assets is above one. See variable definitions
in Table 2.
Table 2. Variable definitions
Variable Definition
|ABWCA| Absolute value of the abnormal WCA calculated as actual WCA minus expected WCA
based on the model by DeFond and Park (2001).
PUBS The number of public clients for which the engagement partner signs the audit report in
the previous year. In cases for which two partners sign the audit report, the number of
public clients is measured for the partner with greater specialisation.
PUBS ≥ 3 One if the number of public clients in previous year is greater than or equal to three,
zero otherwise.
3 , PUBS , 6 One if the number of public clients in previous year is greater than or equal to three but
less than six, zero otherwise.
PUBS ≥ 6 One if the number of public clients in previous year is greater than or equal to six, zero
otherwise.
LOGEXP The natural logarithm of the number of years since the partner’s Certified Public
Accountant (CPA) examination. In cases for which two partners sign the audit report,
experience is measured for the partner with greater experience.
INDSPEC One if the audit partner audited at least two clients belonging to a particular industry in
year t, zero otherwise.
LOGASSETS The natural logarithm of total assets.
GROWTH The percentage change in sales from previous year.
PB Price-to-book ratio.
LEVERAGE Total debt divided by total assets.
INV Total inventory divided by total assets.
LOSS One if net income is negative, and zero otherwise.
OCF Operating cash flow divided by total assets.
AC One if the company has an audit committee, and zero otherwise.
LAGWCA Lagged working capital accruals scaled by lagged total assets.
STDSALES The standard deviation of sales over the years t–3 to t
AUDITFIRM Audit firm fixed effects (Deloitte, EY, KPMG, and PWC).
YEAR Year fixed effects (2006–2010).
INDUSTRY Two-digit SIC industry classifications.
8 K. Ittonen et al.
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Turning to the independent variables of interest, we use the previous year’s number of public
clients in order to measure public-client specialisation at the beginning of a company-year.6
Public-client specialisation in Model (2) is measured in multiple ways. PUBS is a continuous
variable measured by the number of the audit partner’s public clients in the previous year. In
addition to the continuous variable, we construct dummy variables for public-client specialis-
ation. The appendix provides descriptive information about the number of public clients
audited by partners in our sample. We observe that the average number of public clients per
audit partner is 1.92, and, furthermore, that only 20% of partners audit three or more public
clients. Consequently, we regard as specialists the minority of the engagement partners with
three or more public clients. PUBS ≥ 3 is a dichotomous variable that equals one if the
auditor had at least three public clients in the previous year, and zero otherwise. Moreover,
we consider different levels of public-client specialisation and employ the following dichoto-
mous variables:
. auditors with three to five clients (3≤PUBS , 6) and
. auditors with six or more clients (PUBS ≥ 6) (the top 5% of all auditors auditing listed
companies audit six or more public clients (Appendix)).
Auditors with two or fewer public clients (PUBS ≤ 2), are used as the base. We assume
that the highest level of specialisation is represented in the 5% of auditors who have six
or more clients, followed by the group of about 15% of the audit partners with three to five
clients.
Finally, in the fourth specification, we create dummy variables for the following levels of
specialisation: PUBS ≥ 7, PUBS ¼ 6, PUBS ¼ 5, PUBS ¼ 4, PUBS ¼ 3, and PUBS ¼ 2.
These are compared to the base group PUBS ≤ 1. These variables enable us to test whether
there exists a point at which the audit quality benefits associated with public-client specialisation
are mitigated due to over-commitment.
Based on prior audit quality literature, we include numerous control variables in Model (2).
Kaplan, O’Donnell, and Arel (2008), for example, find that high audit experience reduces the
tendency to rely on information from management. To control for the audit partner’s general
audit experience, we use the natural logarithm of the number of years since the partner’s
CPA examination (LOGEXP) and expect this variable to be negatively associated with
|ABWCA|.7 Prior research suggests that industry specialisation is associated with higher
quality auditing and financial reporting outcomes (Balsam et al., 2003; Chi & Chin, 2011;
Ittonen, Va¨ha¨maa, & Va¨ha¨maa, 2013; Krishnan, 2005; Zerni, 2012). Adapting Zerni (2012),
an audit partner is an industry specialist if the partner audited at least two public clients
6The audit report must be signed by at least one auditor. In 16% of the 420 observations, the audit report is signed by two
engagement partners from the same audit firm. We use the value for the partner with greater specialisation when measur-
ing public-client specialisation, and we use the value for the partner with greater experience when measuring partner
experience. As a sensitivity test, however, we use the average of the partners’ public-client specialisation and inferences
from these tests are essentially the same as those from the main analyses, although the significances are weaker. Based on
interest from one reviewer, we also conducted analyses using the lowest number. We find that the significant results for
our test variable become mainly insignificant using this specification. This makes sense because it seems most logical that
the partner with greater public-client specialisation should be most important from a leadership perspective for the
engagement; it also seems implausible that the effect of the partner with less public-client specialisation/experience
would outweigh the effect of the partner with greater public-client specialisation.
7We use the database provided by the Central Chamber of Commerce to identify the number of years of professional
experience for each auditor. We acknowledge that it would be desirable to control for number of years auditing
public clients, however, this information is not available.
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belonging to industry k in fiscal year t.8 We set a dichotomous variable equal to one if the partner
is an industry specialist, and zero otherwise (INDSPEC). We anticipate a negative association
between INDSPEC and |ABWCA|.
We measure client size using the natural logarithm of total assets, LOGASSETS, and expect
that this variable will be negatively associated with |ABWCA| because large companies tend to
have more stable operations (Zerni et al., 2012). We include growth in sales from the prior year
(GROWTH) and price-to-book (PB) ratio in the model to capture the effect of growth on
accruals behaviour, and expect these variables to be positively associated with |ABWCA|
because growth companies have more incentives to try to meet their earnings benchmarks
(Zerni et al., 2012). LEVERAGE equals total debt to total assets. We do not make a prediction
on this control since there is evidence of a positive association with |ABWCA| (Francis &Wang,
2008), as well as a negative association (Zerni et al., 2012). INV equals inventory to total assets
and is used to control for company complexity. Following previous studies (Ashbaugh-Skaife,
Collins, Kinney, & LaFond, 2008; Ittonen et al., 2013), we expect that INV is positively associ-
ated with |ABWCA|, because in companies with larger proportions of inventory managerial dis-
cretion and estimates have a greater impact on reported earnings. We control for company
performance by including LOSS and OCF in the model. LOSS is a dichotomous variable
measuring whether the company has negative net income, and OCF is operating cash flow to
total assets. We expect that LOSS (OCF) will be positively (negatively) associated with
|ABWCA|, because poor financial performance may induce to manipulate earnings (Francis
& Wang, 2008). AC is a dichotomous variable measuring the existence of an audit committee.9
We expect that this variable will be negatively associated with |ABWCA| because the existence
of an audit committee is likely to improve corporate governance and reduce aggressive earnings
management (Klein, 2002). We also include one year lagged working capital accruals
(LAGWCA) to control for the reversal of accruals, and following (Zerni et al., 2012) we
expect a negative association with |ABWCA|). In addition, we include the standard deviation
of sales over the years t23 to t0 to control for the effect of operating variability on abnormal
accruals (STDSALES), anticipating a positive association between this variable and
|ABWCA| because larger variations in operations may provide greater opportunities for earnings
management (Hribar & Nichols, 2007; Zerni et al., 2012).
We include audit firm fixed effects in Model (2) to control for audit firm-level effects on audit
quality. We also include year fixed effects to control for temporal variation in audit quality and
industry fixed effects to control for industry differences.
3.3. Descriptive Statistics
Table 3 Panel A presents the descriptive statistics. The mean (median) absolute ABWCA,
|ABWCA|, equals 0.103 (0.066). In terms of individual audit partner characteristics, we find
that the company-year observations in our sample have on average (median) a partner with
3.607 (3.000) publicly traded clients, while the mean (median) partner experience (EXPERI-
ENCE) is 19 (20) years, and about 13% of the companies are audited by industry specialist audi-
tors. The mean (median) total assets is 1785 (202) million euros. Mean (median) GROWTH is
8The industry classifications are based on two-digit SIC codes. Zerni (2012) defines industry specialists as those with five
clients in the same industry. Our sample is characterised by smaller industry groups and we observe that only about 13%
of the engagement partners are classified as industry specialists. Our sample includes only 15 company-year observations
audited by engagement partners that have more than two public clients in the same industry.
9‘The Finnish Corporate Governance Code’ recommends that the public companies establish an audit committee. Non-
compliance with the recommendation must be identified and explained in the annual report.
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5.3 (5.2) per cent, and mean (median) PB ratio is 2.262 (1.776). Mean (median) LEVERAGE is
0.246 (0.249), and mean (median) INV is 0.144 (0.133). About 25% of companies have a
current-year LOSS. The mean (median) operating cash flow to total assets (OCF) is 0.075
(0.081). About 49% of companies have an audit committee (AC). Finally, mean (median)
WCA in the previous fiscal year (LAGWCA) is 20.005 (0.001), and mean (median) standard
deviation of sales over the years t23 to t0 (STDSALES) is 0.186 (0.132).
Table 3 Panel B displays Pearson correlation coefficients among selected variables used in the
multivariate analyses. The number of public clients (PUBS), and experience (LOGEXP) are
negatively correlated with |ABWCA|. The highest correlation among the independent variables
is between LOGASSETS and AC (0.523). The variance inflation factors (VIF) do not indicate
problems with multicollinearity among these variables.10
In Table 3 Panel C, we report descriptive statistics based on the number of public clients in the
previous year. Table 3 Panel C shows that mean |ABWCA| is generally decreasing as
the number of public clients audited increases. Audit partner experience is increasing as the
number of public clients audited increases. Finally, industry specialisation is highest for audit
partners auditing five public clients.
4. Results
4.1. Univariate Results
Table 4 reports the univariate results when the sample is partitioned into three groups based on
the extent of public-client specialisation. The results in Panel A show that companies with audit
partners that have three to five public clients have significantly lower |ABWCA| (p ¼ 0.040),
LAGWCA (p ¼ 0.016), and STDSALES (p ¼ 0.003), whereas LOGASSETS (p ¼ 0.016)
and the probability of having an audit committee (p ¼ 0.015) are higher as compared to com-
panies with audit partners that have two or fewer public clients. In terms of audit partner charac-
teristics, partners that have three to five public clients have significantly more overall experience
(LOGEXP) (p ≤ 0.001) and industry specialisation (INDSPEC) (p ¼ 0.001) than auditors that
have two or fewer public clients. Panel B shows that companies with audit partners that have six
or more public clients have significantly lower |ABWCA| (p ¼ 0.016) and marginally lower
LEVERAGE (p ¼ 0.086), but higher LOGASSETS (p ¼ 0.001) and a higher probability of
having an audit committee (p ≤ 0.001) compared to companies audited by auditors with two
or fewer public clients. Panel B also reports that audit partners with six or more public clients
have more overall experience (LOGEXP) (p ≤ 0.001) and are more likely to be industry special-
ists (INDSPEC) (p ¼ 0.011) than auditors with two or fewer public clients. Finally, Panel C
indicates that companies with audit partners that have six or more public clients are more
likely to have audit committees (AC) (p ≤ 0.001) and higher LAGWCA (p ¼ 0.004) than part-
ners with three to five clients.
4.2. Multivariate Results
Table 5 Panel A reports results of estimating Model (2) for the total sample. Statistical signifi-
cances are calculated by clustering the standard errors within companies (Petersen, 2009). The
results using the number of public clients (PUBS) are reported in column (1), the dichotomous
variable PUBS ≥ 3 in column (2), dichotomous variables 3 ≤ PUBS , 6 and PUBS ≥ 6 in
10For example, in one of our main estimations, column (1) of Table 5 Panel A, the highest VIF among these variables is
3.833.
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Table 4. Univariate results
Variable PUBS ≤ 2 3 ≤ PUBS , 6
Difference t-stat. or
X2 and p-value
Panel A: Comparisons between low and moderate levels of public-client specialisation
|ABWCA| 0.121 0.093 2.07 0.040
LOGEXP 2.788 2.997 26.18 ,.001
INDSPEC 0.071 0.191 10.49 0.001
LOGASSETS 19.191 19.705 22.42 0.016
GROWTH 0.043 0.060 20.62 0.534
PB 2.217 2.335 20.59 0.556
LEVERAGE 0.261 0.236 1.35 0.179
INV 0.142 0.140 0.16 0.874
LOSS 0.273 0.243 0.38 0.538
OCF 0.069 0.077 20.64 0.525
AC 0.350 0.485 5.94 0.015
LAGWCA 0.004 20.025 2.43 0.016
STDSALES 0.209 0.155 3.02 0.003
N 183 136
PUBS ≤ 2 PUBS ≥ 6
Difference t-stat. or
X2 and p-value
Panel B: Comparisons between low and high levels of public-client specialisation
|ABWCA| 0.121 0.085 2.43 0.016
LOGEXP 2.788 3.039 27.54 ,.001
INDSPEC 0.071 0.168 6.52 0.011
LOGASSETS 19.191 19.948 23.24 0.001
GROWTH 0.043 0.060 20.48 0.630
PB 2.217 2.245 20.15 0.883
LEVERAGE 0.261 0.230 1.72 0.086
INV 0.142 0.153 20.72 0.471
LOSS 0.273 0.208 1.48 0.224
OCF 0.069 0.085 21.41 0.158
AC 0.350 0.743 40.19 ,.001
LAGWCA 0.004 0.006 20.20 0.838
STDSALES 0.209 0.186 0.75 0.456
N 183 101
3 ≤ PUBS , 6 PUBS ≥ 6
Difference t-stat. or
X2 and p-value
Panel C: Comparisons between moderate and high levels of public-client specialisation
|ABWCA| 0.093 0.085 20.62 0.539
LOGEXP 2.997 3.039 1.56 0.119
INDSPEC 0.191 0.168 0.20 0.652
LOGASSETS 19.705 19.948 1.01 0.313
GROWTH 0.060 0.060 20.02 0.982
PB 2.335 2.245 20.43 0.665
LEVERAGE 0.236 0.230 20.31 0.758
INV 0.140 0.153 0.94 0.347
LOSS 0.243 0.208 0.40 0.529
OCF 0.077 0.085 0.70 0.485
AC 0.485 0.743 15.92 , .001
LAGWCA 20.025 0.006 2.88 0.004
STDSALES 0.155 0.186 1.12 0.264
N 136 101
Notes: The significances are based on the t-test for continuous variables and the chi-square test for dichotomous
variables. All variables are defined in Table 2.
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Table 5. Primary hypothesis testing models
Panel A: Total sample (N 5 420)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
|ABWCA| |ABWCA| |ABWCA| |ABWCA|
Dependent variable Exp. sign Coef. (t-value) Coef. (t-value) Coef. (t-value) Coef. (t-value)
PUBS 2 20.005
(21.47)∗
PUBS ≥ 3 2 20.040
(21.83)∗∗
PUBS:
PUBS ≥ 6 2 20.024
(20.97)
3 ≤ PUBS , 6 2 20.050
(22.21)∗∗
PUBS ≥ 7 2 20.031
(20.94)
PUBS ¼ 6 2 20.037
(21.32)∗
PUBS ¼ 5 2 20.077
(22.66)∗∗∗
PUBS ¼ 4 2 20.041
(21.39)∗
PUBS ¼ 3 2 20.076
(22.61)∗∗∗
PUBS ¼ 2 2 20.022
(21.11)
LOGEXP 2 20.030
(21.34)∗
20.026
(21.19)
20.025
(21.16)
20.020
(20.96)
INDSPEC 2 20.010
(20.41)
20.004
(20.15)
20.005
(20.18)
20.006
(20.25)
LOGASSETS 2 20.015
(22.55)∗∗∗
20.014
(22.56)∗∗∗
20.014
(22.53)∗∗∗
20.014
(22.65)∗∗∗
GROWTH + 0.032
(0.73)
0.033
(0.77)
0.035
(0.82)
0.037
(0.82)
PB + 20.008
(21.95)
20.008
(21.96)
20.008
(21.94)
20.008
(22.04)
LEVERAGE ? 20.112
(21.90)∗
20.118
(22.02)∗∗
20.113
(21.97)∗
20.110
(21.92)∗
INV + 20.236
(21.94)
20.244
(22.04)
20.260
(22.11)
20.267
(22.19)
LOSS + 0.015
(0.70)
0.013
(0.63)
0.012
(0.60)
0.013
(0.64)
OCF 2 20.129
(21.94)∗∗
20.137
(22.08)∗∗
20.139
(22.10)∗∗
20.139
(22.10)∗∗
AC 2 0.021
(0.93)
0.020
(0.92)
0.018
(0.83)
0.019
(0.88)
LAGWCA 2 0.021
(0.15)
0.007
(0.05)
20.001
(20.01)
0.008
(0.05)
STDSALES + 0.129
(2.73)∗∗∗
0.122
(2.66)∗∗∗
0.123
(2.70)∗∗∗
0.125
(2.73)∗∗∗
Audit firm fixed effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry fixed effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Intercept 0.510
(3.34)∗∗∗
0.501
(3.46)∗∗∗
0.494
(3.44)∗∗∗
0.505
(3.53)∗∗∗
Adjusted R2 0.28 0.29 0.30 0.30
(Continued)
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Table 5. Continued
Panel B: Sample of income-increasing ABWCA(N 5 223)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
|ABWCA| |ABWCA| |ABWCA| |ABWCA|
Dependent variable Exp. sign
Coef.
(t-value)
Coef.
(t-value)
Coef.
(t-value)
Coef.
(t-value)
PUBS 2 0.000
(0.08)
PUBS ≥ 3 2 20.025
(21.29)
PUBS:
PUBS ≥ 6 2 20.007
(20.32)
3 ≤ PUBS , 6 2 20.037
(21.84)∗∗
PUBS ≥ 7 2 20.009
(20.25)
PUBS ¼ 6 2 20.011
(20.38)
PUBS ¼ 5 2 20.036
(21.34)∗
PUBS ¼ 4 2 20.024
(20.80)
PUBS ¼ 3 2 20.055
(21.78)∗∗
PUBS ¼ 2 2 20.006
(20.25)
LOGEXP 2 20.005
(20.25)
0.004
(0.23)
0.006
(0.31)
0.006
(0.30)
INDSPEC 2 20.001
(20.04)
0.011
(0.46)
0.009
(0.40)
0.009
(0.35)
LOGASSETS 2 20.007
(21.38)∗
20.006
(21.16)
20.006
(21.05)
20.006
(21.19)
GROWTH + 0.095
(1.86)∗∗
0.090
(1.82)∗∗
0.092
(1.86)∗∗
0.096
(1.81)∗∗
PB + 20.009
(21.98)
20.009
(21.98)
20.009
(21.95)
20.009
(22.02)
LEVERAGE ? 20.025
(20.41)
20.038
(20.63)
20.031
(20.51)
20.034
(20.55)
INV + 20.083
(0.72)
20.086
(20.78)
20.105
(20.92)
20.106
(20.93)
LOSS + 20.041
(21.67)
20.041
(21.68)
20.045
(21.84)
20.042
(21.74)
OCF 2 20.059
(20.43)
20.076
(20.55)
20.084
(20.62)
20.091
(20.66)
AC 2 20.007
(20.39)
20.007
(20.38)
20.009
(20.49)
20.008
(20.42)
LAGWCA 2 20.793
(25.58)∗∗∗
20.802
(25.65)∗∗∗
20.814
(25.77)∗∗∗
20.799
(25.72)∗∗∗
STDSALES + 0.150
(1.63)∗
0.148
(1.60)∗
0.150
(1.61)∗
0.146
(1.48)∗
Audit firm fixed effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry fixed effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Intercept 0.212
(1.96)∗
0.199
(1.82)∗
0.191
(1.78)∗
0.203
(1.91)∗∗
Adjusted R2 0.49 0.49 0.50 0.49
(Continued)
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Table 5. Continued
Panel C: Sample of income-decreasing ABWCA (N 5 197)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
|ABWCA| |ABWCA| |ABWCA| |ABWCA|
Dependent variable Exp. sign
Coef.
(t-value)
Coef.
(t-value)
Coef.
(t-value)
Coef.
(t-value)
PUBS 2 20.006
(21.45)∗
PUBS ≥ 3 2 20.042
(21.57)∗
PUBS:
PUBS ≥ 6 2 20.037
(21.17)
3 ≤ PUBS , 6 2 20.046
(21.77)∗∗
PUBS ≥ 7 2 20.042
(21.08)
PUBS ¼ 6 2 20.067
(21.78)∗∗
PUBS ¼ 5 2 20.064
(21.53)∗
PUBS ¼ 4 2 20.065
(21.94)∗∗
PUBS ¼ 3 2 20.072
(22.12)∗∗
PUBS ¼ 2 2 20.035
(21.42)∗
LOGEXP 2 20.006
(20.19)
20.002
(20.07)
20.002
(20.05)
20.004
(20.10)
INDSPEC 2 0.009
(0.37)
0.016
(0.69)
0.016
(0.69)
0.014
(0.55)
LOGASSETS 2 20.011
(21.37)∗
20.011
(21.37)∗
20.011
(21.37)∗
20.010
(21.19)
GROWTH + 20.029
(20.39)
20.027
(20.38)
20.026
(20.36)
20.026
(20.35)
PB + 0.000
(0.02)
0.000
(0.05)
0.000
(0.05)
0.001
(0.19)
LEVERAGE ? 20.129
(22.46)∗∗
20.130
(22.64)∗∗∗
20.129
(22.63)∗∗∗
20.131
(22.65)∗∗∗
INV + 20.314
(22.68)
20.319
(22.72)
20.323
(22.76)
20.333
(22.91)
LOSS + 0.043
(1.14)
0.040
(1.07)
0.040
(1.07)
0.041
(1.05)
OCF 2 20.069
(20.61)
20.068
(20.59)
20.070
(20.61)
20.075
(20.64)
AC 2 0.022
(0.95)
0.021
(0.98)
0.020
(0.92)
0.017
(0.79)
LAGWCA 2 0.734
(4.47)
0.722
(4.51)
0.716
(4.44)
0.725
(4.24)
STDSALES + 0.091
(2.30)∗∗
0.082
(2.25)∗∗
0.083
(2.27)∗∗
0.089
(2.54)∗∗∗
Audit firm fixed effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry fixed effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Intercept 0.321
(2.08)∗∗
0.319
(2.06)∗∗
0.316
(2.05)∗∗
0.325
(2.15)∗∗
Adjusted R2 0.57 0.58 0.58 0.58
Notes: All variables are defined in Table 2. The following symbols indicate significant effects: ∗ ¼ ,0.10; ∗∗ ¼ ,0.05;
∗∗∗ ¼ ,0.01, with probability levels one-tailed for directional expectations. The reported t-values are based on clustered
standard errors within companies (Petersen, 2009). For simplicity, results for the fixed effects are not reported.
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column (3), and dichotomous variables for the different levels of public clients in column (4). All
probability levels are one-tailed for directional expectations.
The results in column (1) indicate that the number of public clients (PUBS) is marginally sig-
nificantly and negatively associated with |ABWCA| (p ¼ 0.073), implying that companies
audited by partners with greater public-client specialisation have somewhat higher audit
quality. The results in column (2) further indicate that public-client specialisation as proxied
by PUBS ≥ 3 is significantly negatively associated with |ABWCA| (p ¼ 0.035). This finding
suggests that auditors who have three or more public-clients perform higher quality audits
than auditors with less than three public clients. Column (3) shows that 3 ≤ PUBS , 6 is sig-
nificantly associated with |ABWCA| (p ¼ 0.015), whereas the coefficient on PUBS ≥ 6 is insig-
nificant. This finding implies that the association is robust for audit partners with three to five
public clients. Overall, these results suggest that there is a positive relationship between
public-client specialisation and audit quality, supporting H1.
Column (4) provides more detailed information about the different levels of specialisation.
The results indicate significantly less abnormal accruals for companies audited by partners
with three to six public clients. Regarding Research Question 1, these results imply that there
is, indeed, a point at which a partner becomes so ‘busy’ auditing public clients that the audit
quality benefits of public-client specialisation are mitigated. That point seems to be when a
partner has more than six public clients.
In terms of the economic significance of our results, the results in column (2) imply that com-
panies with partners that audit greater than or equal to three public clients have (on average)
about 39% lower ABWCA than companies with auditors having less than three public clients.
The results for our control variables in column (1) indicate that STDSALES (p ¼ 0.004) is posi-
tively associated with |ABWCA|. LOGEXP is marginally negatively associated with |ABWCA|
(p ¼ 0.093), suggesting that companies audited by partners with more general audit experience
have higher audit quality. LOGASSETS (p ¼ 0.006), LEVERAGE (p ¼ 0.060), and OCF (p ¼
0.028) are negatively associated with |ABWCA|. In general, our control variables perform simi-
larly across the different estimations.
In Table 5 Panels B and C, we split the sample into two sub-samples based on whether the abnor-
mal accruals are greater than zero (income-increasing abnormal accruals, ABWCA . 0) or less than
zero (income-decreasing abnormal accruals, ABWCA , 0), respectively. In Panel B columns (1)
and (2), the association between public-client specialisation and income-increasing abnormal
accruals is insignificant. In column (3) the negative and significant (p ¼ 0.035) coefficient on the
dichotomous variable 3 ≤ PUBS , 6 indicates that the lower income-increasing ABWCA is
related to audit partners that had three to five public clients. In column (4), PUBS ¼ 3 is negative
and significant (p ¼ 0.039), and PUBS ¼ 5 is marginally negative and significant (p ¼ 0.091).
Panel C columns (1) and (2) indicate that the extent of public-client specialisation is margin-
ally negatively (p ¼ 0.076 and p ¼ 0.060) associated with income-decreasing abnormal
accruals. The results reported in column (3) indicate that companies audited by partners with
three to five public clients have significantly smaller income-decreasing abnormal accruals
(p ¼ 0.040). Moreover, column (4) shows that the association is attributable to companies
audited by partners with two to six public-clients. Taking Table 5 Panels B and C together,
these results suggest that the negative association between public-client specialisation and
|ABWCA| is primarily driven by income-decreasing abnormal accruals.
4.3. Robustness Checks
As a first robustness check, we employ the propensity score matching technique to control for
differences in client characteristics between those that have an audit partner with more versus
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less public-client specialisation (Lawrence, Minutti-Meza, & Zhang, 2011; Lennox, Francis, &
Wang, 2012; Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1983). We match, without replacement, each company with
an audit partner with more public-client specialisation (based on PUBS ≥ 3), with a partner with
less public-client specialisation (two or fewer public clients) that has the closest predicted value
based on the estimated logit model.11 The estimates from that model are reported in Table 6. All
matches are within a maximum distance of 1%. The results show that the decision to hire an
audit partner with greater public-client specialisation is strongly associated with the existence
of an audit committee.
Next, we the use the matched sample of 306 observations and re-estimate model (2). The
results in Table 7 show that PUBS ≥ 3 in column (2), and 3 ≤ PUBS ≤ 5 in column (3) are
negative and significant (p ¼ 0.081 and p ¼ 0.036). Moreover, PUBS ¼ 3, PUBS ¼ 5, and
PUBS ¼ 6 are significantly and negatively associated with |ABWCA| in column (4) (p ¼
0.005 and p ¼ 0.011, and p ¼ 0.098, respectively). The regression results for the income-
increasing and income-decreasing sub-samples (untabulated) indicate that the negative associ-
ation between public-client specialisation and client abnormal accruals is primarily driven by
income-decreasing abnormal accruals. Consequently, the estimations on the matched samples
add credibility to our main findings in Table 5. While matching cannot entirely solve the
problem of endogeneity, it does to some extent alleviate concerns about the issue.
As a second robustness check, we repeat the analyses using alternative proxies for audit part-
ners’ public-client specialisation. First, we measure public-client specialisation based on the
average number of public clients in years t21 and t22 to provide a longer-term average
measure of public-client specialisation. The sample used in these regressions covers the
fiscal years 2007–2010, since we need the information about the number of public clients
from the previous two years. This gives us a sample size of 347 observations. The results
Table 6. Logit regression for modelling the decision to hire an audit
partner with greater public-client specialisation
Dependent variable: PUBS ≥ 3 Coef. Wald x2
Total sample (N ¼ 420)
LOGASSETS 0.015 0.03
LEVERAGE 20.965 1.73
LOSS 0.057 0.04
OCF 0.742 0.42
STATEOWN 0.680 2.39
AC 0.933 12.05∗∗∗
Year fixed effects? Yes
Industry fixed effects? Yes
Intercept 20.159 0.01
Likelihood ratio
x2 57.02
Pr . x2 ,.0001
Note: Industry dummies are based on one digit SIC codes.
∗∗∗ ¼ 0.01, with Probability level one-tailed for directional expectations.
11Adapted from Zerni et al. (2012) the following logit model is used to estimate the probability of employing a public-
client specialist audit partner: Prob(PUBS≥3) ¼ a + b1LOGASSETS + b2LEVERAGE + b3LOSS + b4OCF +
b5STATEOWN + b6AC + annual fixed effects + industry fixed effects + 1. STATEOWN equals one if the
Finnish government has ownership in the company and zero otherwise. Industry fixed effects are based on one-digit
SIC codes. Other variables are described in Table 2.
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Table 7. Robustness tests: propensity score matched sample (N ¼ 306)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
|ABWCA| |ABWCA| |ABWCA| |ABWCA|
Dependent variable
Exp.
sign
Coef.
(t-value)
Coef.
(t-value)
Coef.
(t-value)
Coef.
(t-value)
PUBS 2 20.004
(20.89)
PUBS ≥ 3 2 20.034
(21.41)∗
PUBS:
PUBS ≥ 6 2 20.016
(20.50)
3 ≤ PUBS , 6 2 20.044
(21.82)∗∗
PUBS ≥ 7 2 20.008
(20.18)
PUBS ¼ 6 2 20.043
(21.30)∗
PUBS ¼ 5 2 20.074
(22.34)∗∗
PUBS ¼ 4 2 20.031
(20.92)
PUBS ¼ 3 2 20.085
(22.64)∗∗∗
PUBS ¼ 2 2 20.030
(21.27)
LOGEXP 2 20.041
(21.47)∗
20.033
(21.24)
20.032
(21.22)
20.025
(20.93)
INDSPEC 2 0.005
(0.16)
0.014
(0.45)
0.014
(0.46)
0.008
(0.26)
LOGASSETS 2 20.020
(22.67)∗∗∗
20.021
(22.77)∗∗∗
20.022
(22.84)∗∗∗
20.022
(22.95)∗∗∗
GROWTH + 0.095
(1.83)∗∗
0.091
(1.82)∗∗
0.091
(1.81)∗∗
0.096
(1.82)∗∗
PB + 20.004
(20.71)
20.004
(20.68)
20.004
(20.64)
20.005
(20.76)
LEVERAGE ? 20.177
(22.72)∗∗∗
20.176
(22.82)∗∗∗
20.167
(22.71)∗∗∗
20.166
(22.78)∗∗∗
INV + 20.299
(22.08)
20.304
(22.15)
20.319
(22.18)
20.320
(22.19)
LOSS + 0.034
(1.40)∗
0.034
(1.42)∗
0.033
(1.41)∗
0.037
(1.57)∗
OCF 2 20.181
(22.12)∗∗
20.176
(22.05)∗∗
20.173
(22.01)∗∗
20.170
(21.97)∗∗
AC 2 0.040
(1.57)
0.040
(1.62)
0.039
(1.64)
0.040
(1.71)
LAGWCA 2 0.036
(0.21)
0.024
(0.14)
0.017
(0.10)
0.032
(0.19)
STDSALES + 0.167
(2.89)∗∗∗
0.163
(2.74)∗∗∗
0.164
(2.80)∗∗∗
0.175
(3.08)∗∗∗
Audit firm fixed effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry fixed effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Intercept 0.563
(2.97)∗∗∗
0.564
(3.05)∗∗∗
0.576
(3.13)∗∗∗
0.591
(3.25)∗∗∗
Adjusted R2 0.31 0.32 0.32 0.33
Notes: All variables are defined in Table 2. The following symbols indicate significant effects: ∗ ¼ ,0.10; ∗∗ ¼ ,0.05;
∗∗∗ ¼ ,0.01, with probability levels one-tailed for directional expectations.
The reported t-values are based on clustered standard errors within companies (Petersen, 2009). For simplicity, results for
the fixed effects are not reported.
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(untabulated) support the inferences derived from the main results in Table 5, although the sig-
nificances are weaker. We find that companies audited by partners with greater public-client
specialisation have higher audit quality. In particular, companies audited by partners with on
average three to five public clients have lower |ABWCA| (p ¼ 0.076) than companies
audited by partners with less than three public clients, whereas companies audited by partners
with on average at least six clients do not have significantly lower abnormal accruals than the
control group.
Next, wemeasure public-client specialisation based on the aggregated number of public clients
in years t21 and t22 (results untabulated). First, the coefficient of the continuous variable PUBS
is negative and marginally significant (p ¼ 0.061). Second, a dummy variable PUBS ≥ 512 is
negative and significant at the 0.05 level (p ¼ 0.026). Third, 5 ≤ PUBS , 10 is negative and
significant at the 0.05 level (p ¼ 0.013), whereas PUBS ≥ 1013 is negative and marginally sig-
nificant at the 0.10 level (p ¼ 0.082).
In addition, we conducted a sensitivity test (results not tabled) in which we measured public-
client specialisation as the square root of the sum of partners’ clients’ total assets in the previous
year scaled by largest partner’s total assets. The results from this analysis are, however, statisti-
cally insignificant. This result is perhaps not surprising given that prior research generally shows
that task-specific auditing experience is associated with superior performance. Thus, it is not the
size of the assets audited, but rather the number of client engagements that the partner has been
involved in that appears to be important.
Finally, since we are using panel data, we estimate the main regressions with company fixed
effects instead of industry fixed effects to control for any unobserved heterogeneity across
sample companies. The inferences derived from this analysis are mainly similar to the results
in Table 5, but with lower significance levels. In contrast to Table 5, we find a negative and mar-
ginally significant coefficient on PUBS ≥ 6 in the full sample and a negative and marginally sig-
nificant coefficient on PUBS ≥ 7 in the income-decreasing sub-sample. While the results of the
regressions with company fixed effects support our main findings, we note that company
dummies might cause problems in examining the research question if the public-client special-
isation variables do not vary enough within companies across years and therefore interpretations
must be made with caution.
4.4. Supplemental Tests
Based on previous findings suggesting that auditor experience may affect audit quality (Kaplan
et al., 2008), it could be expected that the importance of public-client specialisation is different
for auditors with lower general audit experience compared to auditors with higher experience.
Therefore, we examine whether public-client specialisation affects the expected negative
association between shorter audit experience and earnings quality. To address this, we estimate
Model (2) after including an interaction term of public-client specialisation and experience
(PUBS∗LOGEXP). The results are reported in column (1) of Table 8. The results indicate
that while public-client specialisation and experience alone are significantly and negatively
associated with abnormal accruals (p ¼ 0.022 and p ¼ 0.020, respectively), the coefficient of
their interaction term is significant and positive (p ¼ 0.059 based on a two-tailed test). This
implies that public-client specialisation compensates for lower audit experience.
12Consistent with our main variable definition, we observe that only the top 20% of partners have five public clients or
more during t21 and t22. Consequently, PUBS≥5 represents the public-client specialisation in this analysis.
13The variable PUBS≥10 represents the top 5% of partners based on the number of public clients during t21 and t22,
and in this analysis they represent the partners with the highest level of public-client specialisation.
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Table 8. Supplemental tests
General auditing experience, public-client specialisation, and |ABWCA|
The interaction
between PUBS
and LOGEXP
The sample partitioned based on audit partner’s general
experience (Mean ¼ 19.298, Median ¼ 20)
(N ¼ 420)
Audit partner experience is
less than 20 years (N ¼ 187)
Audit partner experience is at
least 20 years (N ¼ 233)
Dependent variable
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
|ABWCA| |ABWCA| |ABWCA| |ABWCA|
Exp.
sign
Coef.
(t-value)
Coef.
(t-value)
Coef.
(t-value)
Coef.
(t-value)
Coef.
(t-value)
PUBS 2 20.057
(22.05)∗∗
20.018
(22.18)∗∗
20.001
(20.19)
PUBS ≥ 3 2 20.079
(22.29)∗∗
0.000
(0.00)
LOGEXP 2 20.064
(22.08)∗∗
20.047
(20.83)
20.043
(20.79)
0.064
(0.60)
0.060
(0.55)
PUBS∗LOGEXP ? 0.017
(1.91)∗
INDSPEC 2 20.013
(20.52)
0.030
(0.71)
0.035
(0.85)
20.040
(22.50)∗∗∗
20.041
(22.51)∗∗∗
LOGASSETS 2 20.014
(22.55)∗∗∗
20.022
(22.71)∗∗∗
20.024
(22.86)∗∗∗
20.004
(20.50)
20.004
(20.47)
GROWTH + 0.031
(0.70)
0.034
(0.53)
0.039
(0.64)
20.016
(20.23)
20.015
(20.22)
PB + 20.009
(21.98)
20.016
(23.21)
20.015
(23.14)
0.007
(1.13)
0.007
(1.13)
LEVERAGE ? 20.113
(21.98)∗
20.254
(22.81)∗∗∗
20.257
(23.01)∗∗∗
20.033
(20.47)
20.032
(20.42)
INV + 20.240
(22.03)
20.217
(21.37)
20.245
(21.51)
20.213
(21.73)
20.213
(21.71)
LOSS + 0.014
(0.69)
0.057
(1.53)∗
0.052
(1.49)∗
20.023
(20.84)
20.023
(20.83)
OCF 2 20.126
(21.88)∗∗
0.002
(0.02)
20.012
(20.13)
20.294
(22.95)∗∗∗
20.293
(22.86)∗∗∗
AC 2 0.023
(1.02)
0.038
(1.13)
0.034
(1.02)
20.018
(20.90)
20.019
(20.95)
LAGWCA 2 0.023
(0.17)
20.290
(22.66)∗∗∗
20.318
(22.65)∗∗∗
0.337
(1.75)
0.338
(1.79)
STDSALES + 0.126
(2.68)∗∗∗
0.061
(0.81)
0.047
(0.63)
0.163
(4.62)∗∗∗
0.162
(4.76)∗∗∗
Audit firm fixed
effects?
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry fixed
effects?
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Intercept 0.616
(3.44)∗∗∗
0.804
(3.23)∗∗∗
0.826
(3.24)∗∗∗
20.036
(20.09)
20.033
(20.08)
Adjusted R2 0.29 0.39 0.40 0.36 0.35
Notes: All variables are defined in Table 2. The following symbols indicate significant effects: ∗ ¼ ,0.10; ∗∗ ¼ ,0.05;
∗∗∗ ¼ ,0.01, with probability levels one-tailed for directional expectations. The reported t-values are based on clustered
standard errors within companies (Petersen, 2009). For simplicity, results for the fixed effects are not reported.
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Moreover, we split the sample based on the median of auditor experience (20 years), and sep-
arately estimate Model (2) for the sub-sample of observations where auditor experience is less
than 20 years, and for the sub-sample of observations where auditor experience is greater than or
equal to 20 years. The results in columns (2)–(5) of Table 8 indicate that public-client special-
isation is significantly and negatively associated with abnormal accruals in the below-average
experience sub-sample, but insignificant in the above average experience sub-sample. In sum,
it appears that public-client specialisation has its most important impact on audit quality
when general auditing experience is less than 20 years, but does not have a significant impact
on audit quality when audit experience is higher.14
4.5. Limitations
Prior to discussing our conclusions, we acknowledge certain limitations of the study. First, due to
data limitations, the public-client specialisation variable does not take into account partners’
entire career-long past experience in auditing public clients, public client experience gained
when working on public client audits without signing the audit report, or the time available
for public clients given the number of other (private) clients they have in their portfolio. We
attempt to address the first issue by additionally using the averages and cumulative number of
public clients from the previous two years. In addition, we acknowledge that as a robustness
check it would be interesting to construct a measure of specialisation that takes into account
the individual partner’s entire portfolio of clients, both public and private. For example, two
audit partners with the same number of public clients may still differ in the quality of the
audits they provide because they may differ in terms of their private client portfolio. Measuring
audit partner portfolios to include both public and private clients would be an extremely onerous
task, since e.g. the Orbis database reveals that there are about 180,000 active private companies
in Finland and we would have to manually track the name of the audit partner because it is not
available in the database. Therefore, we opt to use a measure based on public clients only. It
should be noted that the variable measuring audit partner industry specialisation is affected
by data limitations in that we are able to determine industry specialisation based only on the
data of listed companies.
Second, our sample is limited to one geographic region of the world. Replication in a broader
European setting would also be appropriate. For example, it would be interesting to replicate our
study in a European country that has low alignment between financial reporting and tax account-
ing to determine how our results might change regarding income-decreasing abnormal accruals
as the driver of the association between public-client specialisation and audit quality. Third,
abnormal accruals are a noisy measure of audit quality. While prior related research also uses
this measure (Francis et al., 2009; Zerni et al., 2012), future research using more direct audit
quality metrics would be a useful extension. Fourth, it is possible that the regression model
used in this study suffers from self-selection caused by some client characteristics simul-
taneously affecting both the test variables and the dependent variables. We considered control-
ling for self-selection, but were unable to find an exogenous variable that strongly affects the
company’s choice of public-specialist auditors but has no direct effect on abnormal accruals.
Following the conclusions of Larcker and Rusticus (2010) and Lennox et al. (2012), who empha-
sise that implementing selection models without valid instrumental variables can cause extre-
mely fragile inferences, we are unable to control for self-selection. The matching procedures
reported in the robustness checks should alleviate these concerns to some extent.
14Results using cutoffs of 19, 18, 17, and 16 years yield the same inference.
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5. Conclusions
In this paper we empirically examine the association between abnormal accruals and Big 4 audit
engagement partner specialisation in public clients. Based on the literature showing that firm,
office and partner-level specialisation improves audit quality, we hypothesise that audit engage-
ment partners with greater specialisation in public clients have superior knowledge concerning
financial reporting and auditing requirements, and a better understanding of the litigation risks
that such clients present as compared to partners with less public-client specialisation. Conse-
quently, these partners should be able to address the complex financial reporting, regulatory,
and litigation-related issues related to public clients, and thus, outperform non-specialist audit
partners in terms of audit quality. Furthermore, partners with greater public-client specialisation
are likely more willing to resist client pressure because dependence on any one client diminishes
with a larger public-client portfolio.
Our analyses consider the association between audit partner public-client specialisation and
audit quality, proxied by the absolute value of client ABWCA. Extending research on audit
quality at the individual audit partner level, our results reveal a statistically significant negative
association between abnormal accruals and individual audit partner public-client specialisation.
Specifically, companies with partners having greater public-client specialisation have lower
abnormal accruals, and thus higher actual audit quality, compared to companies with partners
having less public-client specialisation. It appears that partners with greater public-client
specialisation seem better able to talk clients away from relatively more aggressive financial
reporting compared to partners with less public-client specialisation. Extending Zerni’s
(2012) findings that clients appear to recognise and value the knowledge that specialised partners
bring to the audit task, thus, implying perceived audit quality, our results suggest that public-
client specialists bring actual audit quality into their audit tasks. In terms of the level of
public-client specialisation that may be optimum, the results show that the association
between specialisation and audit quality is most pronounced for partners with three to six
public clients; thus, there may be a point at which ‘busyness’ becomes an issue.
Moreover, our results suggest that companies audited by partners with greater public-client
specialisation have significantly smaller income-decreasing abnormal accruals. In the Finnish
setting that is characterised by high-tax and high alignment between taxation and financial
reporting, the tax authorities are likely to monitor corporations’ tax minimisation strategies
and thus auditors with greater public-client specialisation appear to recognise the downside repu-
tational implications and achieve audit quality by discouraging tax avoidance. Finally, the
results of supplemental tests suggest that public-client specialisation compensates for potential
lower audit quality of less experienced auditors; public-client specialisation appears to be most
important for less experienced audit partners.
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Appendix
Descriptive data on the number of public-clients of audit partners
Year
Number of signing
partners of listed
companies
Average number
of public clients
per partner
≥2 Public
clients (%)
≥3 Public
clients (%)
≥4 Public
clients (%)
≥5 Public
clients (%)
≥6 Public
clients (%)
2005 90 1.89 38 (42) 18 (20) 10 (11) 6 (7) 3 (3)
2006 89 1.91 37 (42) 17 (19) 10 (11) 7 (8) 4 (4)
2007 86 1.91 38 (44) 18 (21) 8 (9) 5 (6) 3 (3)
2008 80 1.94 35 (44) 15 (19) 10 (13) 6 (8) 5 (6)
2009 76 1.95 35 (46) 16 (21) 9 (12) 5 (7) 4 (5)
2010 74 1.95 32 (43) 16 (22) 9 (12) 6 (8) 4 (5)
Mean 82.5 1.92 36 (44) 17 (20) 9 (11) 6 (7) 4 (5)
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